

CONFIDENTIAL

# NEWS, VIEWS and ISSUES

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12 DECEMBER 1975

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CONFIDENTIAL

# Governmental Affairs

WASHINGTON POST

12 DEC 1975

Stephen S. Rosenfeld

## Causes and Effects

A refreshing question is coming to the fore in public debate over the United States' international embarrassments of recent years. Did what we did, besides drawing criticism and revealing one or another national character flaw, make a real difference? I don't mean a difference in the grand eternal scheme of things or a difference just in our image or self-esteem but a difference in the particular place, where, and at the particular time when, the deed was actually done?

Thus did the New York Times editorialize last Sunday about the Senate intelligence committee's staff report on Chile: "The central fact that emerges is that although the United States did inexcusably interfere in the Chilean political process the United States still was not basically responsible for the overthrow of the Chilean government of President Salvador Allende."

Thus does retired diplomat Lowell Citron write in the last Foreign Policy magazine that journalist Laurence Stern "generally overestimates the centrality of American actions and inactions as decisive factors in the Cyprus imbroglio. Clearly, our diplomatic tactics throughout the crisis were ineffectual in averting and/or ameliorating the disaster. But that disaster was created and worsened by the hubris, treachery, and sheer stupidity of the protagonists."

For what it's worth, I agree with the Times that the United States, though it interfered inexcusably, was not "basically responsible" for the downfall of the inept, divided, minority Allende government, and I disagree with diplomat Citron's contention that American actions and inactions were not "decisive factors" in the Cyprus tragedy.

But these are clearly judgment calls. The encouraging thing is that people are arguing the point. Not only is it a service to truth to try to figure out the effect, as well as the motive and content, of our policies. It is a service to our understanding of ourselves.

In fact, a curious switch between left and right has come about in our approach to this matter of effect.

Previously, even historically, the left held history responsible for most of the good or ill in human affairs. Like Stalin, people of the left easily evoked history to justify arbitrary decisions of their own. The right, though not entirely lacking its own sources of determinism, tended to hold that events could be shaped by men, particularly by leaders.

In its disillusionment with the way the world has been going, however, broad sections of the American left—rejecting determinism as a coward's copout—have

come to impute great powers of decision to the institutions and leaders of states—the better to be able to blame them.

My favorite example is "Inside the Company," ex-CIA agent Philip Agee's expose of his former employer. Relentlessly penitent, he cannot bear to contemplate any misfortune unshaped by the CIA, even attributing to "the Company" the downfall of an early-1960s Ecuadorean president whose alcoholism alone unquestionably provided adequate cause.

So pronounced is the left's inclination to unforgivingly center responsibility on particular people that one conservative observer, Henry Fairlie, writing in the new Commentary, has called for a "Marxist correction" of the left's view—by which Fairlie means that history and the

Los Angeles Times Tues., Dec. 9, 1975.

## Sen. Church Would Slash CIA Covert Wing by 90%

Says If He Were President He would Transfer Such Operations to State Department's Control

BY KENNETH REICH  
Times Political Writer

Sen. Frank Church (D-Ida.), head of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said here Monday that if he were President, he would take the covert operations wing out of the CIA, reduce its personnel by about 90% and put what remained under the State Department.

Church, speaking at a news conference before addressing a Los Angeles World Affairs Council luncheon at the Century Plaza, said he would not do away with covert operations entirely and he said that Portugal was one place where such operations might be undertaken.

But, he said, "If there's any kind of covert action that could be justified, it would be the kind that when our hand is exposed we could say, 'Yes, we are damn proud of it.'"

He said this would be the case if, as in Portugal, the United States was truly enlisted in a struggle for free government rather than in the service of preserving corrupt, despotic right-wing regimes. He said the latter had been the case for most of the last 25 years.

Church's comments about what he would do as President took on added interest because the Idaho senator is openly expressing interest in running for President.

During his two-day visit to Los An-

culture should share the rap.

Meanwhile, back on the right, which is where I would put the center of gravity of American foreign policy these days, the tendency grows to explain defeats and frustrations by reference to the inherent intractability of reality, the cloying denseness of history, the determinative mortgage of the past.

Fifteen years ago in Washington, people thought the world was America's to run, and vast schemes to make men everywhere free and prosperous were launched almost as casually as paper airplanes. But now the thrust of policy is to seek out small limited openings in order to make what progress, or to deter what retrogression, one can.

For myself, I would like to have the truths of both left and right: the left's demand for the accountability of power, the right's respect for the complexity of the medium through which power must move. And I would like to dispense with the defects of both left and right: the left's perverseness in insisting that all problems will yield to the virtue and diligence of good men, the right's weakness for expediency.

A search for the actual effect produced by American policy seems to me an awfully good way to establish that vital balance.

ges to address the World Affairs Council and also a fund-raising dinner of the Anti-Defamation League of B'nai B'rith, Church attended a party for about 135 Democrats interested in his prospective candidacy hosted by Louis and Irma Colen, close friends of Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.).

Mrs. Colen, commenting on the Sunday night affair for Church, told The Times that the 51-year-old, four-term senator had given the group "a very strong indication he was going to run" for the Democratic presidential nomination.

In interviews and the news conference here, all Church would say was that he is going to form an exploratory committee next week, when the investigatory work of his Intelligence Committee is complete, to "determine whether it's possible to put together an organization and gather sufficient money to make it possible for so late an entrant to launch a campaign for the Presidency."

The senator, however, answered enthusiastically when he was asked Monday about what he would do if he were President to exert a tighter, more effective reign over the CIA, FBI and other intelligence agencies.

"Of course, I know a great deal about that," he said. "I suppose I know the most about it and I think that unless a President is fully possessed of that knowledge, it's not

likely that all of these abuses can be eliminated.

"For one thing, I would just take the whole covert operation wing and cut it out of the CIA entirely and diminish it in size to about one-tenth of its present size and place it in the State Department, where it would be subject to the overall policy considerations of our government in connection with the conduct of our foreign affairs.

"As it is (now, in the CIA), it's a self-serving apparatus. It's a bureaucracy which feeds on itself and those involved are constantly sitting around thinking up schemes for (foreign) intervention which will win them promotions and justify further additions to the staff.

"And thus it has grown and grown in the way that most bureaucracies do. And it self-generates interventions that otherwise never would be thought of, let alone authorized."

Later, answering questions from the World Affairs Council luncheon audience of about 550 persons, Church elaborated on what he suggested were hundreds of covert operations staff people in the CIA.

"These are the types that you actually would expect to find—the dare-doer types, the adventuresome types, the people that find their expression in involvement in exciting activities of this kind and sometimes dangerous activities," he said.

"And what are they doing? They are sitting around thinking up schemes for new interventions all over the world and why are they doing it?"

"Because they are professional intervenors. Now, this is how they get promoted. This is how they get decorated . . . And all kinds of plausible schemes are brought to the President. He is told, 'Don't worry about this or that, Mr. President, we can fix it.'"

"And it's a very intoxicating thing if you are President of the United States to think you can fix it because you have the wherewithal, the experts who know how to do the job. The trouble with that is that it ultimately reduces the President of the United States to a kind of a glorified Godfather."

NEW YORK TIMES

10 Dec. 1975

New Year's Resolution

To the Editor:

As we move once more into the season of "Peace on Earth, Good Will to Men," more and more revelations have continued to be made about the evil machinations and shenanigans of the F.B.I. and the C.I.A. Would not our best New Year's resolution for 1976 be to resolve to do away with a national secret police and with this dreadful spying agency?

HERBERT ELIOT FRENCH  
New York, Dec. 4, 1975

## Keeping the CIA strong

The United States intelligence and counter-intelligence apparatus has to remain strong. It will not be weakened through getting rid of abuses, which do not serve the cause of national security in whose name so many have been committed. It must not be weakened through the public ordeal of exposure and reform as the roles of the CIA and other agencies are clarified, their accountability ensured, and their misuse by the administration guarded against.

The case of Chile, for example, shows the need to separate facts from suspicions. Though anti-Allende activities by the CIA have been confirmed, the Senate intelligence committee has decisively denied the suspicion that the CIA played a part in the elected leader's fatal overthrow in 1973.

If there were any doubt about the need for a strong CIA, the growth of the Soviet Union's massive KGB spy system should dispel it. As described in a recent Monitor article by Benjamin Welles, the expansion of the KGB to an estimated 300,000 at home and abroad has been accompanied by close cooperation with spy services it has trained in countries such as Cuba, Hungary, and Romania.

And no representatives of the people are investigating the KGB in the Soviet Union.

But the threat of powerful rivals overseas is not the only reason for maintaining CIA effectiveness. It is also an essential source of advance warning to Washington about crucial events and developments abroad — a continuing flow of information which ideally is coldly analytical and free of political bias.

The CIA's current defensive position — as an object of relentless investigation itself — is already said to have caused some impairment of its functioning. For example, it reportedly has more difficulty gaining cooperation from some foreign intelligence agencies and from some U.S. companies that could provide "cover" for CIA agents.

But according to Seymour Hersh of the New York Times — who called attention to CIA abuses before they were officially investigated — CIA officials feel that all the furor over the agency has "failed to hamper seriously its main function — the collection of worthwhile intelligence."

Such sustained results under fire are a tribute to the basic professionalism on which the CIA has rightly prided itself. The task for the President and Congress is not to destroy but enhance this professionalism as they seek to ensure that it is used for the proper ends.

Christian Science Monitor  
10 December 1975

## Ford yields to House on secrets

By Clayton Jones  
Staff correspondent of  
The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

Two House committees have successfully aimed the threat of contempt citations against two Ford Cabinet members to gain access to U.S. foreign policy information.

This new attempt by Congress to open up executive files and reveal decisions is considered a foretaste of new laws and procedures designed to ensure legislative control over some U.S. overseas actions.

The Ford administration has backed down on two requests for secret information:

- Secretary of Commerce Rogers C. B. Morton agreed to turn over subpoenaed information about U.S. corporation compliance with the Arab boycott of Israel. A House subcommittee withdrew its contempt action against Mr. Morton and pledged to treat the controversial list "in consonance with their asserted confidentiality."

- Two contempt citations were dropped against Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger when the White House allowed member of the House Select Committee on Intelligence to view top-secret documents of U.S. covert intelligence which the committee had subpoenaed.

A third subpoena, however, had not been complied with at this writing and a contempt citation still was possible against Dr. Kissinger. That request was for all U.S. covert operations abroad since 1961 that were requested by the State Department. But support for a contempt vote has weakened as President Ford appears to be compromising on the release of such information.

Mr. Ford offered to identify such operations not by the name of the various intelligence agencies. Executive privilege already had been claimed by the President over the documents but he wishes to head off a contempt citation against the Secretary of State. Such a compromise may be acceptable to the House intelligence unit over the protests of its chairman, Rep. Otis G. Pike (D-N.Y.).

The Pike panel heard legal scholars' opinions Tuesday (Dec. 9) on the role of Congress in overseeing U.S. covert acts.

Legal adviser for the CIA Mitchell Rogovin told the committee that no legal prohibition can be found against the CIA participating in assassinations abroad.

And, said Mr. Rogovin, certain congressional committees have always been told, in general terms, of every U.S. covert act. Those members, he indicated, are at fault for not asking for specific details.

But, asked chairman Pike, "How can Congress ratify covert acts that it cannot be told about?" He suggested new laws giving Congress full access to such secret facts while ensuring the the Central Intelligence Agency and other spy agencies are working from set laws outlining their powers — rather than by precedents of Presidents' actions.

WASHINGTON STAR  
9 DEC 1975

# How the CIA Grew Into a Monster

By Frank Getlein  
Washington Star Staff Writer

If you are as confused as most people are about what the CIA has been doing, what it has been supposed to have been doing and for what purposes it has been doing both, you can do no better than to tune in tonight to a membership week special on WETA-26, "The Rise and Fall of the CIA," a 90-minute show made originally in three half-hour parts by the British commercial television producers, Granada.

The program makes more sense of the perhaps

## TV Preview

deliberately obscured facts about the agency than any attempt so far by our own television, public or commercial.

The British interviewers, who are never seen but are heard asking questions, rely on a large number of ex-agents, some disaffected and even authors of books exposing the agency, others retired but still loyal. Chief of these, the head guide through Langley's labyrinthine ways, is Tom Braden, better known as a philoprogenitive newspaper columnist although, to tell the truth, by the end of the show you wonder how thoroughly Braden has severed his ancient connection.

**ACCORDING TO** Braden and other agents, the CIA grew naturally out of the World War II Office of Strategic Services, changing direction from working against the defeated Germans to working against our partners in victory, the Soviets, not only a remarkable example of secretly turning against one's ally, but an equally remarkable fulfillment of the prophecy on the lips of every captured German officer in the last days of the war.

The agency's first subversive venture against a non-hostile country was a massive parachute drop into Albania to prevent that country from going Communist. It failed because the Russians had Kim Philby working for them in the British equivalent to the CIA and tipped off the Albanians,

who not only went Communist but went violently anti-Soviet Communist, as their next door neighbor, Yugoslavia, already had. The obvious lesson there — that all Communists, Marxists or Socialists are not necessarily Soviet puppets — was either lost on the CIA because its management was too dumb to get the point, or ignored by the CIA as being bad for business.

**MEANWHILE**, the CIA was heavily into radio propaganda through two agencies widely accepted by Americans as being independent and supported by voluntary contributions, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, perhaps the first systematic and for a long time successful effort by the agency to lie to the American people.

From there, the program lucidly lays out the whole history of subverting foreign governments that looked likely to put limits on the activities of American-based multinational corporations, particularly in Iran and British Guyana. The overthrow of the government of Iran was instigated by the British, according to the program, with a view to saving British oil interests from nationalization. With the rightwing Shah installed, 40 percent of the former British contracts went to American firms.

The Bay of Pigs is thoroughly examined and seen, astonishingly, as the springboard to the CIA's protracted, secret and extremely expensive war in Laos. Meanwhile, on the cultural front, the subversion of labor unions and intellectual publications and organizations grew apace.

**WITH ALL** the harrowing record of lies, perjury, murder, drug smuggling, burglary and the rest, the most intriguing single revelation is that for some years the CIA subsidized the American Communist Party publication, "The Daily Worker." Braden explains this plausibly as growing out of the desire to "keep your enemy in position" so that you know what he's thinking. Another explanation is to keep the enemy visible to the

NEW YORK TIMES

7 Dec. 1975

# The C.I.A. in Chile

Revolutions and counter-revolutions inevitably produce political myths. Like all myths that succeed in getting hold of the popular imagination, these legends contain an element of truth; but they also contain large amounts of exaggeration, invention, and imported emotion that is derived from other situations or historical analogies.

The staff report of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has now placed the activities of the United States Government in Chile in recent years in some perspective. The central fact that emerges is that although the United States did inexcusably interfere in the Chilean political process, the United States still was not basically responsible for the overthrow of the Chilean Government of President Salvador Allende. Despite the left-wing myth that this country was the prime mover in that event, the coup was actually conceived and carried out by Chileans, acting for reasons of their own.

It is true that the Central Intelligence Agency on orders from President Nixon became involved in outrageous and futile schemes to block Mr. Allende's election by the Chilean Congress after he had failed to obtain a clear majority in the popular vote in 1970. But, contrary to the widely accepted myth, the C.I.A. did not finance the truckers' strike that preceded Mr. Allende's downfall in 1973. The \$7 million that the C.I.A. spent in Chile from 1970 to 1973 is a derisory sum when measured against the large effects ascribed to the agency by its critics.

The C.I.A.'s interventions did not control events in Chile. In a country with a strong democratic tradition, Mr. Allende, who was elected with the support of only 36 percent of the electorate, did not have a popular mandate to carry out the far-reaching social revolution he envisaged. Ironically, the Moscow-oriented Communist Party recognized this fact and, until the very end, pressed Mr. Allende to reach an accommodation with his Christian Democratic rivals. But he was unable to control other far-left radical elements in his coalition, and at the time of his tragic overthrow, the country seemed to be sliding into civil war.

The United States had no warrant whatsoever to meddle in the internal affairs of Chile. Such attempts to play the ideological and political policeman are usually self-defeating and undermine the ideals of which the United States should be an exemplar. But neither is any good purpose served by exaggerating the importance of the C.I.A.'s bumbling interventions and ascribing to it the moral responsibility for the bloodshed, terror, and loss of freedom that the Chilean armed forces have since imposed on their own people.

NEW YORK TIMES

7 Dec. 1975

## Chile Paper Denies C.I.A. Support

**SANTIAGO, Chile, Dec. 6** (AP) — Chile's most important newspaper chain said today that it "energetically rejects" a United States Senate committee report that the Central Intelligence Agency paid out \$1.6 million to keep it publishing during the era of the late president, Salvador Allende Gossens.

The chain's Santiago newspaper, El Mercurio, said in a front-page editorial that the report by a Senate special committee investigating C.I.A. activities "ventures far beyond reality and is an incredible maneuver to damage the prestige of a news organ and those who direct it."

taxpayers and keep those tax dollars flowing to the half-baked eternal school-boys who ran the spook shop through all its years of glory.

The show is not to be missed by any American with any hope of regaining popular, representative, elected control of the country and its doings in the world.

THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

4 December 1975

# The White House Killers

BY DAVID EISENHOWER

Ordinarily, when you come up against the Kennedy legend and lose, you shrug it off. It rarely occurs to anyone that in such a contest he might win. But when allegations of murder are thrown all over the political lot except at the very people who are most likely to have been implicated with it, it may be worth at least a try at overcoming the invincibility of that Kennedy ethos.

In real terms, this problem comes up as a result of the recent report of Sen. Frank Church's Intelligence Committee. To put the matter as starkly as possible, and also as truthfully as possible, where there is the best evidence that a President of the United States might have known about and sanctioned assassination attempts, the President in question is absolved. Where the evidence is weakest and most attenuated that Presidents were involved, the Church committee uses the strongest language with the most sinister implications. It is unmistakably obvious that the former President is John F. Kennedy and the latter are Dwight Eisenhower and Richard Nixon.

## 'Straightforward Activity'

To take the cases in chronological order, President Eisenhower is accused of involvement in plans to assassinate Patrice Lumumba, a pro-Soviet leader in the Congo before and shortly after its independence from Belgium. The extent of the involvement is that at a meeting of the National Security Council, President Eisenhower is said to have expressed the wish for "straightforward activity" against Lumumba. This recollection comes from one uncorroborated witness. At least three other witnesses of the same meeting did not recall any such order.

A day later, Director of the CIA Allen Dulles is reported to have authorized an attempt on Lumumba, resulting in the transmission of various guns and poisons to the Congo. Six months later, Lumumba died in the hands of his Congolese captors—his death unrelated to a CIA plot, according to the Senate committee itself. On the basis of the one "straightforward activity" remark, the committee draws the "inference" that President Eisenhower authorized an assassination.

On the other hand, the Kennedy brothers are held by the committee to have been unaware of the repeated murder efforts in the Caribbean on the following evidence: There were repeated presidential-level discussions of the Kennedys' displeasure with Castro. As in the Eisenhower-Lumumba case, Sen. Church found references to suggestions for "straightforward activity" against Castro.

However, in what seems to some ears to be stronger language, those discussions also included references to "disposing of Castro." CIA director John McCone recalls that discussions with the Kennedys were even drawn in terms of "knocking

off Castro." CIA aide Richard Bissell recalls that President Kennedy ordered the CIA to "get off its ass" against Castro.

Further, within three weeks of JFK's inauguration, his national security adviser, McGeorge Bundy, was briefed on the development of an "assassination capability" within the CIA. Mr. Bundy supposedly did not order it stopped nor, supposedly, did he tell President Kennedy. Robert Kennedy was informed at least twice about Mafia connections with attempts to kill Castro, without disavowing either and, supposedly, without telling his brother, the President, about them. Robert Kennedy is, in fact, frequently portrayed by the Church com-

*Even when protecting the Kennedys, it is not a laughing matter to throw out inferences of murder into a public forum where the distinctions between "inferences" and facts get blurred.*

mittee as misled by the nature and extent of CIA activities, a proposition which Tom Braden, a Washington columnist with close Kennedy associations and a former Office of Strategic Services man himself, thinks is "impossible to imagine."

All of this activity, the Church committee concludes, shows only that President Kennedy was interested in some kind of "broad strategy" to bring about Cuban democracy.

Moving right along, despite a mountain of evidence of Kennedy's displeasure with the Ngo Dinh Diem regime and undoubted U.S. involvement in the coup against him and his brother Nhu, the Church committee finds the Kennedys absolved because the murders of Diem and Nhu were "spontaneous acts." The assassination of General Trujillo of the Dominican Republic, though plotted with the knowledge of American "personnel" (read "the President, John F. Kennedy") is construed by Church's group as defiance of Kennedy's written statement that assassination is wrong (though not so wrong as to prevent U.S. recognition of Trujillo's assassins should they succeed.)

When the report comes to Richard Nixon, Sen. Church's committee finds "inferences" that President Nixon gave carte blanche to the CIA to kill whoever necessary to keep Allende from power in Chile, and therefore Mr. Nixon should be responsible for the death of General Rene Schneider. General Schneider had been a target for CIA kidnapping, but died in a non-CIA connected kidnapping.

The Church committee is thus giving us more than a double standard. It is saying that where there is clear evidence of re-

sponsibility (the Kennedy cases), even clearer evidence of responsibility is needed to establish an "inference." Where there is extremely vague evidence of responsibility (the Eisenhower and Nixon cases), no more than vague hints are needed.

As I said at the outset, people are used to less than equity when dealing with the Kennedy legend. And, in recent years, politicians have gotten used to throwing around "inferences" pretty casually. But the Church committee's action is a deadly combination of the two. Even when protecting the Kennedys, it is not a laughing matter to throw out inferences of murder into a public forum where the distinctions between "inferences" and facts get blurred. In other words, even to spare the feelings of the Kennedy fans, you should treat accusations of murder similarly in similar cases.

That's what the law is supposed to be about—treating similarly situated people similarly. And respect for the law and for American ideals is supposed to be the reason why the Church committee is washing so much dirty laundry in public. We have to have an open society, reasons Sen. Church, so let it all out, no matter how bad it looks.

## Less Than Meets the Eye?

There are a couple of problems with this posture. One is that we may be letting stuff out that is worse than what really happens. In other words, in the cases of all three Presidents, there is apparently less going on than meets an eye scanning the Church report. A report from an American Senate committee accusing Americans of plotting murder is one thing if it is solidly based. It becomes quite another thing, something more like the most irresponsible kind of partisanship if it is a device aimed at one party by another, using only the most flimsy evidence.

And what good will the report do? We know it has demoralized the CIA. What we cannot know is how foreigners will react to our self-flagellation. Senator Church thinks they will respect our candor. I cannot help but think that this is akin to thinking a rapist will be admired for confessing.

Beyond a few vague pieties about not assassinating people, hedged with more vague words about not barring covert activities, the Church report offers no guidance about how the CIA should be conducting itself, which, after all, is supposed to be the main product of the Church committee. Perhaps that will come with the committee's final report in a few months. In the meantime, is any broader purpose than publicity for politicians being served? It's hard to see what that might be.

Assassination. Just the sound of the word makes one's skin crawl. The committee report calls it "a coldblooded, targeted intentional killing of a political leader." Don't we need far more tangible, convincing proof before we even begin to make such grave charges against Presidents Kennedy or Nixon or my grandfather?

LONDON TIMES  
20 Nov. 1975

John Ehrlichman, one of former President Nixon's closest advisers, tantalizes Washington with a semi-autobiographical novel

## Fiction that tries to be stranger than Watergate fact

From Fred Emery  
Washington, Nov 19

Did a former director of the Central Intelligence Agency, who became an ambassador, blackmail a former President over Watergate-type actions and a Caribbean-linked assassination? Indeed so, at least in a novel that is the talk of Washington before it has even been published.

The reason is that the novel is not by the likes of Mr E. Howard Hunt of "plumbers" notoriety. It is by Mr John Ehrlichman, twice convicted of Watergate crimes perpetrated while he was one of the most powerful men in the land, as President Nixon's adviser on domestic affairs.

That he should write with such verisimilitude of recent events, veiling against libel, but giving a yet more shocking and perhaps, more plausible twist, makes the matter all the more intriguing. Mr Ehrlichman insists that it is all just a novel, assured, of course, of best-seller status. By initial

accounts "there has been nothing like it since the play *Macbird* made President Johnson responsible for the murder of John Kennedy.

With his appeals against convictions pending, Mr Ehrlichman is now in New Mexico, bearded, and reported to be separated from his wife Jeanne, who unflinchingly attended every day of his trials.

The novel was first reported with fascination by Mr William Safire, the former Nixon speechwriter who continues his occasional apology for the deposed President in his column in *The New York Times*. He is perplexed by the close-to-the-bone questions the novel asks, and confesses that there is no knowing how much truth there is in it.

Mr Safire relates that the CIA chief in the book actually carried out in the early sixties an assassination in the Caribbean at the order of a President now dead. Later a President whom the CIA man fears

comes to power, but the CIA man cultivates "a national security adviser with a German accent" who helps to protect the dread secret.

Where Mr Safire is shy of giving away the whole plot, Mr Daniel Schorr of the Columbia Broadcasting System has plunged ahead.

The same day as Mr Safire's column appeared, he broadcast on national television a picture of the novel's flyleaf (*The Company* it is due to be titled) and brazened ahead with the identities of all those we have come to know from the recent power structure.

Mr Schorr also had this vicious scenario: the President wants to use the old assassination report against the dead President's political allies.

The CIA man realizes this will drag him down, too. He confronts the President at a dramatic Camp David meeting. His blackmail: the CIA knows all about the plan for raiding and bugging the opposition political party headquarters,

the White House "plumbers", and the telephone tapping of reporters and staff. He will trade this for the destruction of the CIA Assassination report. The President complies.

The questions being asked in the Washington political community are obvious. Why would Mr Ehrlichman suggest the President had prior knowledge of a bugging break-in? What else did the CIA man have "on" the president, and perhaps others of his staff, that he was so powerful to succeed in this blackmail?

One thing seems clear, at least to Mr Safire. Mr Ehrlichman, who with Mr H. R. Haldeman sought and failed to gain a last-minute pardon from the resigning Mr Nixon, seeks to get his own back on those he might feel abandoned him.

Mr Safire writes: "The author spares nobody... least of all the President. Ehrlichman's 'President Richard Monckton' reflects only the dark side of the leader he followed all his life.

LONDON TIMES  
25 Nov. 1975

## LICENSED TO KILL

Throughout its history the United States has been father to some of the best and the worst in human behaviour. Its leaders and its ordinary citizens have shown themselves capable of the highest idealism and the lowest gangsterism. The Senate report on the CIA displays both elements in a mixture that is uniquely American. On the one hand it presents an extremely disturbing picture of criminal, immoral and inefficient behaviour by agents and institutions of the United States Government. On the other hand it shows another branch of the same government exposing this behaviour, albeit very late in the day, and rendering it much less likely to be repeated in the future. Friends of America can only hope that the benefits deriving from this demonstration of the system's ability to correct its own abuses will outweigh the damage done by the revelation of the abuses themselves.

There is no doubt that the revelations are damaging. The squalid and often laughable antics of some of the crackpots and gangsters who were drawn into the service of American foreign policy (a saddening picture in itself) should not obscure the serious implications of the evidence that earlier American administrations thought they were justified in trying to engineer the assassination of foreign politicians. Counsel for the defence would presumably say that the United States was engaged in a struggle equivalent to a war with a ruthless communist power which would use any methods in pursuit of world domination. Such a struggle it would be naive and unrealistic

to be too scrupulous about methods. Nice guys finish last, as the Americans say. What are the lives of a few unlamented and often fairly villainous foreign leaders in comparison to the free world's interest in preserving American influence around the world?

Counsel for the prosecution could reply roughly as follows. It is true that the deaths of Lumumba and Trujillo evoke few tears and were probably broadly in the American interest. But the death of President Ngo Dinh Diem of South Vietnam solved nothing. If Dr Castro had been assassinated it is far from certain that the United States would have been better off, and the threat which he was thought to pose has since proved much milder than expected, partly because the Russians did something to restrain his attempts to promote revolution in Latin America. As for the death of Dr Allende, which he himself did much to bring about, it has produced a situation which could yet rebound against the United States and has already done its reputation some damage.

In other words, even on the coolest calculation of national interest, and leaving morals aside, assassination is an imprecise weapon which is liable to have unpredictable results, such as the martyrdom of the victim or his replacement by somebody worse. Granting that extreme situations can sometimes demand extreme actions, and that moral absolutes may conflict with political needs, it is highly doubtful whether this particular branch of CIA activity would have been of significant benefit to the United States even if it had been

more efficient and had not been brought to light.

A more substantial argument is that by using such methods the United States damaged and diminished itself at home and abroad. International as well as domestic politics must be subject to some legal and moral order if they are not to degenerate into anarchy. Once a government starts using the methods of the gangster its entire mentality is liable to be corrupted. The Watergate affair was a symptom of corruption deriving from the belief that any methods were justified in what was assumed to be the defence of the American presidency. The activities of the CIA were the result of a belief that any methods were justified in the defence of what were assumed to be American interests abroad. They went longer uncorrected because the checks and balances of the American system are less effective in foreign policy than in domestic affairs.

But American interests do not depend only on nuclear weapons and friendly governments or client states. They depend also on the ability of the United States to convince people that it represents certain values and principles and ways of life that are worth defending. If it uses the same methods as the KGB it will come to be regarded in the same light. Obviously it cannot always appear as a knight in shining armour, and moral posturing in the wrong context can sometimes be as damaging as immorality, but if American power is to survive in the world Americans must think as much of what they are defending as of the means of defence.



NEW YORK TIMES  
6 DEC 1975

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WASHINGTON POST  
7 DEC 1975

## 4 EXPERTS ASSAIL U.S. COVERT ACTION

WASHINGTON, Dec. 5 (AP)—Covert action aimed against foreign governments has damaged the reputation of the United States and should be severely curbed, four authorities on issues of national security said today.

"Many of the problems which beset the intelligence community result from historical slips on the banana peel of covert action," said David A. Phillips, a former Central Intelligence Agency official who was involved in undercover operations.

"Our reputation has been damaged and our capacity for ethical and moral world leadership has been impaired," said Clark M. Clifford, former Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Clifford told the Senate Intelligence Committee it was clear that covert operations have gotten out of hand.

Knowledge about such operations has become so widespread," he said, "that our country has been accused of being responsible for practically every internal difficulty that has occurred in every country in the world."

### Security Need Stressed

Cyrus R. Vance, former Deputy Secretary of Defense, said he believed it should be United States policy to engage in covert actions only when it was "absolutely essential" to the security of the nation.

By covert operations, the witnesses were referring to secret actions taken to influence another country's attitudes and public opinion, including attempts to change the government or course of events. Most of the witnesses did not oppose other intelligence-gathering operations.

However, Morton Halperin, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for National Security Affairs, said all or most of the United States clandestine intelligence-gathering operatives should be called home.

The other witnesses said the capability for such action should be retained. Mr. Phillips said that ending covert operations entirely would be like disbanding the Army in peacetime or "abolishing the office of the President because it has been once abused."

Mr. Clifford and Mr. Vance proposed a complete overhaul of the 1947 National Security Act to make certain that all covert action proposals are considered and approved only at the top level of the executive branch and reviewed in advance of their implementation by a Congressional committee.

### Ex-Ambassadors' Testimony

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 5—The Senate committee's hearing yesterday was largely devoted to statements and testimony from three former United States diplomats involved with Chile: Ralph A. Dungan, Ambassador

between 1964 and 1967; Edward M. Korry, Ambassador between 1967 and 1971, and Charles A. Meyer, who was Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from 1969 to 1973.

Mr. Dungan urged in a statement that the C.I.A.'s clandestine operations apparatus be sharply reduced in size and that its functions be centered more on intelligence gathering.

Mr. Meyer confirmed in brief testimony statements in the report that he was uncomfortable about intervention in Chile's internal affairs.

Mr. Korry angrily charged that Senator Frank Church, chairman of the select committee, and committee staff members had tried to keep him from testifying. He charged that the committee report painted Dr. Allende and the Marxists in Chile in an entirely favorable light, while making the United States representatives appear to be "goons."

He said that this was an inaccurate "rewriting of history." Mr. Korry said he neither approved nor knew of plans to cause a military coup in 1970 and had argued against such an approach.

In a 28-page letter to Senator Church, given to reporters at the hearing, Mr. Korry charged that an article in the Sept. 8 issue of The New York Times had been leaked by a counsel on another subcommittee headed by Senator Church.

The article, the Korry statement said, contained material critical of him.

Mr. Korry's statement continued:

"Do you not find these accusations by your staff, leaked sneaky anonymity without any prior notification, without any communication to me, of any kind, without any opportunity to this date to examine charges or to rebut them, a callous, even criminal abuse of the U.S. judicial process?"

### C.I.A. Called 'Amoral'

Also during his appearance, a brief one devoted mainly to reading parts of his letter, Mr. Korry described the C.I.A. as "amoral."

"It was authorized by Congress to be so," he added. "It was paid to be."

His letter said the agency could "operate behind my back, not merely with the President of the United States, but with Chileans and private Americans, because the whole process of espionage and intelligence, like knowledge, confers immense power, and because the C.I.A. was the one permanent institution to tie the past to the present in the influential and persuasive arena of clandestine political activity."

Nevertheless, Mr. Korry strongly defended the actions of C.I.A. representatives in Chile during his tenure. He said they were fulfilling their "rightful responsibilities and by precedents legitimized by successive Presidents and Congresses."

Mr. Korry charged that Senator Church had covered up real events in Chile.

Was not the cover-up, he asked, "indispensable to your

concoction of a simplistic and monstrous black and white mythology—a legend in which the American bullyboys kicked and cuffed small and innocent Social Democrats because they only wanted control of their resources, and because they only wished to implement some progressive socio-economic programs, and besides, weren't they democratically elected?"

While the committee staff reported that it could establish no direct operational involvement by the C.I.A. or United States Embassy in the 1973 coup, the members agreed during a press briefing today that the United States policy had "created the atmosphere" in Chile for Dr. Allende's removal.

### 1964 Election Influenced

According to the committee staff, the attempts to manipulate the Chilean Government were most intense in 1963 and 1964 and from 1970 to 1973. The staff reported that the United States supplied \$3.4 million to help bring about the election of Eduardo Frei Montalva, a Christian Democrat, as President in 1964, defeating a coalition of Marxist parties. Mr. Frei's party also won control of the Chamber of Deputies.

At the briefing session with reporters today, committee staff members asserted that Mr. Kissinger was the central figure designing United States policy in Chile during the Nixon years. They said that as national security adviser and chairman of the 40 Committee, which authorizes covert operations, he was constantly being pressed by President Nixon to get things done.

The report said the effort to stop Dr. Allende's election began in the spring of 1970. It said that Mr. Korry, who was then Ambassador, submitted a plan to spend \$500,000 to affect the Congressional vote if there was a runoff.

This was rejected on June 27, the committee said, but it added that the 40 Committee, an arm of the National Security Council that is supposed to review all clandestine operations, voted \$300,000 to be used as a "spoiling" operation in the election. The State Department, the report said, opposed this.

The report recalled that after the Allende inauguration, President Nixon said in his 1971 State of the World Message:

"We are prepared to have the kind of relationship with the Chilean Government that it is prepared to have with us."

The report then said:

"Yet, public pronouncements notwithstanding, after Allende's inauguration the 40 Committee approved a total of over \$7 million in covert support to opposition groups in Chile."

It said the money also funded an extensive anti-Allende propaganda campaign.

"The C.I.A. rebuilt its new network of contacts," the report asserted "and remained close to Chilean military officers in order to monitor developments within the armed forces."

## Intelligence Deputy Set At Pentagon

Reuter

The White House has decided to create a new Defense Department post of second deputy defense secretary that will be largely concerned at least initially with intelligence problems, according to informed government officials.

The officials, who asked not to be identified, said the new Defense Secretary, Donald H. Rumsfeld, has decided to promote Robert Ellsworth, the present assistant defense secretary for international security affairs, to the post.

Ellsworth, a former U.S. ambassador to NATO, will report directly to the Defense Secretary and will be on the same level as the present deputy defense secretary, William P. Clements Jr.

The officials also said Rumsfeld has decided to bring in deputy White House press secretary William Greener as the new assistant secretary for public affairs to replace Joseph Laitin, a close associate of former Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger.

NEW YORK TIMES

24 NOV 1975

### C.I.A. Said to Have Links With Azores Secessionists

The Central Intelligence Agency has developed extensive contacts with a group favoring secession for the Portuguese Azores and State Department officials have received representatives of the group, Time magazine has reported in its issue that goes on sale today.

Time said the contacts were set up with the Azorian Liberation Front, which advocates independence for the island group in the Atlantic, despite United States Government claims of "strict noninvolvement" with the separatists.

The C.I.A. purpose, the magazine said, was "occasionally to provide some guidance and share information about developments on the mainland."

"The C.I.A. also wanted to be in a position to help push for secession if Lisbon went Communist," it added.

Time said that representatives were of the Azorian Front had been received by middle-level State Department officials in Washington, although it did not say when.

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PENTHOUSE  
December 1975

BY JOSEPH B. TREASTER

# PHOENIX MURDERS

THE CIA'S PHOENIX PROGRAM WAS DESIGNED TO "NEUTRALIZE" THE VIET CONG LEADERSHIP. INSTEAD, TENS OF THOUSANDS OF VIETNAMESE CIVILIANS WERE KILLED, THE VIET CONG NOW GOVERN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND WILLIAM COLBY, WHO SUPERVISED PHOENIX, IS NOW THE DIRECTOR OF THE CIA.

Back in those difficult days in the White House when the war in Vietnam was getting bigger and seeming more unwinnable every day, it must have looked like such a beautiful plan: get the CIA to pull together all the intelligence people on our side—the South Vietnamese police, the military, everyone who knew anything about the Viet Cong; pinpoint the enemy's political leaders, the men who called the shots; then send in commandos to neatly, surgically take them out of the picture. You risked only a few men. You ripped out the heart of the hated Cong. And the insurgency collapsed from within.

It was simplicity itself. But what became known as "the Phoenix Program" was one of those concepts that did not move gracefully from the drawing board to real life—at least not in the hands of the CIA.

In fact, Phoenix—the CIA's bird that never flew—will probably go down in history as one of the agency's messiest blunders. As it unfolded in the hamlets and villages of Vietnam, Phoenix was a bumbling, slipshod operation, poorly supervised and controlled, shot through with corruption and ineptness—a tragically lethal operation in which tens of thousands of ordinary South Vietnamese civilians were murdered, swept into prisons and, often, horribly tortured. In the end, Phoenix failed completely to even dent the so-called Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI)—the political apparatus whose members are now governing Communist Saigon.

Nothing worked the way the planners of Phoenix had hoped. Precise intelligence on the Viet Cong's political leaders never surfaced; most of the data was sketchy and inaccurate. At best Phoenix "targeted" low-ranking Communist functionaries; at worst the victims were the political or social enemies of the local Saigon government province chief. President Nguyen Van Thieu liked Phoenix (there were charges he used it to dampen

would-be rivals), but many of his subordinates did not. So, the ranks of Operation Phoenix were layered with incompetents and castoffs and, apparently, not a few sadists.

None of the various agencies involved in Phoenix—least of all the CIA—was willing to share its best information. South Vietnamese agents proved to be unreliable and failed to penetrate deeply, while the big-nosed, white-skinned Americans could not operate covertly at all. Meanwhile, Viet Cong agents wormed their way into nearly every important office in the Saigon government and probably infiltrated the ranks of the CIA's local agents as well. So surprise thrusts into the Viet Cong heart were virtually precluded even if the intelligence had been developed.

By all accounts, only a small percentage of the deaths attributed to Phoenix came as a result of any kind of planned intelligence effort coordinated with a specific attack. Most often, the casualties occurred in standard military operations and the dead were identified *after the fact* as members of the Viet Cong Infrastructure—sometimes accurately, sometimes not. Phoenix, in reality, was not the scalpel that had been envisioned, but a coarse dragnet that snared not the wily Viet Cong political chiefs, but the unfortunate junior cadre—the messengers and the tax collectors—or unwitting civilians who got caught in the cross fire.

Phoenix, which in Vietnamese is "Phuong Huang" (the mythical bird that brings news of peace), not only failed to eliminate the key members of the Viet Cong political apparatus, but, if anything, may have speeded the Communist takeover by further alienating the people of South Vietnam with its reckless terror and haphazard harassment.

Most of the Americans who were personally involved with Phoenix in the field agreed to discuss it with me only on the condition that their names not be published, either out of embarrassment or because years of intelligence work had made them automatically seek anonymity.

Phoenix was one of several projects the CIA got into in Vietnam which took it far beyond the role of collector and analyst of intelligence that Congress had originally intended. In the early 1960's, for example, the agency organized a small army of hill tribesmen in the central highlands of Vietnam, not unlike the army it built to fight the "Secret War" in Laos. This army, the Civilian Irregular Defense Force, which grew to 42,000 men and was directed in the field by Green Berets, established a chain of forts for frontier security and sent squads on forays into Laos and Cambodia.

Later, the agency created "Counter-Terror" teams that tried to systematically return the violence the Viet Cong had visited upon Saigon government officials, and presaged the Phoenix program. Then came the fifty-nine-man Rural Development or "RD Cadre" units that were assigned to every province to dig wells, bolster village spirit, gather intelligence, and counter local guerrillas.

To tackle these assignments and Phoenix, as well as to handle its ostensibly basic mission of collecting intelligence, the CIA put between 400 and 600 agents into Vietnam—reportedly the largest force of spies ever fielded in a single country.

Agents were plucked from posts all over the world and dozens of soldiers of fortune were hired on contract to help out, too. Many of the veteran cloak-and-dagger men resented the paramilitary work and argued that it wasn't what they were supposed to be doing.

But Robert W. Komer, a former CIA analyst, White House special assistant, and head of the American "pacification program" in Vietnam, contends that President Johnson was adamant that the United States effort in Vietnam should not be strictly military, and had specifically called the CIA into the fray.

Komer, a blustery, hard-driving man who was known in Vietnam as "Blowtorch Bob," says it is "just ridiculous" to argue that CIA operations in Vietnam violated the agency's charter "when there's been a long record of application [of this sort of thing] in places like Cuba, Laos, and Iran."

A strange argument, it would seem, when most critics are contending that the Bay of Pigs invasion, the Secret War in Laos, and the overthrow of the government of Iran are precisely the kind of activities the agency should not be involved in.

But Komer did not earn his nickname by chance, and he charged on, hardly pausing for breath: "Any insider knows that the impetus for all these things came from the top—the president and his special assistants."

As authority for the CIA's ventures beyond the realm of intelligence, Komer cites the section of the National Security Act which states that among the duties of the agency is "to perform such functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." Thus, as in Watergate, "national security" seems to be an excuse for an administration to do whatever it wants.

To this day, no one knows exactly how much Phoenix cost the United States (the General Accounting Office told Congress it didn't know) and no one can say with certainty how many Vietnamese lives were taken in its name. By mid-1972, five years after the birth of Phoenix, the official figure on deaths given by the United States government was more than 26,000. A year earlier, the South Vietnamese government had put the death count at more than 40,000. Phoenix continued until the Saigon government collapsed, but no further statistics were issued. At any one time, there were probably 50,000 to 70,000 prisoners in South Vietnam's jails. But an attorney who served as legal adviser to the Phoenix program for more than a year says there was a constant turnover of prisoners and estimates that more than 250,000 persons passed through the prison system annually. This is an especially interesting figure since the CIA estimated the total strength of the VCI to be between 70,000 and 150,000. But we must always remember that the numbers of arrests, deaths, and even the strength of the VCI, like most other aspects of Phoenix, were generally regarded as being hopelessly unreliable.

"Forget the figures, they don't mean anything," said the Phoenix legal adviser. "The fact is, there could have been twice the number of civilians assassinated or killed—or one-third the number. There's just no way of knowing one way or the other, the reports and the basic intelli-



gence were that bad."

Of all the Americans who have been involved in Phoenix, undoubtedly the man most closely identified with it is William E. Colby, a thin-lipped, ascetic-looking devout Roman Catholic who has spent most of his life as a covert intelligence operative and is now director of the CIA. Colby, a Princeton and Columbia Law School graduate, was one of the principal architects of the program, working first as chief of the CIA's Far East Division; later as deputy to the American head of pacification in Vietnam, who oversaw the Phoenix operation; and finally as chief of the pacification program himself, during the nearly three years from late 1968 to mid-1971 when Phoenix was at its peak.

Colby is described by acquaintances as soft-spoken, with a casual manner and a forthright style. Despite the likelihood that working as a spy has forced him to dissemble and misrepresent, he is said to have a strong personal sense of honesty. "If you ask him a question on a sensitive subject," one acquaintance said, "he'll answer you directly. He won't lie, but he won't tell you any more than precisely what you ask. So the question has got to be phrased perfectly. If you don't know the subject, you won't learn anything."

In several appearances before Congress—in 1970, 1971, and 1973—Colby clearly attempted to put Phoenix in the best possible light and to minimize the abuses without perjuring himself.

In a hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in February 1970, for example, the chairman, J.W. Fulbright, asked whether captured Viet Cong were "executed," and Mr. Colby replied:

"Well, let me say they are not legally executed, no. . . . Now, I would not want to say here that none has ever actually been executed. . . . but the government's policy and its directives are that these people when captured are placed in detention centers. . . ." A little later, Colby told the senators, "I would not want to testify that nobody was killed wrongly or executed in this kind of a program. I think it has probably happened, unfortunately."

In testifying the next year, Colby conceded that there had been "some unjustifiable abuses" in Phoenix, but he indicated that he had steadily tried to correct the abuses and improve the program.

Some Americans who served in the field have different memories about the way things were when Colby was in charge of Phoenix. "I really got pissed off when I heard he was telling Congress the abuses were being corrected," the former legal adviser to Phoenix said. "They were never corrected. He was concerned—particularly after Congress started asking questions, and probably even before—but I don't think anything was being carried out at the lower levels."

One former army lieutenant who spent nearly a year working with Phoenix in the northern provinces says, "We were just told not to view torture. They [his superiors] would say, 'It goes on. It's to be expected. It's part of the way the war is fought, part of the normal Asian disregard for life.' Once the Vietnamese brought in a girl of about twenty and killed her right in the office. A sergeant kicked her in the stomach and she died." The officer said he reported torture when he saw it and added, "I couldn't figure out how they didn't reform it

at all after cataloging all these abuses."

Several members of Congress contended that Phoenix violated the Geneva Conventions on treatment of civilian prisoners in wartime. But the State Department countered that the conventions did not apply because the South Vietnamese were victims of their own government and not of an alien military force. Under congressional questioning, Colby said he felt the procedures supported by the United States in Phoenix might technically meet the requirements of international law, but he admitted they fell short of complying with the spirit of that body of law and certainly did not square with "our concepts of due process."

"The tragedy of this thing was the easy acceptance of inhumanity," the former legal adviser to Phoenix said. "One could argue the point of whether Vietnamese civilians came under the Geneva Conventions, but there was no question that civilians were frequently tortured, beaten, and targeted on little or no evidence."

Representative Bella Abzug of New York, and other members of Congress, urged in 1972 that financial support for Phoenix and several other programs in Vietnam be terminated, charging that the United States was "supporting the very sort of police state that we allegedly went to Vietnam to oppose." She and Representative Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., of California and several others also called for a full investigation of Phoenix by the State Department and Congress. But they were never able to rally their colleagues and Phoenix, with its name changed to F-6 and its wings somewhat clipped after the American advisers went home, continued to receive United States aid indirectly through the South Vietnamese national police—who maintained liaison with the CIA—until the country finally fell to the Communists last year.

As Komer tells the story, Phoenix had its genesis in 1967 while he was working in the White House as President Johnson's special assistant for pacification. One day, Komer says, he was having a chat with Bill Colby, who was then chief of the Far East Division of the CIA. "I'd been hearing all about the infrastructure," Komer said in a recent interview, "and I said to Colby, 'What can we do about this?'" The solution which evolved, Komer said, was the Phoenix program. Looking back over the wreckage of the program, Komer says there was no single architect, but there were several "key planners," including Colby and himself.

In a short time, Evan J. Parker of the CIA and an army colonel were in Saigon working out the nuts and bolts of the new program, which at first was called "ICEX," for Intelligence Coordination and Exploitation. Not much later, as Phoenix became a reality, Komer, too, went to Vietnam to head a new superpacification agency he had conceived called "CORDS," Civil Operations and Rural Development Support. Early in 1968 Colby became Komer's deputy and when Komer left toward the end of the year, Colby took over.

Phoenix was to be the business end of the pacification program. "I said, 'What the hell's the point of our people trying to build roads and sow miracle rice in the countryside if the VCI are going to come in with a terror program and raise hell?'" Komer relates. "I was an advocate of security for the pacification program." And that was

where Phoenix came in. Phoenix was supposed to "neutralize" the VCI by capturing them, persuading them to defect—both of which were often extremely difficult—or by killing them.

The ambition of Phoenix was to reach into every hamlet and village in the country, bit by bit piling up scraps of information until dossiers were bulging with the inside stuff on the meanest Cong—where did they go, who did they see, what were their jobs, who were their relatives, where were their weak spots?

The initial collection points were to be in the districts, which encompassed several villages and, though smaller, corresponded roughly to counties in the United States. So in each of the 250 districts of South Vietnam, the CIA built small buildings with two or three rooms and named them "District Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers," which became known as "DIOCC's" (pronounced either "Dee-ocks" or "Dye-ocks").

In the capitals of the provinces, which could be compared to states, the agency opened the same sort of offices—sometimes in the larger buildings already serving as province headquarters for the American pacification officials. These were called "Province Intelligence and Operations Coordinating Centers" or "PIOCC's" (pronounced "Pee-ocks").

The district offices were run by American sergeants or lieutenants from military intelligence; and usually a major ran the PIOCC's. At its peak there were about 800 Americans directly involved in Phoenix, including about 100 CIA agents, many of whom had other duties as well. In both the district and province centers, the Americans were supposed to "collate" intelligence to make up dossiers and "black-lists" of "wanted" persons. But they weren't always certain how to go about getting the basic intelligence—they had no agents of their own and often there was little or nothing forthcoming from the police special branch, the police field forces, the military security service, or the other units in the area.

"We never had a real idea of what the VCI was," one lieutenant recalled. "It was all so vague, we never associated it with anything but a concept. We never got much in the way of intelligence. I only remember one case of a certified VCI cadre being brought in and he was released after a couple of days. We never found out from the Vietnamese why they let him go."

Wayne L. Cooper, a foreign service officer who spent eighteen months as a Phoenix adviser in the Mekong Delta, says, "A typical DIOCC would have an impossible clutter, with wheat and chaff filed together. The alphabetical files we insisted they keep would not be cross-referenced by alias, family location, or any other useful designation. The dossiers so vital to province security committee prosecution would contain poor, skimpy information; perhaps enough for an operation, but not enough for prosecution. Other files—most-wanted lists, potential guide files, mug shots, and so on—were maintained so poorly as to be useless, or never kept at all. There would be no intelligence collection plan, and agents received little direction."

The Provincial Reconnaissance Unit or PRU (pronounced either "P-R-U" or "Prew"), with at least thirty-five to forty men, was designed as the "action arm" of

Phoenix, the exploiter of the intelligence. These gentlemen were rough. They were direct descendants of the CIA's counter-terror teams; in some cases they were the same people, and their tactics were often indistinguishable. The PRU's were criminals, deserters, former Viet Cong, men whose families had been wiped out by the Viet Cong, thugs of one kind or another.

A former army officer recalled the PRU team chief in his province. "One of his brothers had been killed by the VC, so all he wanted to do was get out and shoot VC," the officer said. "That was all he lived for. He wouldn't extort anything. He wouldn't accept a beer as a gift. All he cared about was shooting VC."

The PRU—recruited, trained, and paid by the CIA (and drawing four times as much cash as regular South Vietnamese troops)—wore camouflaged fatigues and green berets and loaded themselves down with hand grenades, bandoliers of bullets, a couple of rifles, pistols, and knives. And, as if they needed it, the PRU's were spurred on by the CIA with bonuses for weapons and bodies and sometimes ears.

The PRU were awesome enough to make a grizzled sergeant gulp and retreat, but they became absolutely terrifying when one realized that their principal job was to go out and "neutralize" the hapless folks whose names managed to find their way on to the blacklists put together helter-skelter in the DIOCC's and PLOCC's.

Georgie Anne Geyer of the *Chicago Daily News* reported in an article for *True* magazine in 1970 that two years earlier a PRU team in the Mekong Delta had crept out on a midnight raid and snatched a Viet Cong province chief from his bed; and from time to time there have been other reports of a handful of PRU's slipping into a hut with silencers on their rifles and rubbing out a Viet Cong official. But these were extremely rare. By far the most common PRU operation was the ambush.

"Unless somebody made a mistake," said a former captain who spent three years advising different PRU teams, "you're not going to find a guy alone. And if you go in and try to tangle with a whole village, you're in deep shit. If the guy is that important, it's very hard to extract him."

The captain said he personally could recall only one instance of the PRU trying to get a specific official alive. It was during a wedding ceremony in a village near the Cambodian border. The target was the groom, a Viet Cong district official who was marrying the daughter of a Saigon government village chief.

"The first one of our guys in the door of the building says, 'You haven't got a prayer, so just drop it,'" the captain remembered. "But some VC in the wedding party goes for his gun and our guy opens up. The next two or three guys through the door open up, too, and the first thing you know there's a lot of blood on the sand. So that didn't work too well. We didn't lose anybody. But there were twenty-two people in the wedding party and twenty were killed."

Ambushes were not as spectacular as a run into a sleeping village, perhaps, but they were a whole lot safer, which was a factor not to be underestimated.

"My team leader preferred to play it

safe, and so did I," the captain said. "The first consideration... is the safety of your own men. The first thing is, don't get us hurt, hurt them."

The ambush, the captain said, "was strictly a death trap. You set up a killing zone and they don't have a chance, if you do it right. You get into the area undetected. You know a certain guy is going to be transiting the area. You set up so that with the application of fire, everybody who gets into it is dead. You get everybody in the killing zone and they're dead."

"The idea I was always pushing," he continued, "was capture. Unfortunately, in many instances, a pretty fair percentage of the time, these guys ended up biting the dust, simply because of the nature of the operation."

The captain said if "all went right" he and his men would have "a complete bio and a mug shot or a family photo" of the person for whom they had laid the ambush. But there were times, he said, when several unexpected people would walk into the ambush along with the target and they would unfortunately be killed, too. In that case, the PRU would try to match up the dead with names on the blacklist. Sometimes the captain said he had "gone out to police up the bodies" after an ambush and found several dead who were merely Viet Cong soldiers and did not qualify as VCI. But he said his unit never killed any innocent civilians. Many others, however, could not say the same.

The captain, an ROTC man from a Midwestern university, said he "bristled a lot" when people described his work with the PRU's as assassination. "It doesn't get at what we were trying to do," he said. "It may be what we ended up doing. You went in for a guy and couldn't get him so you zapped him. But that wasn't what we were trying to do."

There is something about the word "assassination" that neither Colby nor Komer nor any of the other senior men responsible for Phoenix can abide. They admit that the program involved violence and that people were killed—sometimes the wrong people. But whenever he is questioned, Colby asserts without variation, "The Phoenix program was not a program of assassination."

Indeed, said the former legal adviser to Phoenix, the official goal was to take members of the VCI alive in hopes that they would talk and lead the way to higher-ups in the Communist organization. Another possibility was that a captured VCI member could be turned into a double agent.

"But when you got to the operational aspects of the program," the lawyer said, "there was little concern with whether the suspect was dead or alive."

One of the highest-ranking CIA officials in the field in Phoenix said the whole argument "rapidly gets into semantics." Yes, he conceded, individuals were singled out, especially targeted for "neutralization," and often the result was death. No, he said, he and his colleagues never sat down and specifically plotted the killing of any individual. But why split hairs? he asked. "Whether you called it assassination or something else, the man was dead. Somebody comes down a pitch-black trail, you don't know if you're firing at armed people or not. We never sat down and said, 'Who're

we gonna kill tomorrow?' The question was, 'Who're we gonna neutralize?' Maybe he got killed and maybe he didn't."

Who were these people who had been singled out for "neutralization"? All too often, the men with the guns didn't really know, as Representative Ogden R. Reid of New York brought out in his questioning of Colby during the congressional hearings in the summer of 1971.

"Are you certain," Reid asked, "that we know a member of the VCI from a loyal member of the South Vietnam citizenry?"

"No, Mr. Congressman, I am not," Colby replied.

Abuses were predictable in introducing a program like Phoenix to a society that had been at war for generations and was seething with hatred and suspicion. But instead of establishing strong controls, or trying another approach entirely, we fueled the chaos by establishing a quota system.

Putting pressure on the Vietnamese in Phoenix, with their jobs and futures on the line, the former legal adviser said, "got a lot of people being killed and jailed, irrespective of whether they were VCI, just merely to meet the quotas." There was also a lot of falsifying of reports to meet monthly goals—at least on paper—which threw all the statistics out of whack and, in itself, should have been enough to discredit the quota system.

But, Komer says, "We always had to have quotas. Without quotas, performance goals, programs never got under way. They found the same thing in American factories."

Komer insisted that he always argued that quotas should be realistic and that he protested when President Thieu set very high goals. But Komer says Thieu told him the program was very important and quotas had to be increased.

"Cordon-and-search" operations were also used in prosecuting the Phoenix program. I went on several of these with regular military units. What they amounted to was ringing a village with troops as stealthily as possible—preferably at just the crack of dawn when everyone was still at home—and then going from house to house, searching for weapons and supplies, inspecting papers, and questioning everyone. A cordon-and-search meant that no work could be done in the village for several hours. The questions were almost always rude and abrasive and the troops could rarely resist stealing a few ducks and chickens.

One former captain who advised a PRU team in the central highlands said his men would "shake down" a village in a cordon operation "for any number of reasons."

"The province chief had his quota to meet," the American said. "In addition to political and military VC, he'd be looking for prostitutes and black marketers. Our function varied. If it was kind of shaky territory and there was some doubt as to whether territorial forces could handle it, we'd be used as part of the cordon."

"Say it was a hard-core village and you wanted to give them an idea of what the program was," he continued. "If nothing else, you stood around looking fancy in the green beret. People in the province knew about the PRU and they figured if the PRU came in it must be kind of serious. And that was always a pain in the ass for them. There was no real violence. You might

rattle somebody's teeth a little bit, but it never seriously hurt anyone. There was one time we bounced a fella off a few walls because we knew he had relatives in the VC and he didn't want to talk about them. If a guy didn't wise up, he might get cuffed around a little bit."

Giving an example of what was understood at headquarters in Saigon as opposed to what was done in the field, Komer says, "There never was a cordon operation that was called for in the Phoenix program. I would think this would be a terrible misuse of PRU's."

It was, in fact, in cordons and the large military sweeps that the vast majority of men, women, and children were arrested in the Phoenix program, and not in the small, precisely targeted operations that had originally been envisioned. Colby said that by far the majority of the deaths—87.6 percent, for example, in one fifteen-month period between January 1970 and March 1971—came in the more classic military operations. These figures were cited by Colby and others as a means of showing that the PRU and the police were not so bad after all. How could they be if they had accounted for only 12 to 13 percent of the "kills"? But they also demonstrated that Operation Phoenix was proving to be the opposite of what it was intended to be.

Many times when I accompanied combat troops in Vietnam we would come across Vietnamese civilians who the troop commander somehow felt were suspicious. The civilians might be military-age young men. They might be anyone without proper identification papers. They might just be farmers working in a field. They didn't have packs and rifles so they couldn't be POW's. But maybe they were VCI. It was always safer for a company commander to have civilians "checked out" than to take a chance, even if the only result was to create more enemies. So the so-called "civilian authorities" would be notified—perhaps the province chief, who, in fact, was usually a lieutenant colonel—and the "suspects" would be trundled off in trucks or boats or helicopters. Before long they would find themselves at the "Province Interrogation Center" or PIC.

The CIA had built PIC's in each of the forty-four province capitals of South Vietnam. They were low and square and looked like tin-roofed forts. Offices, cells, and interrogation chambers were built along the inside walls and a large space in the center was left open as a courtyard.

The CIA trained members of the special branch of the National Police—roughly equivalent to the FBI—to run the PIC's; and the agency was supposed to oversee the operation of the centers. But, in fact, the CIA provided virtually no supervision and, according to vivid accounts of ex-prisoners and doctors and nurses who treated some of the victims, the PIC's became snakepits where the only limits upon sadistic police were their own demented minds.

The PIC's, like the DIOCC's, PIOCC's, PRU operations, and everything else in the Phoenix program, were almost impenetrable to journalists. Komer says it was not a "secret" program, but I can say from personal experience that the people in the field generally behaved as though it was.

One rather lengthy account of what went on in the PIC's was put together by an American study team on Religious and

Political Freedom in Vietnam which spent a week in the country in 1969. The team was headed by Bishop James Armstrong of the United Methodist Church and included two congressmen, a retired rear admiral, the executive director of the American Civil Liberties Union, and two other clergymen.

The team found that "most" prisoners in South Vietnam's detention and interrogation centers had been tortured. Most often the prisoners had been beaten not only with fists but with sticks and clubs.

A number of prisoners told the team of being submerged in a water tank which was then beaten on the outside, causing internal injuries. In another water torture, prisoners recalled being tied to a bench and having a soaked cloth placed over the nose and mouth, giving them the impression they were drowning. Some said water had been pumped into their noses.

The team also reported instances of prisoners having their hands tied behind their backs and then being hoisted toward the ceiling by a rope around their wrists, and of prisoners being shackled to the floor in a squatting position for several days so that when they were finally freed they could not walk.

Sexual torture, the team said, was not uncommon. Frequently, the team members said, soft-drink and beer bottles were prodded into vaginas. Another favorite was connecting electric wires to prisoners' genitals.

The chief of CIA operations in the northern provinces said that the man he assigned to oversee the PIC's in his region usually dropped in on the centers once a week for an hour or so and "then went on about his business."

"Even if you spent eight hours a day in the PIC's, prisoners are there twenty-four hours," he said. "Somebody would go into a cell and rape a female prisoner after you'd gone. I've seen reports of it. There's no way to stop it."

The official said to maintain a twenty-four-hour watch on the PIC's throughout South Vietnam would have required more than 220 men, or more than a third of the CIA's complement in Vietnam.

"That's where we got into a bind," he said. "We devised a plan and ran into problems of not being able to directly supervise it. Too many problems were forced upon us. We didn't have enough people on a worldwide basis to staff Vietnam."

The CIA official said that from time to time, usually after a critical news report was published, he had spoken to the local chief of the special branch about the abuses. "I'd say, 'Goddamn it, knock this stuff off! We're taking a beating on the publicity.' And he would nod and smile and say, 'Come with me.' So I'd see him chew out the PIC chief, and then they all went back to doing what they usually did. There's no question in my mind we did not want this abuse. And what we didn't want worse was the bad publicity."

Once, the official said, word came from Saigon that an international investigating team was going to visit the PIC's in the northern region and the agency spent \$180,000 to spruce up four of them. "Christ, they shipped us paint and new fans and plumbing from all kinds of places," he said. "In a matter of weeks everything was stolen again. That's just Vietnam. It's what they do normally—steal everything they can get their hands on."

Under a "suspect" could be held in a PIC for forty-six days, then he had to be released or turned over to either a military field-court or the Province Security Committee. Most often, suspects went to the security committee which, under the so-called "An Tri law," could imprison a person for two-year renewable terms simply because he was considered "dangerous to national defense and public security." No evidence was required. In fact the process was aimed at jailing those against whom there was insufficient evidence to convict. The suspect had no right to appear in his own defense, no right to counsel, no right to confront his accuser, and no right to even look at his own dossier to see what charges had been leveled.

After sentencing, prisoners were sent to one of South Vietnam's national prisons, the most infamous of which was on Con Son Island. The island prison gained worldwide notoriety in 1970 when two American congressmen visited and discovered a section of small isolation cells called "Tiger Cages" which had stone walls and bars running across the tops. Former prisoners said that men and women were sometimes handcuffed and bolted to the floor of the cells and that guards walking overhead would dump lime on them. After an avalanche of criticism, the Saigon government announced that the Tiger Cages were being abandoned. But in a short time they were replaced by "Cow Cages," which were reported to be even worse.

As bad as the Tiger Cages and Cow Cages may have been, however, the former legal adviser said they were no worse than many of the thirty to forty province and district lockups he'd seen.

Vietnamese opponents of the Saigon government and many other critics have claimed that the South Vietnamese held more than 200,000 persons in their jails, many of them political prisoners whose only offense had been opposition to the régime in power. But the *Washington Post* said recently that reports of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which the United States government had kept secret until the war was over, indicated that the maximum capacity of the Saigon government's prisons was 70,000. Only about a third of the prisoners, the *Post* said, were prisoners of war, captured with weapons in hand or wearing insignia.

The *Post* said the South Vietnamese government would not let the Red Cross freely visit and report on its civil prisons, and committee members never fully inspected the prison on Con Son, which was the largest in the system.

Throughout most of the years of American involvement in Vietnam, United States officials had lied and insisted—along with the Saigon Government—that there were no political prisoners in the country. They lied also about conditions in the prisons and pretended that torture existed only in the minds of Communist propagandists. Rather than try to persuade the South Vietnamese to permit American newsmen to visit the prisons, the United States Embassy in Saigon joined ranks to maintain the barriers.

As early as 1963—and probably several times since then—an American public safety adviser went to Con Son and wrote a report on the Tiger Cages. Yet when the congressmen made their visit, the American Embassy in Saigon claimed to be surprised by the existence

of the tiny cells and said it had no information on them.

In December 1973, Henry S. Sizer, a political officer in the United States Embassy in Saigon, completed a fourteen-page report on South Vietnam's prison system which supported earlier claims that no political prisoners were being held and that the maximum capacity of all facilities was 51,941. He made no references to torture, the conditions in the prisons, or how it happened that people landed in the jails. However, Ambassador Graham Martin, who was forced to flee from his embassy as the country fell to the Communists, described Sizer's report as "an exhaustive and painstaking analysis."


Some key officials in Phoenix point out

—no doubt quite accurately—that in the context of the war Phoenix was a relatively small program and that there were many greater atrocities. By some remarkable logic, they seem to feel that makes Phoenix less of a horror.

After Komer left Vietnam in late 1968, President Johnson appointed him ambassador to Turkey. But from the time he arrived he was the target of left-wing student protests critical of his work in Vietnam and he eventually resigned without his nomination having been confirmed by the Senate. Komer is a private consultant on government affairs now and he is tired of the criticism—most of which he considers unjust—which has been heaped upon him and his friends

like Colby who, no doubt because of his high visibility as director of the CIA, has had Phoenix hung around his neck like an albatross.

"It's terribly misleading, a gross injustice," he told me. "to say that Colby did all this, that the Americans did all this in Vietnam." You see, he went on, referring to Phoenix, "it was a Vietnamese program." Sure, the Americans initiated the Phoenix concept, Komer concedes, "but the Vietnamese carried it out. We didn't invent anything. We just put together what they had."

"I think," he laments, "we have gotten a terrible, terrible bum rap . . . because we failed, and we *did* fail. And since we lost, we must have been bad." 

PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER

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## International interference

# Communists have dirty tricks

By SMITH HEMPSTONE

WASHINGTON—Anthony Lewis, holder of the Frank Church Chair of Handwriting at The New York Times, last week was beating his breast over the peripheral involvement of the U. S. in the events leading up to the Chilean coup of 1973.

So distraught was Lewis over these past hijinks (which involved the expenditure of some \$11 million, a sum less than that spent by many cities for snow-removal) that he had not a word to say about a casebook example of Communist dirty tricks that is taking place today. I refer to the massive Soviet-Cuban military intervention in Angola, where an estimated 10,000 people have lost their lives this year.

A brief rundown of the facts:

Angola, a West African territory twice the size of France, was abandoned by Portugal on Nov. 11 at a time when a three-cornered civil war engulfed the country.

The Marxist regime of Agostinho Neto, which held Luanda (having driven its rivals from the capital) and little else, was promptly recognized by such pillars of democracy as the Soviet Union, East Germany, Algeria, Cuba, Guinea, Mozambique and Somalia.

But Neto's "government," whose program includes such reformist notions as people's tribunals and corrective labor camps for those who reject the gospel according to Brezhnev; was soon hard-pressed by the forces of two non-Communist nationalist leaders, Holden Roberto (an old favorite of the CIA) and Jonas Savimbi.

In the 17 days since the withdrawal of the Portuguese, a Russian sea and airlift to Luanda has provided Neto's forces with some 200 T-54 tanks and



armored cars, dozens of batteries of 122-mm, ground-to-ground rockets, 25 mm. recoilless rifles and SAM-7 missiles; at a total cost of more than \$110 million.

Between 2,000 and 4,000 Cubans have joined the fighting units of Netos Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), where they are supported by an estimated 400 Russian "civilian technicians" (a euphemism for KGM agents and soldiers in multi).

But these transgressions on the part of the wonderful folks who gave us detente apparently have not come within the ken of Anthony Lewis, as he plods his weary way along the Via Dolorosa of the CIA's misdeeds.

Faced with a bewildering maze of

unpronounceable names, conflicting political movements and obscure tribal rivalries in a distant land, the average American may be forgiven if he throws up his hands and asks: Does it matter who rules Angola?

Unfortunately, it does.

In a political sense, the message to Africa of a Neto victory would be loud and clear: The Soviet Union has both the means and the will to support its friends; the U. S. does not.

Strategically, victory for Neto's Marxists would provide the Russian navy with deep-water ports on the Cape of Good Hope shipping route and give the Kremlin ready access to the South Atlantic.

Nor is Angola any mean prize in an economic sense. With a population of only 6 million and less than 2 percent of its arable land under intensive cultivation, it could be the breadbasket of the continent.

Roberto and Savimbi, who are linked in an uneasy alliance, control 75 percent of Angola's area and more than half its population. Their forces are on the offensive and, were there no intervention on either side, almost certainly would be victorious. But the Russian-Cuban intervention could tip the balance Neto's way.

Sens. Hubert Humphrey and Richard Clark, apparently fearful of incurring the wrath of Lewis and other cardinal hemophiliacs of the left, have delayed until after Thanksgiving recess authorization of increased aid funds for Zaire, funds obviously intended for diversion to the non-Communist Angola groups.

By which time Angola may have become a Russian sphere of influence. And everyone, possibly including Lewis, will wonder why.

## THE MAFIA, THE CIA, AND THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

An effort to  
make sense out  
of all the  
assassination talk,  
including a  
review of the  
most discussed  
critics and  
theories.

By Milton Viorst

Let's face it: No one, except a handful of people with vested interests of one sort or another, now believes the Warren Commission. What's worse, fewer and fewer Americans are willing to believe that the one-assassin, magic-bullet theory is even an innocent mistake. More and more, the unthinkable comes into focus—that agencies of the United States government were involved in President Kennedy's assassination or, at least, were a part of a subsequent process which has passed into our vocabulary as "cover-up."

If we want the truth, and it's by no means certain that most Americans do, we won't get much help from President Ford. He's among those with a vested interest. He was one of the seven members of the Warren Commission. Furthermore, he wrote a book on its findings, a clip-and-paste job that insisted on Lee Harvey Oswald's singular and mindless culpability. One can reasonably assume that whatever institutional obligations Ford has acquired since entering the White House have simply reinforced his temperamental and self-interested objections to any re-examination of the Warren Commission's conclusions.

Senator Richard Schweiker, a moderate Republican from Pennsylvania, recently has taken the lead in demanding that Senator Frank Church's special committee on intelligence reopen the assassination inquiry. He cites compelling evidence of perjury on the part of J. Edgar Hoover in minimizing the Federal Bureau of Investigation's involvement with Oswald. A recently declassified letter to former Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren from J. E. Curry, then the Dallas chief of police, states that Curry had been pressured by the FBI to conceal its contacts with Oswald. FBI Director Clarence Kelley has since admitted that the FBI had destroyed a threatening letter it received from Oswald shortly before the assassination. Schweiker maintains that this evidence is sufficient to justify a new inquiry, but Church has refused, saying that "this committee already has enough on its plate."

From the beginning, the structure of the

*Milton Viorst is a Washington writer who first expressed skepticism about the Warren Commission in the February 1967 issue of The Washingtonian. Much of this article is based on the research of Michael Ewing, who began his study of the intelligence agencies while on the staff of former Senator Harold Hughes of Iowa. Assistance in the research was provided by the Committee for Public Justice.*

Warren Commission would have made it impossible to implicate the FBI in the assassination, whether or not such implications existed. One of the first decisions the Commission made, and one which fixed its entire course, was to establish no investigative force of its own but to rely exclusively on the FBI. J. Lee Rankin, the Commission general counsel, recognized that this was a mistake, but no effort ever was made to repair it. In a recently released transcript of Warren Commission deliberations, the following discussion is recorded:

**Rankin:** Part of our difficulty in regard to it [the scope of the investigation] is that they [the FBI] have no problem. They have decided that it is Oswald who committed the assassination, they have decided that no one else was involved, they have decided . . .

**Senator Richard Russell:** They have tried the case and reached a verdict in every aspect.

**Representative Hale Boggs:** You have put your finger on it.

**John J. McCloy:** They are a little less certain in the supplementals than they were in the first place.

**Rankin:** Yes, but they are still there. They have decided the case . . .

Today, it is possible to hypothesize a variety of motives for FBI involvement in the assassination, not the least of which was J. Edgar Hoover's profound resentment of the Kennedy Administration's efforts to put the agency under its effective jurisdiction. In addition, FBI-watchers have forever been at a loss to understand Hoover's persistent indifference to organized crime, and a few have publicly questioned whether it was related to his well publicized obsession with the race track. Organized crime has been mentioned, and will be mentioned again in this article, as a possible factor in the Kennedy assassination.

Yet, moving away from hypothesis, the evidence suggests no more than that the FBI was slovenly before the assassination in its dealings with Lee Harvey Oswald, an ex-defector to the Soviet Union known for political instability. Then it went to great lengths after the assassination to cover up its ineptitude.

From what we know of J. Edgar Hoover's concern with the FBI's image, such a cover-up would be characteristic. But while the FBI is guilty of presenting real obstacles to the unraveling of the Kennedy assassination, there is no evidence that its motive was any more venal than excessive solicitude for its good-boy image. With all of the information that has since poured forth on FBI abuses, we have not heard of its involvement in—committing, rather than investigating—

assassinations. The same cannot be said of the CIA.

The CIA, too, was covered within the Warren Commission. Its number one guardian was Allen Dulles, America's super-spy, director of the CIA from 1953 to 1961. In appointing Dulles to the Warren Commission, whether it crossed President Johnson's mind that Dulles might be something of a Trojan horse we have no way of knowing. But Dulles was not the only member with intelligence connections. John J. McCloy, the New York lawyer whom Richard Rovere once called the head of the American establishment, had been instrumental during World War II in setting up the OSS, which was the CIA's parent organization, and there are indications that he, too, retained ties to what is referred to as "the intelligence community."

Dulles certainly knew, and McCloy probably did too, that the CIA maintained important links with the Mafia. They dated back to Lucky Luciano during the period of McCloy's work in World War II, and they continued right up through the Bay of Pigs invasion, for which Dulles was responsible.

Half-heartedly, the Warren Commission explored the possibility of a Cuban relationship to the assassination, but Dulles said nothing about the Mafia's authorized attempts on the life of Fidel Castro or its involvement with Cuban emigré groups, both of which began when he was director. The Warren Commission report contains no information on CIA-Mafia ties, and, unless there are some surprises in its file of CIA documents, still classified Top Secret in the National Archives, it is unlikely that Commission members were in any way aware that the CIA might somehow be implicated in the murder.

Seymour Hersh of the *New York Times* broke the story of the CIA's involvement with the Mafia last March 10. His account of the liaison began with a contract on Castro's life in early 1961, one of many as it turned out. He then sketched in some history, going as far back as Luciano's putative assistance, provided from a prison cell, in planning the American invasion of Sicily in 1943. Ironically, Robert Kennedy had learned of the relationship when he was an investigator with the McClellan anti-crime committee back in the 1950s but did not pursue it. When he became Attorney General some years later, he apparently tried to break up the alliance. As the story has since been elaborated by Hersh and other reporters, the Mafia was available to the CIA not only for such odd jobs as political murders but for such ongoing assignments as infiltrating the unions of French dockworkers to make sure their strikes did not interrupt the flow of war materials to Indochina.

In return for these services, the Mafia was amply rewarded. Luciano, his contributions swelling with the re-telling, was transformed into something of a folk hero, granted executive clemency by New York's Governor Thomas E. Dewey, and allowed to live out his remaining years in comfort as a senior racketeer. That



seemed a small enough price to pay for the biggest island in the Mediterranean.

The subsequent benefits were more generous—or would have been if the CIA, the Mafia, the anti-Castro battalions, and the White House hadn't fumbled the Bay of Pigs. Had Cuba been delivered, the mob would have gotten back all of the casinos, hotels, and whores that Castro had confiscated after he took over the island in 1959. Castro cost the Mafia not only future profits, which was exasperating enough, but a very substantial sum of its own variously gotten gains that it had invested in Havana.

Needless to say, the racketeers were in no position to file law suits or complain to the press. But their cause, in effect, was served by the outraged Cuban emigrés who were convinced that Kennedy had betrayed them by abandoning the Bay of Pigs operation midway and allowing it to miscarry. With Castroites denouncing Kennedy for trying and anti-Castroites blaming him for failing, it was logical after the assassination for Americans, including the Warren Commission, to look for a Cuban connection. The Cuban connection that Americans did not look for was the Mafia, which took to violence even more readily than those whose ends were merely political.

Another benefit the mob received in payment for its services to the CIA was a lock on the heroin traffic in Southeast Asia. It is not a secret any longer that some of our favorite politicians and generals in South Vietnam did some moonlighting in hard drugs. In Laos, which was a special CIA preserve, the custom was even more widespread, to say nothing of the fact that some of our most faithful allies were the opium-growing tribesmen of the Laotian hills.

It made good sense for us to support our friends in Indochina, and the CIA, much like the commercial attache in any country, took steps to find willing buyers for the willing sellers. Well before Kennedy's death, it was clear that there was a huge amount of money to be made on heroin in Southeast Asia, and the CIA was quite willing to let the Mafia make it.

If one were to chart a coziness quotient for the CIA and the Mafia, 1961 would probably have been its best year. In spite of the fiasco at the Bay of Pigs, the Kennedy Administration was keeping the pressure on Castro. Step by step, the US was intensifying its commitment in Indochina, with characters of the CIA's choice. By Kennedy's own admission, the CIA was growing increasingly powerful, and was threatening to become as much a law unto itself as the FBI had been for many years. J. Edgar Hoover may not have been a partner of the Mafia, but his neutrality toward organized crime was the next best thing, and he showed no inclination to extend his anti-Communist obsession into the CIA's domain. It was, for the agency and the brotherhood, a rosy year.

If there was a dark cloud, it was over at the Justice Department, where the President's brother, Robert Kennedy, ruled with autocratic determination. Kennedy was the first Attorney General anyone could remember who seemed earnest about challenging organized crime. He

had restructured the divisions of the Justice Department to create special anti-Mafia task forces, and he had established a particular unit whose assignment was to lock up the president of the Teamsters, James R. Hoffa, a man whose association with organized crime particularly offended him.

Robert Kennedy had more influence on the President than anyone else in government and he did not approve of the CIA's indulgence of the Mafia, and it appears he tried to stop the CIA-Mafia attempts to assassinate Castro. Robert Kennedy even tried to exercise his lawful authority over Hoover, and for a while the battle was touch-and-go. At first, no one was quite sure what to make of the young Kennedy, but his persistence soon erased all doubts about his intentions.

By the third year of the Kennedy Administration, the rosiness had begun to fade for the Mafia and its friends. The drive against organized crime and the Teamsters—some called the latter a vendetta—grew more intense. According to Victor Navasky's *Kennedy Justice*, in contrast to the 19 syndicate indictments in Eisenhower's last year, there were 687 such indictments in Kennedy's last year. Under Robert Kennedy, the Justice Department also indicted 100 Teamster officials and 90 others said to be criminal associates, of whom 115 were convicted before RFK resigned. As for the feud with J. Edgar Hoover, Kennedy never did acquire mastery of the FBI bureaucracy, but in his crusades against Hoffa and the Mafia he did succeed in circumventing the FBI most of the time.

In the early fall of 1963, Robert Kennedy told the McClellan crime committee that he intended to expand his war against the mob even further. The targets he singled out to the committee were Sam Giancana, Hoffa, and Carlos Marcello. Giancana, an old-time Mafia chief, was murdered gangland-style, while supposedly under surveillance by the FBI, just before he was to testify before the Church committee earlier this year on the CIA-Mafia relationship. Hoffa disappeared soon afterward, another presumed victim of the mob. When last seen, by contrast, Carlos Marcello was thriving.

Carlos Marcello is a New Orleans racketeer who has controlled much of the Mafia empire in the South and Southwest, including Dallas. Marcello, known as "The Little Man" in syndicate circles, long has been regarded by federal authorities as one of the two or three most powerful Mafia leaders in the nation. Maintaining unquestioned control over his important syndicate region, Marcello has exercised a leading role as a member of "The Commission," the syndicate's secret governing council.

For many years before the Kennedys, the Justice Department had been trying to deport Marcello, and, very briefly, Robert Kennedy succeeded by some dubious stretching of the law. After a few weeks in Guatemala, Marcello returned home in a state of outrage, determined upon revenge. In a meeting of Mafia chiefs at his plantation near New Orleans, there was some serious talk of killing the President, chiefly to dispose of the Attor-

ney General. According to a report made to a government investigator by one of the participants in the meeting, Marcello's thinking had progressed so far that he already talked of finding a "nut" to do the job.

Jimmy Hoffa, although remorselessly pursued by the Justice Department's special task force, eluded prison as long as Jack Kennedy was alive. Helping him was the same Carlos Marcello, who had joined Hoffa on a number of occasions in raiding Teamster pension funds for investment in various syndicate business activities. At one point, Teamster and mob sources collected some \$2 million to beat Hoffa's conviction for jury tampering. They turned the money over to Marcello, presumably to spread around as bribes.

Like Marcello, Hoffa had long since acquired a reputation as a man willing to kill, although the only threat he is known to have made was directed not at Jack but at Bobby. That incident took place in the summer of 1962, and the source of the report was Ed Partin, the ex-Teamster official who gave the testimony which convicted Hoffa in the jury tampering case. Hoffa "asked my help in a scheme to kill Attorney General Robert Kennedy," Partin said in *Life* magazine, adding that Hoffa talked of using a high-powered rifle for the murder. Though Partin himself had a seamy police record, he submitted to a lie-detector test on his *Life* assertions and passed.

Ben Bradlee of the *Washington Post*, in his recent book on John Kennedy, reports that on February 10, 1963, the President told him that "some hoodlum" had informed the Justice Department that he had been hired by the Teamsters, given a gun fitted with a silencer, and sent to Washington to kill the Attorney General. "I found this one hard to believe," Bradlee writes, "but the President was obviously serious."

It is not illogical that the enemies of Robert Kennedy should reason that the surest way to get rid of him was through his brother, the President. Hoffa and Marcello would have no trouble concluding that if Jack Kennedy were no longer in the White House, Robert Kennedy would not be Attorney General, and the Justice Department's hounds would be withdrawn from their pursuit. Besides, the wider range of Presidential enemies might make it easier to conceal a bigger murder—that of the President—than a smaller one.

Such reasoning proved sound, in that law enforcement agencies after President Kennedy's assassination didn't know whether to look to the left or to the right, to Americans or foreigners, to love or politics or revenge for suspects, and thus exonerated them all with the explanation that Lee Harvey Oswald was a homicidal nut. It proved sound, also, in that Robert Kennedy left the Justice Department soon after President Kennedy's assassination, and in short order the crusade against organized crime and Teamster corruption waned. The Hoffa prosecution, however, had by that time gone too far, and in March 1967, Hoffa went to prison, to be released later by Richard Nixon's clem-



ency writ. In the heat of the Presidential campaign the year after Hoffa went to jail, Robert Kennedy was also murdered.

In this same fall of 1963 when the Teamsters and racketeers were feeling Bobby's hot breath on their necks, President Kennedy apparently was contemplating major changes in American foreign policy. Though the historical record remains equivocal, there is indication that Kennedy was giving serious consideration both to repairing relations with Castro and to reversing the American commitment in Indochina. Having commitments of its own, the CIA would presumably have no use for such changes, and the Mafia certainly would interpret them in terms of the hundreds of millions of dollars that would go down the drain.

Nothing hereinafter suggests that the CIA had a direct involvement in the Kennedy assassination. Yet, any agency that was as ready to kill as we now know the CIA was may not have limited its targets to foreign heads of state. We have no evidence that the CIA paid the bills or delivered the guns connected with Kennedy's killing. On the other hand, evidence does exist which could lead reasonable people to conclude that those who killed for the CIA also may have killed John Kennedy. Certainly, whatever suspicions the CIA inevitably had of the culpability of organized crime were not transmitted to the Warren Commission and were, in fact, defiantly kept within its walls.

But if the CIA was itself innocent of conspiratorial entanglement, one might question why it remained silent about its suspicions of those who were not. If one is generous, one will dismiss out of hand the thought that the CIA would be an accomplice in the murder of a President simply because it disliked his policies or his treatment of its friends.

However, just as we know now that the FBI kept dossiers on Congressmen which it could use when needed, the Mafia had bulging dossiers on the CIA. The moment the CIA entered into its dirty partnership with organized crime, it was subject to blackmail at every turn. Once Kennedy was dead, silence may have seemed like a small price to pay for the CIA to keep intact the secrets of its ruthless conduct in countries all over the world.

Let us start our re-examination of assassination day with Jack Ruby. The Warren Commission, after an intensive investigation, concluded that Oswald's celebrated killer was a small-time punk who had occasional passing contacts with unsavory characters but no status in any criminal organization. The Commission accepted Ruby's explanation that he shot Oswald in a fit of passion, to "spare Mrs. Kennedy" the ordeal of having to return to Dallas for a trial. Yet in the Warren Commission's behalf, one must acknowledge that it was conscientious about publishing much about Ruby's background, though items of testimony were scattered through the twenty-six volumes of its hearings. These items make clear that the Commission

## The Single-Bullet Theory

What is now regarded as the key area of the President Kennedy assassination investigation—the "single-bullet theory"—is the one issue on which the myriad critics of the Warren Commission appear united.

Simply put, the Warren Commission and the FBI concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald could have had enough time to fire his rifle and hit Kennedy twice and Connally once only if a single bullet passed through both men before the final fatal shot hit the President's head. This crucial conclusion—upon which the Warren Commission rested its lone-assassin findings—came to be known as the "single-bullet theory," or, as the critics call it, the "magic-bullet theory."

Scientific examination of the famous Zapruder film of the assassination made the single-bullet theory necessary. The film, recorded by a movie camera operating at 18.3 frames per second, showed that Kennedy and Connally both were first hit within 1.5 seconds, or 28 Zapruder frames. Yet scientific analysis of the Oswald rifle showed that it could not fire two shots in less than 2.3 seconds, or 42 Zapruder frames. Thus, either a single bullet passed through both men or there were two assassins firing. As a top Commission lawyer put it, "We had an either/or situation, with nothing in between."

The single-bullet hypothesis had some holes in it, and several Warren Commission members immediately looked upon it with something approaching incredulity. First of all, Connally and his wife both had testified that he was hit by a second, separate bullet after the first shot hit the President. Secondly, the alleged single bullet that supposedly hit both men was recovered in near-perfect condition on a stretcher after the cars bearing the wounded men rushed to Parkland Hospital. Twelve years of forensic and ballistic tests indicate it would be

was, by a generous interpretation, naive about Ruby, and that he was far from the hot-blooded patriot he represented himself to be.

Ruby came from Chicago, where he was secretary of the Scrap Iron and Junk Handlers Union at the time that its founder and chief mover, one Leon R. Cook, was shot to death. Ruby was picked up for questioning at the time, but was released when it was established that a third union official had committed the crime. Ruby's degree of involvement was never resolved, but the killing provided the opening for a takeover of the union by Paul Dorfman, a mobster with widespread underworld connections.

In short order, Dorfman entered into an alliance with Jimmy Hoffa, and an insurance company he formed was selected to underwrite the Teamster pension funds under Hoffa's jurisdiction. Dorfman later returned the favor by applying muscle that Hoffa needed to win the fight for succession to Dave Beck, the Teamsters' international president, who, ironically, had been driven from office by the McClellan committee's investigation under Robert Kennedy. Kennedy once jokingly acknowledged that he had made Hoffa what he was, and that he felt quite sheepish about it. Ruby subsequently wound up in Dallas, with plenty of money to set himself up in the nightclub business.

Various descriptions of Ruby appear in

next to impossible for a bullet to hit Kennedy's back, pass through his throat, enter Connally's back, glance off a rib, pass out his chest, enter and shatter his wrist, lodge in his thigh, and be recovered in near perfect condition. The mangled and shattered bullets that result from scientific simulations leave little doubt.

Thirdly, and here the issue comes full circle, the Zapruder film shows President Kennedy and Governor Connally were struck within a short time of each other—but not at the same time. To this last flaw, Warren Commission counsel Arlen Specter, who conceived the single-bullet theory, answered that a neurologically rare "delayed reaction" to the wound by Connally could explain the time lag shown in the film.

Senator John Sherman Cooper joined Senator Richard Russell and Representative Hale Boggs, the two members already suspicious about the FBI's other investigative work for the Commission, in voicing opposition to the controversial theory. Specter, however, found a willing proponent for his theory in Congressman Gerald Ford, who pointed out that failure to adopt the theory would prolong the Commission's work and open a hornet's nest of problems. Ford recommended an official Warren Commission conclusion that there was "compelling evidence" to support the single-bullet theory. Senator Russell, however, said he would publicly break with the Commission and refuse to sign its report if Ford's recommendation were followed. A final internal battle ensued, with former CIA Director Allen Dulles backing Ford.

Finally, the members agreed on a compromise wording—watering down Ford's "compelling evidence" to "persuasive evidence." Russell, Cooper, and Boggs then reluctantly signed the Warren Commission's report.

testimony published by the Warren Commission. Luis Kutner, a Chicago attorney who had worked for the Kefauver Crime Committee, said Ruby had appeared before Kefauver's staff in 1950, and in the course of subsequent investigation it was learned that Ruby was a syndicate lieutenant who had been sent to Dallas to serve as a liaison for Chicago mobsters. A former Dallas County sheriff also testified he knew Ruby had links to organized crime. According to other witnesses, Ruby was known as "the payoff man for the Dallas Police Department" and "had the fix with county authorities."

The Warren Commission hearings also disclosed testimony that in 1956 an informant for the Los Angeles Police Department described Ruby as the central figure in a "large narcotics setup between Mexico, Texas, and the East." At another point, the FBI cited one of its own informants who said Ruby was the contact man for various numbers operations in Dallas.

If this testimony was true, and it is extremely convincing, then Ruby was much more than a small-time punk. The Warren Commission tells us that shortly before Castro closed Havana's casinos in 1959, Ruby spent ten days there hobnobbing with major organized crime figures at the Mafia's Tropicana Hotel. More relevant to the assassination, however, is the fact that Ruby's narcotics and gambling con-

nections would have had to make him a collaborator of Carlos Marcello, the Mafia's regional director in New Orleans and the man who vowed to get the Kennedys.

Telephone logs published in the Warren Commission volumes show that on November 7, 1963, which was after the White House announcement of Kennedy's impending visit to Dallas, Ruby spoke to one Barney Baker in Chicago. Walter Sheridan, in an authoritative book on Hoffa, describes Baker as "a three-hundred-pound former prizefighter [who] had come up through the tough New York waterfront jungle, where he had been a strongarm man for a group of racketeers who had attempted to take over the piers and truck terminals in the late thirties and early forties." Over the years, Baker plied his craft in such locations as Hollywood, Florida, and Las Vegas before entering the permanent employ of Jimmy Hoffa. In his own book, *The Enemy Within*, Robert Kennedy described Baker's assignment as "Mr. Hoffa's roving 'organizer' and ambassador of violence."

On November 20, 1963, according to the logs, Ruby placed another call to Chicago, to Irwin Weiner. Weiner was in the bonding business, in association with Dorfman's insurance company, which continued to rake in Teamster premiums on behalf of the Chicago mob. Sheridan says that Weiner was the recipient of millions of dollars more in bonding premiums from Teamster locals under Hoffa's jurisdiction. If Baker was one of Hoffa's enforcers, Weiner was one of his trusted advisers. Ruby's conversation with Weiner took place two days before Kennedy's killing. Ruby provided the Warren Commission with no adequate explanation why he made either call.

That brings the story up to Jim Braden, a lesser known figure than Jack Ruby, a shadow who glides through the Warren Commission volumes. Braden was picked up by a suspicious Dallas policeman across the street from the Texas Book Depository just minutes after the fatal bullets were fired. Taken to the sheriff's office, he said he was an oil man from Beverly Hills who had been in Dallas for two days on business. He said that when the President's motorcade passed by he was looking for a taxi, and that after the shooting he had gone into a nearby building to make a phone call. In the confusion that followed the assassination, the police cursorily examined Braden's identification, found no reason to reject his alibi, and released him, without taking fingerprints or checking into a possible criminal record.

Two months later, the FBI routinely called on Braden at his Beverly Hills office in the course of its assignment for the Warren Commission. Braden repeated to the FBI the account he had given to the Dallas police on the day of the murder. The Warren Commission did not see fit to question the FBI's official report which stated, "Braden has no information concerning the assassination and both Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby are unknown to him."

## The Assassination Critics

The Warren Commission has been under attack since it published its findings in 1964. Here are the more prominent critics:

**Sylvia Meagher**—Perhaps the most respected authority on the Warren Commission's 26 volumes of hearings and exhibits, Meagher, a New York librarian, compiled the privately printed "subject index" to the Commission's findings, which has become a basic tool of the critics. Meagher's 1967 book, *Accessories After the Fact: The Warren Commission, the Authorities, and the Report*, is considered the most comprehensive refutation of the Warren Commission's conclusions.

**Harold Weisberg**—A diligent researcher and veteran Senate investigator, Weisberg has written and privately printed four books, known as the *Whitewash* series, on aspects of the JFK assassination. He has taken Freedom of Information suits against the FBI as high as the US Court of Appeals before being defeated. New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison used Weisberg's book, *Oswald in New Orleans*, during his ill-fated investigation in 1967-69.

**Bernard Fensterwald Jr.**—A Washington attorney and former staff director for Senator Kefauver's Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly, Fensterwald is director of the Washington-based Committee to Investigate Assassinations, a coordinating group formed in 1969 of various Warren Commission critics. Fensterwald has financed private investigations into President Kennedy's assassination and is assembling a central compendium of JFK conspiracy evidence. A specialist on Oswald's mysterious travels to Mexico City two months before the assassination, Fensterwald also has served as Harold Weisberg's attorney in court battles aimed at forcing Freedom of Information Act release of FBI "spectrographic analyses" of the bullets used in the shooting.

**Richard Sprague**—A computer specialist, Sprague has researched the possible role of intelligence agencies in the JFK murder. Author of frequent magazine articles relating to the assassination, Sprague also specializes in photographic evidence of the shooting and evaluations of media coverage

There the matter rested until 1969, when a former FBI agent tipped off Peter Noyes, a producer for CBS television, about the existence of a mystery man named Braden in the assassination story. At the time, the former agent was working in New Orleans for District Attorney Jim Garrison, who was later to claim he had "solved" the Kennedy murder, only to have his suspects acquitted in one of the more bizarre, if not ludicrous, prosecutions of our time. Noyes followed up the clue, and his initial findings transformed him into one of the breed known as "assassination buffs." Noyes wrote a solid though scarcely noticed book on his findings called *Legacy of Doubt*. In it he demonstrates that Braden was actually Eugene Hale Brading, a frequently jailed racketeer with longstanding ties to organized crime. In September 1963, Eugene Hale Brading notified the California Department of Motor Vehicles that he had legally changed his name to Jim Braden, and was issued a new license under that name.

In November 1963, while still on pro-

of the assassination controversy.

**Josiah Thompson**—A philosophy professor at Haverford College, Thompson's book, *Six Seconds in Dallas*, is, with Meagher's book, one of the most respected works on the subject. A specialist in ballistic and photographic evidence of the assassination, Thompson worked as a consultant for *Life* magazine in analyzing the Zapruder film in the mid-1960s—an analysis that led to the magazine's advocacy of a re-opening of the assassination investigation.

**Donald Freed**—Freed was co-author of the 1973 film *Executive Action*, which reenacted the JFK assassination with emphasis on official evidence suggesting a conspiracy. He has been active in California groups working to re-open both the JFK and RFK assassination investigations.

**Dr. Cyril H. Wecht**—A forensics expert and coroner of Allegheny County in Pennsylvania, Dr. Wecht is one of the few medical experts ever allowed to examine the JFK autopsy photographs and X-rays in the National Archives. Author of several articles attacking the single-bullet theory, Dr. Wecht maintains that at least one shot struck Kennedy from the front. He recently charged that the Rockefeller Commission deliberately "misrepresented" his testimony on the nature of the President's wounds and on the possibility of a second assassin.

**Mark Lane**—His early bestseller, *Rush to Judgment*, made Lane one of the best known Warren Commission critics. He continues his decade-long tour of the college campus circuit and has formed the Washington-based Citizens' Commission of Inquiry, which works toward a re-opening of the JFK case.

**Dick Gregory**—The humorist has been investigating the JFK assassination for the past year and has made frequent appearances on college campuses. He recently testified before the Rockefeller Commission and claims photographs show Watergate burglars E. Howard Hunt and Frank Sturgis present at the JFK assassination scene. Gregory's willingness to embrace nearly any conspiracy theory has damaged his credibility among more serious critics.

bation for an embezzlement conviction, Braden received permission from the Parole Board in Los Angeles to make a trip to Texas. On November 21, he checked in with Roger Carroll, the chief parole officer in Dallas, who reported that Braden informed him "he planned to see Lamar Hunt and other oil speculators while here." Lamar Hunt is a son of the late billionaire oilman, H. L. Hunt, who long was active in rightwing politics. Paul Rothermel, a former FBI agent then serving as chief of security for the Hunt Oil Company, has confirmed that on the afternoon of November 21, twenty-four hours before the assassination, Braden visited the Hunt offices with a group of men, at least one of whom was known to Los Angeles police to be a member of the Mafia.

That same afternoon, according to a statement he made to the Warren Commission himself, Jack Ruby visited the same offices of H. L. Hunt. The Commission, however, asked him nothing about Braden, nor at any point did it seem to occur to the drafters of the Warren re-

port that there might be a Ruby-Braden connection.

Having fixed the likelihood of this connection, turn now to another mysterious figure named David Ferrie. The FBI and the Secret Service both scrutinized Ferrie for possible involvement in the assassination but neither reported anything incriminating to the Warren Commission. Ferrie subsequently achieved a certain renown when Garrison—whom assassination “revisionists” recently have begun taking more seriously—pointed to him publicly as one of the targets of his murder case. Six days after Garrison’s announcement, Ferrie was found dead in his apartment in New Orleans. The death was ruled a suicide, though some of the evidence suggested murder.

Curiously, the FBI and Secret Service reports on Ferrie were not among the documents published by the Warren Commission. They were released by the Justice Department years later, as part of what was said to be a campaign to discredit Garrison’s prosecution.

Ferrie was an ex-airline pilot who was employed by Carlos Marcello at a variety of odd jobs, including transporting his boss around in a private airplane. Ferrie is said to have flown the gangster back into the country after Marcello’s contested deportation by Robert Kennedy. In the weeks before the assassination, Ferrie worked with Marcello’s attorney on an investigation to defeat perjury charges which Kennedy had brought against his boss. The office in which Ferrie was based was Room 1707 of the Pere Marquette Building in New Orleans. At the same time, Jim Braden was working, ostensibly on matters related to the oil business, either in Room 1706, the adjacent office, or in Room 1701, just down the hall.

Evidence now exists to confirm that Ferrie, in addition to being a pilot, was a homosexual, a narcotics addict, a hypnotist of some talent, and a gun enthusiast. On November 23, the day following the assassination, an informant told the Secret Service that Ferrie was acquainted with Lee Harvey Oswald, in fact had trained him in the use of a rifle with a telescopic sight and had visited him in Dallas earlier that month. A suggestion also was made that Ferrie did, or was to, pilot a getaway plane from Dallas after Kennedy was killed.

It was not until November 25 that the FBI and the Secret Service caught up with Ferrie—his whereabouts during the previous few days still are not fully accounted for—and confronted him with the charges. Ferrie denied them all, and when he told his interrogators whom he suspected to be their informant, they did not contradict him. When the informant heard over the radio that Ferrie had been questioned, he immediately retracted his accusations, as any prudent man who knew of Ferrie’s relations with the Mafia might do. From this retraction the Warren Commission concluded that the informant’s assertions were without validity, and proceeded to drop Ferrie not only from their deliberations but, save for one obscure reference, from their twenty-six

volumes of supportive material.

Thus the chain was broken. It might have been possible, with investigative work, to establish links from field operators Ferrie, Ruby, and Braden to planners Marcello and Hoffa to grand strategists at the highest levels of the Mafia. But with its investigations aborted at the bottom, the Warren Commission had no way of getting to the top.

One might wonder what role Oswald played onstage if the behind-the-scenes drama resembled what is conjectured here. The obvious answer is that he was silenced by Ruby, under orders, because he knew too much. But what did Oswald know?

According to the testimony of a KGB defector in a recently declassified Warren Commission document disclosed by CBS’s Daniel Schorr, the Russians were so convinced that Oswald was a CIA agent that they refused to let him re-enter the country after his first trip there. But then the Warren Commission told us that a man whose associations were with Communists, Cubans, and right-wing extremists, who had a Russian wife and traveled widely abroad without visible source of income, acted out of motives that were wholly psychopathic. The most one can say for the Warren Commission is that it conscientiously collected information, then proceeded to make a travesty of it.

As for the murder of Robert Kennedy, there is far less information to deal with. The political and criminal forces that found John Kennedy’s death congenial to their purposes would have had the same motives for seeing Robert Kennedy dead too. The threats to Bobby have been plentifully documented. It is no surprise that he was left alone from the time he left the Justice Department in 1964 until June 5, 1968. The night he was killed was the night that, having just won the Democratic primary in California, he was celebrating the momentum that seemed might propel him to the Presidency.

Even when it was universally accepted that Sirhan Sirhan murdered Robert Kennedy in a fit of anti-Israeli madness, there was testimony on his unexplained contacts with dubious characters in California prior to the shooting. In April 1974, Bernard Barker, the Watergate burglar and CIA liaison to the Cuban battalions during the Bay of Pigs, hinted in an NBC interview of CIA knowledge of some strange connection between Cuban politics and Robert Kennedy’s death. Now that the case has been reopened, almost any new theory is fair game.

Perhaps Senator Church is correct when he says that in its investigation into activities of American intelligence agencies “this committee already has enough on its plate” and can’t take on Kennedy assassinations too. But if the Church committee has no appetite, then there ought to be another committee, with a clean plate, prepared to dig into the assassinations of John and Robert Kennedy.

## The Assassination Theories

A plot to secretly control who will be, or will not be, the next President of the United States; sets of footprints that lead to shadowy ex-CIA/ex-FBI characters; a cast of assorted Cuban exile operatives; intrigues in Mexico to finance the plot; the director of the FBI helping to cover up the conspiracy; death threats, large cash bundles, official stonewalls.

All are elements in the assassination of President Kennedy as well as in the crimes collectively known as Watergate. And despite three years of intensive investigation, we still do not know for sure, as Sam Ervin has said, who ordered the Watergate break-in. No one has been indicted for initiating the Watergate act. Was it Mitchell? Magruder? Colson? Nixon? We may never know. Is it any wonder then that speculation persists about who killed John Kennedy, a much greater crime about which much less is known?

A rundown of some of the JFK assassination theories:

**The Russians**—Soon after the JFK shooting some observers theorized that the Russians, under Nikita Khrushchev, were the real conspirators behind the assassination, even though Kennedy and Khrushchev had established a personal detente of sorts. Though Lee Harvey Oswald had been to Russia, no evidence to support this theory was uncovered. The thought that the Russians would risk world nuclear war by assassinating the American President (who would be succeeded by a more conservative President) soon faded into obscurity.

**Fidel Castro**—The Cuban dictator soon became a more likely suspect in the alleged conspiracy. Oswald, of course, was identified as a pro-Castro Marxist, and Castro was a fiery militant. However, here again, evidence was lacking. Recent revelations of repeated CIA attempts to kill Castro—several during the Kennedy years—have refueled the “Castro scenario,” the theory that the assassination was retaliation. The late President Lyndon Johnson once voiced suspicions along these lines.

**Anti-Castro Cuban Exiles**—Unfortunately for those critics who had eyed Castro as the real force behind the shooting, Oswald had also had repeated contact with anti-Castro groups, both in New Orleans and elsewhere. In addition, Oswald and his wife were closely acquainted with several Russian refugees in Dallas opposed to the Soviet government. Oswald also had reported ties to people on the right of the political spectrum, including militants involved in the anti-Castro Bay of Pigs invasion, which the CIA coordinated and Kennedy aborted. Additionally, federal agencies had received reports as late as two weeks before the assassination alleging that an anti-Castro group of Kennedy-hating Cubans was planning to assassinate the President.

**The Dallas Police**—With Jack Ruby’s murder of Oswald in front of a phalanx of Dallas policemen in the police department basement, the conservative-dominated Dallas police force came under suspicion. Ruby had somehow gained entrance to the basement just seconds before the killing. Ruby was a personal friend of several dozen Dallas cops, and his stripjoint nightclub was a gathering place for many on the force. In addition, many people viewed the mysterious shooting of Dallas patrolman J. D. Tippit shortly after the assassination as part of the alleged conspiracy. Oswald was charged with the Tippit slaying but reports surfaced of possible contact between Ruby and Tippit at Ruby’s nightclub. Right-wing financing of the assassination—perhaps

from the Texas oil empires of various Kennedy-haters—also usually is tossed into the Dallas police scenario.

**The Mafia**—That other legion of Kennedy haters, the Mafia, also has been a suspect behind the ultimate act of organized crime, killing the chief of state. Again the key was Jack Ruby. A sinister, pistol-packing hoodlum from Chicago, Ruby was shady and his friends were shady. The idea of this hardbitten character throwing his life away to kill Oswald for no apparent reason just doesn't wash with many people. Thus Ruby and his reported connections to organized crime became areas of suspicion.

**The CIA and FBI**—Some regarded as the more "radical" critics of the Warren Commission came to suspect the nation's top intelligence and law enforcement agencies. Rumors that Oswald once had been in the employ of the FBI were rampant in Texas following the assassination. The Attorney General of Texas himself transmitted similar allegations to the Warren Commission. Suspicions also were fueled by Oswald's reported contact with people allegedly connected with the CIA and by the careless way the CIA and FBI conducted their supposedly thorough investigations of the President's murder. Secret classified files on both Oswald and Ruby were quietly transferred from the CIA and FBI to a locked vault in the National Archives—legally restricted from disclosure until the year 2039.

**The Military**—The old *Seven Days in May* scenario has an enraged anti-Kennedy Pen-

tagon plotting his assassination in the interests of "national security." President Kennedy, as some of the critics were quick to point out, once had mused that General Curtis Lemay of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was the kind of man who might want "to get rid of" a President. Kennedy's gestures towards rapprochement with Russia and his Test Ban Treaty of late 1963, which some top Pentagon brass viewed with alarm, have been cited as motivation for his elimination.

**The Others**—Groups and individuals spanning the conspiracy-laden horizon from left to right and back again have been suggested as the real conspirators behind the assassination. The Chinese planned it all. The John Birch Society. Western European intelligence operatives. The Reverend Carl McIntire. Madame Nhu. The Minutemen. Charles McGarry in his recent novel, *The Tears of Autumn*, presents a clever case that members of Ngo Dinh Diem's family had Kennedy killed in retaliation for the assassination of the South Vietnamese premier. Richard Condon, in another recent novel, *Winter Kills*, saw the conspirators as a cabal of disgruntled right-wing businessmen headed by none other than Joseph P. Kennedy.

It's impossible to say now who any conspirators were, but all leading Warren Commission critics believe the following parties either carried out the assassination or were involved in concealing the identity of those who did: Cuban refugee conspirators

with close CIA and/or Mafia ties; elements of the Dallas police force; elements of the FBI; extreme right-wing financiers; and organized crime figures.

Some of the more studious Warren Commission critics believe that Victor Marchetti, the former CIA executive and author of *The CIA and the Cult of Intelligence*, recently supplied an important piece of the puzzle in confirming information he originally disclosed to several people in the late 1960s.

Marchetti, who once was executive assistant to the deputy director of the CIA, said that during one of several high-level CIA meetings he attended in early 1969, then-CIA Director Richard Helms admitted that Clay Shaw, the man New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison alleged to have been a key assassination conspirator, was in fact a CIA contact man. Marchetti reports that Helms went on to say that "the Agency" might have to "give some help" to Shaw during Garrison's controversial prosecution of him. Marchetti says Director Helms also spoke of helping David Ferrie, the mysterious airline pilot who was subsequently found dead shortly after Garrison announced that Ferrie also was a target of his investigation.

Marchetti also reports that there were other high-level CIA discussions, some of which he did not attend, regarding Garrison's investigation. Marchetti is preparing a detailed account of this information. □

THE DETROIT NEWS

1 DECEMBER 1975

## Traded secrets for political help

# Church CIA report aided Soviet's KGB

By COL. R.D. HEINL JR., USMC (Ret.)  
News Military Analyst

WASHINGTON—Under a gelatinous coat of preachy sanctimony and pietistic breastbeating, the Church report on CIA assassination plots is a brazen tradeoff of state secrets for partisan (read Democratic) advantage in an election year.

Back in 1929 when, to considerable national cost, Henry L. Stimson axed in entirety the United States' foreign code-breaking program, he uttered the dictum: "Gentlemen do not read each other's mail."

History, that cruelest looking-glass, quickly and ever after made Stimson look like a Pecksniffian fool for having blinded American intelligence during half the decade immediately preceding Pearl Harbor. And it was thanks only to Franklin Roosevelt's less moralistic view of a perilous world that we were again able by mid-1942 to read Japan's codes and thereby reverse the Pacific War at the battle of Midway.

HENRY STIMSON MAY NOW move over to make room for Frank Church. On page 259 of the senator's canting hatchet-job on the CIA, we read the following preachment: "We do not think that traditional notions of American fair play need be abandoned when dealing with our



Col. Heinl

adversaries." (Tass, Pravda, and KGB headquarters please copy.)

Frank Merriwell could hardly have put it better.

(Church's senatorial cohort and fellow spirit on the committee, Sen. Schweiker, gives even the late Merriwell a run for his money by modestly describing the report—which he of course signed—as "An example of our greatness as a nation.")

An example, all right: but of greatness, no; of suicidal stupidity, yes.

Nothing could more clearly demonstrate both the partisanship and the slippery desire to dodge blame for consequences than the Senate's leadership decision to prevent an up or down vote after a furious four-hour debate as to whether the report should be issued or killed. In the end, by sheer Democratic weight, a record vote was avoided and the Senate thus let it all hang out.

As to the report itself, the following observations seem in order:

No distinction whatever is made between assassination and what in all cases mentioned (Trujillo, Duvalier, Lumumba, Castro, Sukharno, Diem) was in fact, or would have been if realized, tyrannicide. The slaying of tyrants, which all the above abundantly were, has been morally sanctioned by ancient philosophers and by church fathers for 2,500 years—except apparently when involving the CIA.

The report reeks of exposure for exposure's sake far beyond any requirement of history or future guidance. The wilful insistence of Sen. Church & Co. on naming

and thus fingering for lethal retribution, living individuals who on orders and in line of duty took part in operations described is only one example of the committee's zeal for sensation. Another random example is the solicitude for readers with which the report, not content with identifying certain groups by contemporary designations, carefully explains their current (and until now, secret) titles, functions and identities.

Closely akin to the foregoing, the report savagely punishes the honorable, intelligent, yes, patriotic men whom four Presidents gave the job of protecting and pursuing the interests, objectives, and security of the United States in mortal contest with the Kremlin and the KGB. The senators' treatment of high-minded, able public servants such as Richard Helms and Richard Bissell, let alone incumbent CIA Director W. E. Colby (whom President Ford to be sure shucked off like a 4th Class Postmaster) is enough to discourage any man of spirit from public service.

Besides exposing intelligence misdeeds—if misdeeds they were, a concession I for one do not make—the committee repeatedly slanders out working details of U.S. intelligence methods. The late Mr. and Mrs. Rosenberg rightfully went to the electric chair for revealing to Russia the working details of an atom bomb. Is it any less heinous—however high-minded the claimed motives in either case—to reveal to the world (and thus instantly the KGB) how American intelligence works?

By deeply ironic coincidence last week as Sen. Church was preparing to blacken the intelligence community with his report, word finally seeped into the open of the late J. Edgar Hoover's despicable campaign to assassinate both character and body of Martin Luther King Jr. Compared to anything the CIA may have done beyond the frontiers of the United States in kill-or-be-killed encounter with international communism, Hoover's perform-

25 November 1975

Bob Wiedrich

# Congress never bothered to ask

ance was that of a Himmler and a deep disgrace to the FBI, which has done so much otherwise to protect the country.

By contrast, the CIA's worst crime has been to try to carry out the wishes, whether expressed or implied, of four Presidents of the United States. Standing in Pharisaic judgment today, Sen. Church admits the "tensions" in the report but says the main question is to resolve the role of secret institutions in a free and democratic society.

But that is only one question and perhaps only an incidental one.

How long, senators, could the United States remain "a free and democratic society" or even remain alive without the kind of secret institutions, committed to the keeping of honorable, decent men, that the Central Intelligence Agency has to be in order to fulfill its ultimate, essential duties?

THE GUARDIAN (MANCHESTER)

25 NOVEMBER 1975

## London Letter

YOU WERE all quite wrong. America is nowhere near the paranoid society you imagined before those reassuring CIA plot hearings blew the cobwebs away. Herewith a memo frank and trusting enough to make Kim Philby weep.

It comes from the New York HQ of NBC, the television network, and goes to all its correspondents and part-time "stringers" around the world. "Recent reports from Washington," it says, "indicate that the CIA and other intelligence groups within our Government employ abroad various people who are contributors to the major news media.

"NBC's policy is simple and correct. No one who works for NBC news on a staff or freelance basis can work for anyone else without telling news management. Not informing management is grounds for dismissal."

So far so good.

"Therefore," continues the memo, "we ask you to sign below after answering the following question. Do you work for, contribute information to, or advise any agency, office, or department of the US Government or any foreign Government?"

Thereafter you either tick no, or yes. If yes explain. Spies please note.

BY UNEARTHING the Central Intelligence Agency plots to assassinate foreign leaders, the Congress of the United States has taken the road to repentance.

For if there is one single group in America that must share the blame for such unbridled insanity, it is Congress itself. Until now, it has failed miserably in its constitutional duty to hold the superspy agency in check.

Since the CIA's birth after World War II, its annual appropriations have been inviolate, the billion-dollar lifeblood of its international and domestic operations unquestioned by the men charged by their election with the essential function of overseeing the CIA.

SO BECAUSE the CIA had a free rein, and because some of its zealots knew that, such lunacy was at liberty to fester and to take form. And now we, the American people whom Congress represents, must pay the price of international shame.

Think of it, entertaining serious thoughts of killing foreign leaders working for their own national interests merely because their objectives happened not to coincide with ours.

That, simply, is what the CIA plots were all about, eliminating by violent means people who disagreed with us.

And that tortured philosophy was able to gain credence within an official arm of the government of a nation that has always respected differences of opinion and freedom of political thought, even when it bordered on overthrow of that government.

However, sadly, that has proven to be our only domestic stance. Overseas, at least in the overzealous minds of a select few at the CIA, it was a different ball game, a different bag with no holds barred and murder the ultimate punishment for those who opposed the United States on their own nationalistic grounds.

There is no question in our mind that people like Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba, and Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo were a threat to the United States and its hopes for a peaceful world at the time the CIA assassinations are said to have been hatched.

But we simply are not that kind of nation. We can tolerate differences of thought and political ideology. In other times and other places, we have found ways of combating threats to our security, but with methods far less lethal.

The bearded Castro is a good example of other means. We diminished his global impact through economic sanctions. We defanged his Russian missiles by firm diplomatic and military actions. We bared for the world what his oppres-

sive communist dictatorship threatened to Latin-American stability.

The CIA did not have to plot eight assassination attempts to undermine Castro's position 90 miles off the American mainland. Nor, for that matter, did it have to conjure kooky plots to topple Lumumba by death instead of logic.

However, reprehensible as assassination may be a majority of Americans, that philosophy did take hold within the inner circles of the CIA and, apparently, with the approval of at least two of its former directors, Allen Dulles and Richard Helms.

We assume that in their minds any means justified the end, so long as the act was committed in the name of preserving democracy.

Dulles is reported by the Senate Select Intelligence Committee to have taken the late President Eisenhower's disapproval of Patrice Lumumba as an unspoken authority for assassination. The same holds true for Helms in his testimony before the House Intelligence Committee.

Helms told Rep. Morgan Murphy Jr. [D., Ill.] that the genesis for the plots entertained for Castro came out of a discussion at the White House about the Cuban dictator.

Helms, now the American ambassador to Iran, recalled the late Atty. Gen. Robert Kennedy wondered what could be done about eliminating the Castro problem. And Helms testified he took that to mean he now had authority to do anything in his power to rid the hemisphere of Castro.

Later, his underlings interpreted that to mean anything — including murder. Presumably, they assumed that since other foreign governments did that kind of thing, the United States could, too.

Worse, they probably also assumed that since neither the President nor Congress had ever inquired into the dirty clandestine dealings of the agency, their lack of interest constituted silent approval.

NOBODY EVER ASKED. They never had to account to anyone. So why not assume that assassination, as a shortcut to rational behavior, had won tacit approval as an instrument of foreign policy?

Damaging and painful as the CIA murder plot disclosures may be to American pride and prestige, they have also had the effect of returning Congress to its responsibilities to ride herd on the CIA.

The United States needs an efficient intelligence community in order to survive. But if we sink to the level of our enemies, have we not become the instrument of our own destruction?

# RADIO TV REPORTS, INC.

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FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS STAFF

PROGRAM Commentary STATION WTOP Radio  
 DATE November 23, 1975 11:56 AM CITY Washington, D.C.  
 SUBJECT Full Text

ANNOUNCER: And now commentary on News Radio-15, a personal point of view from Hugh Sidey.

HUGH SIDEY: We will be digesting the bizarre stories of CIA misadventure for weeks and months, the intriguing details laid out in the Senate's report on CIA assassination attempts.

It is a black drama filled with too much brutality, immortality, lying, arrogance, and the evident corruption of power and secrecy.

But there are some things we should keep in mind as we read about the poison pills, the guns, the grenades, and the schemes to kill Castro and Lamumba, and to help other revolutionaries get rid of their leaders.

The late 1950's and the early 1960's were tense times on this globe. The Soviet Union ruthlessly crushed uprisings in Hungary, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. There were murders and kidnappings in the shadowy back halls of counterintelligence.

We perceive Communism as a monolithic monster bent on devouring the world, whether right or wrong.

Recall the grim year of 1961, we had to send troops over the German Autoban into Berlin to assert our rights. John Kennedy heard Nikita Khrushchev pound the table in Vienna and say Berlin was "a bone in his throat that had to be removed."

They buzzed our airlines, fired on innocent planes, then the Berlin wall went up, as ugly and affront to human dignity as man has divided beyond the gas chambers of the Nazis and the prison camps of the Soviet Union.

In that world, at that time, when most of the assassination plots and other dirty tricks were devised, we asked if the CIA was as good as the KGB? Could our agents kill and lie and steal as well as the Communists?

We worried if our poison pills and our silent rifles would work as well as the enemy's.

We may have been wrong, nevertheless. That's what we



worried about.

We expected the men who ran these operations to act innocent in public, to distort or evade the truth when questioned.

It is a different world now. We needed this report. We need to change our ways to counter our adversaries, but the actions of the men who fought those silent, deadly battles for us years ago should be measured by those times, not today's world.

This is Hugh Sidey.

NEWSDAY

26 November 1975

**Nick Thimmesch**

## Murky Facts In CIA Reports

Washington—So the United States revealed the dark and sinister side of its multifaceted self, with the release of the report on the CIA by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The bright and virtuous side is seldom on display these days.

Depending on whose interest is at stake, the lengthy report is likened to a fat Uncle Sam taking his pants off at a cocktail party (CIA view); a brave, penitent, upright Uncle Sam confessing all before the world congregation (Sen. Frank Church's [D-Idaho] view); the old script of a politician grabbing hold of a publicity-generating investigation and using it as a springboard to what? (Cynic's view of Sen. Church.)

Actually, there's a bit of all three in this episode; and while the report doesn't nail one President as ordering an assassination, there are enough questions raised so that they all look suspicious. Still, the evidence is so tentative, even murky, that one wonders, if the report on "alleged CIA assassination plots" should have been issued at all.

Those who have professionally defended the republic for a generation see the Church report as a spectacle, a public punishment of one member by the rest of the family. To the rest of the world, this indecent exposure is inexplicable, making European cynics observe that the United States is not a nation but a church, that Puritanism and the pharisaical impulse still prevail here.

The CIA is damaged but not as badly as its old hands expected. The agency loses the benefit of many an American abroad adventurous and patriotic enough

to turn in some information now and then. One such informant even fears execution.

Ironically, Sen. Church began his investigation on the high road, vowing nonpartisanship, no news leaks and a paucity of sensationalism. The old hands feel that Church wound up as the sensationalist, and that Rep. Otis Pike (D-Riverhead), who is doing the House version on the CIA, has changed from wild charger to careful analyst—particularly in terms of the CIA's budget and management capability.

But now come the holy men who joined Church at his press conference and spoke piously about the evil deeds our government was capable of. When it comes to individual Presidents, however, there are many disclaimers. Indeed, the only presidential name to darken the headlines over stories here in The Washington Post this week was that of its favorite ogre, Richard Nixon, and his "orders" on Chile.

There is substance in the charges that all the testimony given to Church's committee was not reflected in the final version, and that there was "selective" reporting. Then, too, the report is studded with apparently meaningless tidbits. For example, a claim is made for evidence that a "close friend" of President Kennedy had frequent contact with mobsters John Rosselli and Sam Giancana, at a time when they were subsequently identified as being involved in a plot to assassinate Castro. Suddenly, we are treated to a footnote reassuring us that Frank Sinatra "is not the President's friend discussed in the preceding subsection." Egad, what does that mean? Forget it. The names strewn through this report may be those of "big" or "small" men, but little is proved.

Small wonder that the cowardly Senate conducted debate on the report but never voted on the important question of its release. The Senate tigers left that responsibility to the Church committee, which, after all these weeks, had little option but to release what they had been searching for.

Sen. Church is expected to announce his candidacy for the presidency in a couple of months. There will be no interim report on any other plans he has.

WASHINGTON POST  
11 DEC 1975

## The CIA and FBI as Threats to the Country

If we do not master the CIA, we shall no longer have any respect abroad. And if we don't bring the FBI to heel, we won't have any respect for ourselves at home.

It is intolerable that we should nurture agencies effectively answerable to no one—secret organizations whose moral code resembles that of the original Murder, Inc.

What sort of a country is America, what kind of people are we, to let a lot of faceless ideologies befoul our national honor?

The CIA abroad and the FBI at home are an affront to the heritage we expect to celebrate in 1976. They have disgraced the flag. They have incidentally distorted and

vitiated the legitimate functions of investigation and disclosure that we entrusted to them.

The CIA has given every one of our detractors abroad an irrefutable opportunity to blame our country for any outrage occurring anywhere in the world. The CIA should be recognized as America's rival to the Irish IRA and the Arab terrorist guerrillas—except that the CIA hasn't the guts or the gutsiness to

claim credit for its dirty deeds.

But the deeds of the CIA abroad—real, imagined, or imputed—are the deeds of the United States of America. And as long as the CIA may engage in covert "dirty tricks" abroad, we are not in control of our own affairs in this dangerous world. In its present form and function, the CIA is a deadly threat to the honor, authority, and security of our country.

JAMES E. BRYAN

Washington

NEW YORK TIMES  
11 Dec. 1975

## House Committee Drops Charge Against Kissinger

By DAVID E. ROSENBAUM

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 10—The House Select Committee on Intelligence today withdrew its recommendation that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger be held in contempt of Congress for failing to provide the committee with subpoenaed documents.

The chairman, Otis G. Pike, told the House in a brief speech this afternoon that a confrontation had been averted because the Ford Administration had been in "substantial compliance" with the subpoena.

It was the second time this week that a committee, after threatening to ask the full House to cite a Cabinet member for contempt, had reached an accommodation with the Administration over access to information.

Secretary of Commerce Rogers C. B. Morton agreed Monday to give the House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation a list of American companies that had been asked to support an Arab economic boycott of Israel.

The two cases were handled according to a tradition, as old as the republic, for resolving conflicts between two branches of government.

Both sides—Congress and the executive branch—asserted their claims vigorously for a time but did not press them to a conclusion. Instead, they arrived at a compromise that left unanswered the Constitutional question of whether Congress has an absolute right to information collected by the executive.

Over the years, a succession of Presidents and Congresses has been reluctant to test the issue in court. Each side fears that it might lose and set a precedent that would prove to be damaging in similar situations in the future.

The dispute between the intelligence committee and Mr. Kissinger involved the committee's demand for 20 separate State Department requests to Presidents since 1961 for covert operations abroad.

Time and again in recent weeks, Mr. Pike argued that the committee needed the actual State Department documents to determine whether Presidents had exercised proper control over intelligence agencies.

President Ford asserted the doctrine of executive privilege

and refused to relinquish the material on the ground that to do so would violate the confidentiality necessary to Presidential decision-making.

The compromise breaking the deadlock was arrived at last night at a meeting between a delegation from committee and Presidential assistants.

### Briefing Settles Issue

Under the compromise, William G. Hyland, director of the State Department's bureau of intelligence, agreed to brief the committee extensively on the contents of the documents, and the committee agreed not to press its claim to see the documents themselves.

"We did not get everything we wanted," Mr. Pike, a Suffolk County Democrat, told his committee this morning, "but we got more than they were willing to give us."

A Congressional official who was briefed on the documents characterized them as "certainly not spectacular or dramatic" and added, "The information was not worth the battle."

There was no objection from the 12 other committee members to Mr. Pike's proposal that the recommendation of contempt be dropped. Later, there was scattered applause from Democrats and Republicans after Mr. Pike announced the committee's decision on the House floor.

The House Democratic leadership worked actively to prevent the contempt citations against Mr. Kissinger and Mr. Morton from being brought to a vote of the full house.

A staff member who works closely with the leadership said the leaders feared that Congress would suffer regardless of the outcome of the votes.

In their view, if the contempt citations were rejected, it would seriously embarrass the committees that had sponsored them. If, on the other hand, the citations were approved, long court battles would result, with the committees still not having access to the information they wanted.

By dividing power among three branches of government, the framers of the Constitution guaranteed that there would be repeated conflicts between branches. The issue of access to information has often been

the battleground for such conflicts because of the close relationship between information and power.

The first such dispute was probably the one in 1792 in which President Washington decided to withhold from Congress details of Gen. Arthur St. Clair's disastrous expedition against the Indians. Eventually, however, the President yielded and Congress held its investigation,

## JONATHAN STEELE on the CIA scandal Secure as ever

A FEW DAYS ago, before the publication of the CIA assassination report, the New York Times interviewed several of the agency's officials asking if their work was likely to be impaired by the current spotlight of public attention. The answer from the horse's mouth was "No."

This sobering and probably realistic assessment may explain the relative silence in which yesterday's damning report has been received in this country. It would be nice to report that shock and horror are the main reactions.

Alas, that is not so. Embarrassment, cynicism, a feeling that when it comes to national security anything goes, and "doesn't the KGB do the same thing, anyway?" are more common attitudes. Several Republicans, including Senator Barry Goldwater, did not want to see the assassination report published.

There is even a degree of faint amusement about it all. The bungling of the various assassination plots, the bizarre and ridiculous schemes which some agents at the far end of the chain of command dreamed up, and the Keystone Cops image of it all, are getting banner headlines here. They give the comfortable impression that, thank God, American boys were amateurs in this business.

Yet, two fundamental conclusions emerge from a close reading of all the numerous secret cables and notes which the Senate report now publishes for the first time. The CIA comes out as a lavishly financed, extremely powerful organisation, able and only too willing, at the White House's direction, to spend millions of dollars on bribing foreign politicians and army officers, fomenting strikes and disturbances, and creating economic chaos.

Before Senator Allende's election in Chile, Mr. Nixon, with Dr. Kissinger's backing, ordered "Save Chile, not concerned risk involved . . . no involvement of embassy . . . 10 million dollars available, if necessary . . . make the economy scream."

The other main thread in the report is the doctrine of "plausible deniability" ("no involvement of embassy"), or as the one-time Director of the CIA, Mr. Richard

Helms, said about the attempted murder of Castro: "One sort of grows up in the tradition of the time, and I think that any of us would have found it very difficult to discuss assassination with a President of the United States. I just think we all had the feeling that we're hired to keep those things out of the Oval Office . . . but, if he had disappeared from the scene, they would not have been unhappy."

Does one then believe it when some officials claim that covert operations are a thing of the past? The CIA officials interviewed by the New York Times described some of the changes which have resulted from publicity.

"Some British intelligence officials no longer tell us where they get their information," but only give it to the CIA "on loan" to prevent it being subpoenaed by Congress as the "property" of the CIA. But, the CIA officials claimed, these restrictions were minor. "We've staved off the worst," one source put it in the New York Times.

For Europeans, the CIA revelations are almost equally relevant. The present Administration sees Western Europe nowadays as a more important testing ground for the Western system than any flashpoint in the Third World. In spite of the recent denial by Dr. Mario Soares of CIA involvement in Portugal, via the Western Socialist Party, Washington still envies its European allies for what it sees as their ability to act there without the same scrutiny as the American press.

The gradual electoral success of Italy's Communists is causing major worry to the Administration. Because of Italy's membership in NATO and the Common Market, it is considered more alarming than the situation in Portugal. Moderate Communists are described as more dangerous than Stalinists and more frightening than Cunhal.

The question is whether the same kind of operation as the Senate inquiry has now revealed in the Third World could be or, indeed, is being planned in Western Europe, and whether the European public would react with as much cynicism and as little embarrassment as most Americans are doing here today?

Congress would concede that it had given more than the other side to avoid contempt actions.

The truth seems to be, in the view of officials who have seen such disputes come and go over the years, that neither side relinquished much. Congress was able to get most of the information it wanted, and the Administration was able to maintain the longstanding position of Presidents that Congress is not entitled to information that a President wishes to withhold.

As has often been the case in past confrontations, today

## The Washington Merry-Go-Round

# Criticism of CIA Exposure Rejected

By Jack Anderson  
and Les Whitten

Spiro Agnew resurfaced the other day to warn against revoking the Central Intelligence Agency's writ to assassinate foreign VIPs. He doesn't want high level murder to get out of hand, mind you, but regards it as "an extreme option that we should keep."

At the same time, members of Congress, administration spokesmen and even some editorialists have denounced congressional committees for publicizing the CIA's homicidal intrigues. There are signs that the committees are backing off and pulling their punches.

Some of the critics oppose washing our blood-stained linen in public because it hinders intelligence gathering, complicates our relations with touchy nations whose leaders may have been on our hit list and alienates people around the world who might look askance upon government gangsterism.

Others contend that the CIA must operate at the same subterranean level as the KGB; that we must confront the Communists in the netherworld as well as the visible world; that we must give our officials secret authority to play the dirty game, trusting them to do the right thing.

The trouble with such sentiments is that they are un-American. Literally. They simply cannot be squared with four fundamental assumptions upon which the American system was constructed:

(1) Officialdom, left to itself, will tend to do wrong not right; (2) powers not rigidly limited and regularly inspected will be used against our people as well as others; (3) secret, unaccountable powers must be forbidden to government, particularly the power to commit crimes; and (4) should one branch usurp such powers, the others are duty bound to expose and restrain it.

Is it possible that, only 16 months after the Watergate climax, these homely truisms must be relearned? If so, there is need to review how the CIA got into the assassination business.

Who, for instance, gave the CIA authority to commit murder? In this land, the people are the sovereigns, and the government cannot assume powers that the people do not bestow. Any agency that operates beyond its authority, therefore, is acting illegally.

The assassination plots, like Adolf Hitler's death ovens, were carefully hidden from the people. If the Senate intelligence committee could not identify who had authorized the killing of undesirable potentates, the committee at least traced how the ugly secret finally leaked out.

We played the key role in this unraveling, which began almost nine years ago. On March 7, 1967, we reported a 1963 CIA plot to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro. "Our sources agree," we wrote, "that a plot against Castro definitely was taken up inside the CIA at the time Senator Robert Kennedy, D-N.Y., was riding herd on the agency for his brother."

This was the first that President Johnson had heard about it. Our story, according to the committee, "prompted Johnson to direct (CIA chief Richard) Helms to conduct an investigation."

As we poked deeper into the dark recesses of the CIA, meanwhile, we contacted John McCone, who had headed the CIA during the assassination attempts. In great alarm, he called Robert Kennedy, who asked him to set down his recollections in memo form. McCone dictated the memo on April 14, 1967.

Relates the committee: "The memorandum was prompted by a telephone call from the newspaper columnist Jack Anderson, who at that time was preparing a column on Castro assassination attempts. After talking with Anderson on the telephone, at Robert Kennedy's request, McCone dictated the April 14, 1967 memorandum, which stated . . . 'I recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro.'"

Helms, meanwhile, assigned the CIA inspector general to conduct the investigation Johnson had requested. The subsequent report, dated May 23, 1967, confirmed a series of CIA assassination involvements.

But Helms deceived Johnson, the committee says, by giving him an abridged oral report on the earlier attempts to kill Castro, without mentioning that these efforts had continued into the Johnson presidency.

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The Japan Times Sunday, November 30, 1975

## Self-Indictment in the U.S.

The United States is again examining its moral failings before the world public with the revelations of a Senate report documenting plots by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) to assassinate foreign leaders.

The Senate select committee investigating intelligence activities by the U.S. made public its 345-page report and a list of CIA and other persons involved against pleas by President Gerald Ford not to. Mr. Ford felt that this action was not in the national interest of the U.S. But the lingering "spirit of Watergate" to leave no official secrets untold prevailed.

The report revealed assassination plots against five world leaders including Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, former Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba and former South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem. All the plotting went on during the administrations of former presidents Dwight Eisenhower, John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson.

Only in spy-thrillers have we read of murder devices as bizarre as those dreamed up by the CIA to assassinate Premier Castro. Dr. Castro's favorite cigars were poisoned and delivered in a box to a would-be assassin. The CIA enlisted the Mafia to obtain hit men to do away with the Cuban leader. The CIA considered devising a seashell that would explode underwater while Premier Castro was skin diving. If the purpose was not so deadly these schemes would be ludicrous.

Fortunately, none of these exotic murder devices were ever employed against Dr. Castro, and, in fact, the Senate committee says the CIA was not even involved when some of the leaders were eliminated by other people.

For years, it had been rumored that the CIA was behind the assassination of Diem and his brother in 1963. But the committee "exonerated" the CIA, saying the organization only supported the coup against the Vietnamese President.

Although the committee spent six months delving into the secrets of the CIA, it could find no definite, direct links between the plots and the three American presidents in office at the time. The report said that there was a lack of accountability in the CIA's command and control system which made it difficult to know if the Presidents authorized any of the assassinations.

And the committee stated that all the plotting could have been done on lower levels. This makes it all the more horrifying and disturbing.

The committee stated its moral position by saying that "short of war, assassination is incompatible with American principles." And it urged the Congress to pass a law against assassination as an instrument of national policy.

No one can really challenge this position, and no one in the U.S. Government did. President Ford issued a statement immediately after the report was released, saying he "absolutely abhors government officials being involved in those kinds of things." And he said no officials in his administration would be.

However, the committee seemed to answer one moral question and leave others unanswered. It used the phrase "short of war," implying that assassinations are moral and proper in wartime but not in peacetime. This reflects the unhappy double standard still with us that all moral restraints can be forgotten in war.

If we think in these terms then what can be done and not done in a cold war which prevailed at the time of the assassination plots. The committee did not follow this interesting line of thought, probably because it had no answers.

Sen. Frank Church, the committee's chairman, said that the most important lesson learned by the investigation was that "we should never abandon our own principles and adopt the principles of the Communists." Sen. Church and his committee members must be respected for attempting to set higher moral guidelines than some members of former administrations cared to do. At the same time, not only Americans but peoples everywhere can learn something from these sordid incidents, and perhaps improve their own behavior.

The Senate committee stated in justifying its making public the report that "the story is sad, but this country has the strength to hear the story and learn from it."

Similar statements have been made since the era of Watergate began. However, there is a question on how many more exposes the American public can take without a further and debilitating loss of faith in government. And how much more tarnishing of the American image internationally can go on without reducing the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy.

America's newly found candor draws respect and at the same time creates doubts in the rest of the world on whether the U.S. Government can escape from its preoccupation with its own sins. There are pressing economic and political issues of the present that require the full attention of both the Congress and the administration.

WASHINGTON STAR  
5 DEC 1975

## Treasury Aid Plan vs. CIA's Skulduggery

# Bailing Out and Strangling the Chilean Economy

By Norman Kempster  
Washington Star Staff Writer

The U.S. ambassador in Santiago at the time Salvador Allende became president says the U.S. Treasury was ready to bail out the faltering Chilean economy at the same time that the CIA was trying to strangle it.

In a rambling statement to the Senate Intelligence Committee, Edward M. Korry, accused Chairman Frank Church, D-Idaho, of covering up evidence of "the strenuous and the innovative efforts to reach an accommodation with the Allende regime."

According to Korry, he relayed to Allende an offer of U.S. guarantees for Chilean bonds as "part of a fair, nondogmatic and inexpensive settlement" of differences between the two countries.

**KORRY'S VERSION** of the events that followed Allende's victory in a three-way presidential election Sept. 4, 1970, is sharply different from the story the committee's staff pieced together from CIA and State Department documents and months of closed-doors hearings.

The staff report said that despite a top-level assessment that Allende posed no threat to U.S. security, then-President Richard M. Nixon ordered the CIA to attempt to foster a military coup against the Chilean president. When that failed, the CIA opposed Allende with political, economic and propaganda measures.

The effort to disrupt the Allende regime continued in spite of intelligence reports indicating that Allende was having little success in consolidating his power. An intelligence analysis in 1973 concluded that the political situation in Chile was nearing a deadlock that could have continued until the next election in 1976.

The U.S. campaign against Allende came in at least three parts.

NEW YORK TIMES  
2 DEC 1975

## Of Eisenhower and the C.I.A. Plots

To the Editor:

On the basis of my service with President Eisenhower from 1954 to 1961 and out of respect for his memory, I would like it known that the recent report of the Senate Committee on Intelligence regarding the subject of assassination activities, and the news reporting based upon it, are according to my knowledge incorrect and unfounded in the reference they make to his actions and his views.

Together with Gordon Gray, then President Eisenhower's special assistant for national security affairs, and John Eisenhower, then my assistant, I was in a position—as staff secretary and defense liaison officer, with duties including staff assistance on day-to-day security and foreign policy activities—to know his thinking in this regard.

There was no instance whatsoever,

First was an attempt to defeat him at the polls prior to the 1970 election. Second was an attempt to prevent the Chilean congress from ratifying his election Oct. 22, 1970. The third was a covert program to undermine his regime that continued until he was ousted in a bloody coup Sept. 11, 1973.

**DURING THE** second phase, then-CIA Director Richard B. Helms wrote in his notebook following a meeting with Nixon, "Make the economy scream."

The staff report added that during the second phase, Korry told the defense minister in the outgoing government of President Eduardo Frei that "not a nut or bolt would be allowed to reach Chile under Allende."

But in testimony yesterday, Korry said the report was filled with misstatements. He accused Church of "a simplistic and monstrous black-white mythology—a legend in which the American bullyboys kicked and cuffed small and innocent social democrats."

Over a 10-year period, the staff report said, the CIA spent more than \$13 million in an effort to manipulate Chile's politics.

The story of U.S. intervention in Chile began in 1963 when the Kennedy administration decided to back Frei, the candidate of the new Christian Democratic party, in Chile's presidential election the next year. Frei, a liberal reformer, was considered to be amos' a prototype of the sort of leader the Alliance for Progress hoped to foster in Latin America.

**THE STAFF** report said the CIA contributed more than half of Frei's campaign funds in 1964. In a field that included Allende and a right-wing candidate, Frei polled 57 percent of the vote—a landslide in multiparty Chile.

Although the support of Frei was considered a major CIA success at the time, the committee said it probably backfired in the long run. When word of his secret CIA backing leaked out, it undercut the prestige of Frei and his party, paving the way for Allende's victory in the next election.

U.S. efforts against Allende ranged from supporting anti-Allende newspapers to attempting to foster a military coup. The U.S.-backed coup failed two days before the congress confirmed Allende's victory in 1970.

Korry, Dungan and Meyer all said they knew nothing of U.S. support for the 1970 coup attempt. The report said Nixon's order to try a military takeover was so secret that the ambassador, the State Department and the Defense Department were kept in the dark. In addition to CIA officials, the plan was known only to Nixon, Henry A. Kissinger, then national security adviser, and then-Atty. Gen. John N. Mitchell.

While denouncing the coup attempt, Korry, Dungan and Meyer all insisted that much of the U.S. intervention was justified.

Church insisted that even U.S. backing for Frei in the 1964 presidential contest was wrong.

"We think it is so wrong for foreign citizens, let alone governments, to contribute to our political parties that we have outlawed it," Church said.

But Committee Vice Chairman John Tower, R-Tex., said he disagreed with much of the criticism of CIA covert action.

"It would strike me as a naive course to follow when there is in existence in a country less sophisticated than our own an infrastructure that is dedicated to destroying pluralistic democracy and replacing it with a dictatorship," Tower said.

assassination] is so inadequate a representation of the views I gave, and I believe of theirs as well, as to serve to obscure rather than clarify the President's true attitude in this matter.

There can, of course, be no objection to careful, nonpartisan inquiry to determine whether appropriate controls were established and were observed in a matter of this sensitivity and importance.

But any associating of President Eisenhower with activities of this kind, on the basis of ambiguous and inferential testimony of the nature cited in the report, is in my opinion neither proper nor just to the memory of this outstanding American, a man devoted to our country's highest values and finest ideals. **ANDREW J. GOODPASTER**

General, U.S. Army (Ret.)  
Alexandria, Va., Nov. 25, 1975

# Mary McGrory

## Colby Lectures Us On Need for Stealth

Two weeks to the day after the assassination report was published, CIA Director William E. Colby was standing in a public place, boldly speaking for "all of us."

Colby discoursed confidently on what "we Americans" should do to restore the agency he loves to the image he has of it as a force for peace, freedom and democracy in the world.

Colby was the star of a panel on intelligence at the "Pacem in Terris Convocation." The great champion of covert activities was reaping the rewards of openness. His agency's plight has made him a celebrity. He was stormily applauded during the session and afterwards besieged by autograph seekers. In America, to be a celebrity is to be forgiven everything.

He had friends on the platform, too. Sen. Frank Church, chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, could not bring himself to advocate the banning of all covert activity. He could think of justifiable instances, said Church, who was on the point of conducting hearings on Chile, which is generally regarded as the most repulsive of these secret interventions. He also is about to become a candidate for the presidency and apparently does not want to be thought rash.

**SEN. CLAIBORNE PELL, D-R.I.**, who suffers from an abiding anxiety not to offend anyone, said that he thought the congressional investigations of the intelligence services, while "entirely proper" and "long overdue," should be terminated.

Ray Cline, a former CIA official, said, he, too, favored covert operations. He went on to destroy his stand by telling of his disapproval of the secret war in Laos, the Bay of Pigs and the misbegotten Chile operation.

As Colby had depicted the CIA as an enclave of efficient elves toiling for peace, Cline pictured it as a kind of university, where scholars diligently studied and sifted information to put at the disposal of presidents.

Pell marveled at the presence of our CIA director right out in public. Only in America, he breathed.

This prompted Charles Morgan of the ACLU, the angry man on the panel, to growl that the only reason Colby was present was because of the horrendous revelations about his agency.

Colby serenely defended everything: the operation in Laos, the Chilean intervention.

**THE MENTION OF Chile** brought forth from Church a denunciation so impassioned it should have caused him to rescind his previous advocacy of any covert action.

# CIA should be allowed to recruit at MSU

MSU Placement Services is bringing CIA members to campus today and tomorrow for recruiting purposes. In reaction, some students have pushed the red-light button labeled "Moral Indignation."

Persons calling themselves "a group of concerned students" and the "Nov. 20 Mobilization," have distributed emotionally charged leaflets stating that the CIA is "invading" MSU. Their position is that since the CIA is a morally questionable organization they should not be invited to campus to recruit students.

But what these and other persons fail to understand is that it is not the job of the Placement Services or the University to make moral judgments. Rather, they should provide as many job opportunities and alternatives to the students as possible.

We must not ask, nor allow, any person or group, including the University, to bar potential employers from campus based on questions of morality. Otherwise, we relinquish our right to make these moral choices for ourselves, both now and in the future.

If some of us do not wish to work for the CIA for ethical reasons then that is our decision to make. But the University has the obligation of allowing us to make that choice, as they are presently

doing.

An added, and ironic, side to the CIA protests is that a university is probably the best place to recruit new personnel, particularly from a reformist standpoint. If we question the integrity of the CIA then the best way to change it is to revamp the agency from within, by hiring intelligent, ethically-minded persons.

The best place to find these persons is probably at a university, particularly one which has a criminal justice program as highly regarded as MSU's.

Those who wish peacefully to protest the activities of the CIA or their presence on campus should feel free to do so. But they should find a means that does not infringe on the rights of their fellow students to find a job.

If, as has happened at University of Michigan, the CIA is dissuaded from recruiting on campus because of the protests of vocal minorities, an injustice will be done to students needing jobs, and who are willing and able to work for the CIA.

Rather than protest the decision of Placement Services to allow the CIA to recruit, we should commend them for preserving each individual's right to determine future plans — even when that right is unpopular with campus moralists.

cannot show our hand.

**AND WHY CAN'T WE?** For the simple reason that CIA covert activity has so weakened our moral leadership that our open intervention would spell the destruction of the forces we want to help.

That's what the CIA has done to America. We can only do good by stealth. We are reduced to covert activity because of what covert activity has done to our good name.

That's why Colby is sitting in the catbird seat. That's why he dares to speak for the American people and lecture Congress and blame its negligence for the CIA's "few mistakes." And why he can say that what this country needs is a law punishing former agents for finking on "the company."



REGISTER, Des Moines  
23 November 1975

# CIA kill? Kaul says it couldn't

*Over the coffee*

By DONALD KAUL

A couple of months ago I wrote a column saying that the CIA was not primarily an intelligence-gathering organization but a murder and assassination bureau peopled largely by gangsters, cut-throats and thugs. I suggested that we give our CIA executives more colorful nicknames, such as William (Greasy Thumb) Colby, Richard (The Enforcer) Helms and Allen (Eyeballs) Dulles.



The column never was printed. My editors thought it too harsh a judgment.

Oh, I complained. I cursed. I thought bad thoughts about my editors. I even thought bad thoughts about my editors' mothers and all of their ancestors back to Biblical times and beyond. It did no good. The column was stillborn.

I would hereby like to make a public apology. I've been reading the new Senate report on the CIA and I find that I was wrong and my editors were right. I was too harsh.

If the CIA presented in that report is made up of murderers and assassins, so are the Katzenjammer Kids. My Uncle Jacob, who used to get drunk and throw bricks at casual passersby, was as dangerous as the CIA and not so funny by half. Not that it doesn't try to be dangerous; it just doesn't know how.

Consider the evidence published by the Senate: The CIA put no fewer than five foreign leaders — Patrice Lumumba, Fidel Castro, Rafael Trujillo, Ngo Dinh Diem and Salvadore Allende — on its hit list and, while all but Castro died suddenly, the CIA was little to blame. It says so right in the report. Left to the ingenuity of the CIA, they'd all have died of old age.

This is because the CIA doesn't know an assassination from a Halloween prank. For example, they tried to kill Patrice Lumumba by poisoning his toothbrush. They didn't know he didn't brush after every meal.

They tried to incapacitate a hostile Iraqi colonel by mailing him a poisoned handkerchief. It got held up in the mail and by the time it arrived he had been shot by a firing squad.

But the CIA saved its best shots for Fidel Castro. I'll tell you, they tried everything but sending him a suicide note.

They tried to poison his cigars. They tried to poison his skin-diving suit. They tried to stick him with a poisoned needle hidden in a pen. They even tried to blow him up with an explosive seashell. The

STATE NEWS (MICHIGAN STATE UNIVERSITY)  
19 NOVEMBER 1975

VIEWPOINT: PLACEMENT

# CIA shouldn't recruit

By WAYNE BIGELOW

Within the past few years we have been bombarded with a multitude of disclosures concerning the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. The most "credible" information we have received originated from the Rockefeller Commission; a group whose objectivity was tainted by a conflict of interests.

The committee consisted of three people who have established relationships with the CIA, six who occupied high government posts during the 1960s, and four members who are linked together in Rockefeller's multinational business, political and charitable enterprises. Yet, this "white wash" commission still exposed some frightening facts. As reported in the New York Times:

The CIA conducted a vast network of unlawful and uncontrolled domestic operations which resulted in the creation of files on at least 300,000 individuals and organizations. Operation CHAOS was a seven year plan in which 13,000 dossiers were compiled on American citizens. Another 57,000 people were listed and filed as "possible continuing intelligence interests." The Huston Plan — a White House project implemented in 1970 — consisted of unauthorized and illegal burglaries and wiretappings to subvert anti-war and student activities.

Further tactics included the using of sophisticated equipment which can open, copy and resal mail. The CIA, with the explicit consent of the Postmaster General, encroached on the private contents of 4,000,000 letters a year. Utilizing ITT's massive computer and technical system, the CIA and NSA have extensively monitored the telephone and telegraph communications of American citizens. In addition, the CIA has been involved in surveillance, 'bugging,' and burglaries of American political parties — culminating in the Watergate 'burglary' and subsequent cover-up.

Obviously the CIA has acted without regard for the constitutional rights of Americans. Yet the CIA was formed during

the Truman administration as a foreign "information-gathering" agency. The National Security Act of 1947 explicitly states that the CIA shall engage in "no police, subpoena, or law enforcement powers of internal security functions." Violation of this charter is constitutional grounds to discontinue its existence (a function of Congress).

Yet the Rockefeller commission stressed that these violations were the result of the "poor judgment of high officials" and they never addressed the legitimacy of the CIA itself. We can only suggest that the development of this embryonic police-state is necessitated by the dynamics of our political-economic system; the perpetuation of this system's control warrants such CIA actions. These violations will continue at home and abroad as long as the present institutional structure exists.

Thus far we have neglected to discuss the major thrust of CIA activity: the subversion of Third World countries through the overthrow of liberal or left-wing governments, the assassination of political leaders and funding of right-wing organizations. We have attempted to focus instead on those actions of the CIA which most directly threaten us as students and American citizens (while recognizing that this is only the 'tip of the iceberg').

As Americans and as MSU students, each of us should feel outrage and indignation at the Placement Bureau's allowing the CIA to come here this Wednesday and Thursday as "just another employer." We believe it is the responsibility of us as MSU students to denounce this and to demand that the Placement Bureau withdraw this and/or subsequent invitations to the CIA. We seriously wonder if the Placement Bureau might not just as well invite another organization that the CIA has used from time to time, a group whose activities in blackmail and assassination parallel those of the CIA: the Mafia. We, for our part, would see no difference.

Wayne Bigelow is a senior majoring in sociology.

hired Cubans to do the work, they hired gangsters, they even sent their own people. Nothing seemed to work.

They didn't merely attempt to kill Castro, however. They also had schemes to discredit him in the eyes of his people.

One of them involved spraying Castro's broadcast studio with an agent that would disorient him and make his speeches sound incoherent to his public.

Another plan — and this is a particular favorite — called for dusting Castro's shoes with thallium salts, a substance that would cause his beard to fall out. Clean-shaven, the CIA figured, Castro was nothing to worry about. They planned to bribe a hotel employee to do it when Castro went out of the country and put his shoes out at night to be polished. Unfortunately, he never put his shoes out, and the plan fell through.

The best plan of all, though, was to think you can say this without fear of

contradiction — was the one in which a rumor would have been spread throughout Cuba that a second coming of Christ was imminent and that Christ didn't like Castro. Then, at an appointed moment, an American submarine would surface just off Cuba and send up some starshells. The people of Cuba, it was assumed, would accept this as a manifestation of the Second Coming and overthrow Castro's government.

And I'm not making that up, either. It's in black and white in the report. No wonder the CIA didn't want the report made public. If I had a dippy fantasy life like that I'd want to keep it quiet, too.

On the other hand, there's just a chance that the CIA still is hiding its light under a bushel. After all, the people on its hit list did meet provocative ends. Allende, for example, committed suicide. With a machine gun. In the back.

Has a kind of CIA ring to it, doesn't it? Either that or the Marx Brothers.



# Probes 'destroyed morale' in CIA, ex-official says

Washington Bureau of The Sun  
Washington—A former official of the Central Intelligence Agency said yesterday recent investigations and disclosures have "destroyed morale" in the agency and "very nearly destroyed" its effectiveness as an intelligence-gathering system abroad.

Ray S. Cline, former deputy director of the agency, urged Congress to assign a joint committee of both houses to exercise "rational" control of the agency. He said the agency had made "very serious mistakes," but added they chiefly were made in following "the orders of the President of the United States" regarding domestic activities prohibited by law.

Mr. Cline's defense of the Central Intelligence Agency was even stronger than that of

the outgoing director, William E. Colby. They and a panel of critics took part in the final day of a privately sponsored convocation on national security.

Mr. Colby too conceded the recently exposed mistakes of the agency, including abortive assassination plots against some foreign leaders. But repetition could be avoided, he said, through better guidelines, closer supervision, and protection of legitimate secrets.

Much of the discussion centered on the relative need for so-called covert activities—secret U.S. involvement in the political affairs of other governments. Even Senator Frank Church (D., Idaho), whose Senate committee investigated the agency, conceded the need for covert operations in what he called "a dire emergency."

But, he said, the U.S. should remain in a morally defensible position. "If our hand were exposed helping a foreign people in their struggle to be free," he said, "we could scorn the cynical doctrine of plausible denial and say openly, 'Yes, we were there, and proud of it.'"

In his sharp criticism of the Central Intelligence Agency's secret activity, Mr. Church concentrated on those that went wrong. Mr. Cline emphasized those that went right. The face of Europe might be quite different today, he said, if the agency had not supported free governments in France, Italy and Germany after World War II.

Morton H. Halperin, former defense official and former aide to Henry A. Kissinger, the Secretary of State, opposed any covert operations. "There is no

way to bring that process under democratic control," he declared. Even at a time of disclosure, he said, the U.S. is "involved" in Portugal, Angola and "probably the Azores."

Mr. Cline responded to criticism of assassination plots against Fidel Castro, the Cuban premier, by saying Mr. Castro "seems remarkably healthy today." Indeed, he said, Mr. Castro has sent Cuban troops, "supported and trained" by the KGB, the Soviet intelligence service, to bring about a Communist victory in Angola.

As he has before, Mr. Colby denied that the CIA was responsible for the overthrow and assassination of President Salvador Allende in Chile in 1973. American activity there was in support of "democratic forces," he asserted, although that ac-

tivity is widely acknowledged to have created the climate for Mr. Allende's overthrow.

"That there can be debate as to the wisdom of any individual activity of this nature is agreed," Mr. Colby said. "That such a potential must be available for use in situations truly important to our country and the cause of peace is equally obvious."

One reason for abuses, he remarked, was the failure of Congress to take responsibility for "the necessary unpleasantness" of intelligence.

Mr. Cline's reasoning on that score was more direct. The activities against Allende, he said, were "laid on by [former President] Richard Nixon and Dr. Henry Kissinger without much consultation within the intelligence community."

MAIL, Charleston, W.Va.  
24 November 1975

## Alas For Spy Fiction; No Plot, No Bungle

On the word of Sen. Church and his select committee, one would have to believe that at some time the Central Intelligence Agency entertained assassination as a logical and essential instrument of U.S. foreign policy.

What could not be achieved by military or political means in defense of the republic might yield at last to a bit of intrigue, capped off by some infernal device. The details which stud this scrip are hideous or ludicrous or both. Perhaps Fidel Castro could be dispatched by planting a loaded sea shell where he delights to go scuba diving.

On this and nothing more one would have to agree further that even as a subject for discussion all this is unbecoming in a great power with any pretensions to moral sensibility. For the Balkans, perhaps, or some of the minor powers emerging from barbarism into dictatorship, but not for the United States of America which rewards its friends and enemies alike with "Get well" funding and dispatches the Peace Corps upon request!

Sen. Church and his committee make the most of the contrast and shudder affectingly for the camera

close-ups—so affectingly that it requires some effort to pursue the report into its fine print and its more reassuring conclusions.

Even as it seems clear that the CIA did give some consideration to these schemes, none of them matured into anything as concrete as a plot.

Either that or the CIA, having read too much and too carelessly of James Bond, bungled the undertaking and earned nothing more than a big, fat "F" for futility.

In either case, once the fantasies are disposed of, the report concludes soberly that "no foreign leaders were killed as a result of assassination plots initiated by officials of the United States."

Considering the build-up given to this peek-behind-the-scenes, which has earned Sen. Church more exposure than John Chancellor and Walter Cronkite combined, it is a distinct let-down. Indeed, it takes an effort to go back and read what the report actually says: No one died as a result of assassination plots initiated by officials of the United States.

WASHINGTON STAR  
7 DEC 1975

# Another captive watchdog?

By Les Aspin

The intelligence agencies may yet win their battle with Congress because Senate and House reformers appear ready to get bogged down in a squabble over matters of monumental inconsequence.

There is general agreement in Congress that the Senate and House special intelligence committees — which will die early in the new year — should be succeeded by a permanent committee to keep a watchful eye on the rascals in the intelligence agencies.

Members of Congress have a way of devoting endless time and energy — not to mention words — to their own rules and procedures. And reformers seem prepared now to spend an inordinate amount of effort in a hassle over whether there should be one intelligence committee in each house or a joint committee, how many members should serve, how the membership should be divided between parties and over other issues of little consequence.

The real issues, which may get lost in the verbiage, are: (1) How to banish abuses by the intelligence community such as the opening of private mail; (2) How to keep covert operations under control; and (3) How to help the intelligence community do a better job of producing thoughtful assessments of what's going on in the world.

There are only two sure results of the long investigations into the intelligence community: first, there will be at least one congressional oversight committee approved next year, and, second, the proposers of this reform will soon be sadly disappointed.

The public should be aware that any permanent intelligence committee will begin life with three big weights tied around its neck.

First, many congressional committees have a way of becoming advocates of the programs they are supposed to oversee. The Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee, for example, is largely the captive of the fishing industry and merchant marine, and the Agriculture Committee largely the captive of farmers and agribusiness.

The Senate and House have each had small subcommittees which for years were supposed to keep an eye on the intelligence community. But in two decades the watchdogs never barked. It has been suggested that rotating members on and off the committee might lessen the likelihood of capture. But then the members would never gain any expertise.

*Les Aspin, a Democratic representative from Racine, Wis., has been in Congress since 1971. He is a member of the House Select Committee on Intelligence.*

The members of an intelligence committee will already be suffering from limited knowledge. That's the second weight. They will be limited largely to what the intelligence agencies tell them. The intelligence committee will be quite different from other committees — much of its work will be done behind closed doors.

won't be able to point up foibles.

It will be unlike the Education Committee, for example, which hears from teachers, parents and superintendents and doesn't have to rely solely on the Office of Education or HEW to tell it if a program is working or not. Similarly, environmental groups flock to the Interior Committee when they feel some administration policy is shafting them. Who is going to complain to a congressional intelligence committee? The Russian ambassador?

Third, after all the CIA's skeletons have been exposed, the dust has settled and the CIA is no longer Page One news, many members are likely to lose interest in the subject — including those assigned to an intelligence committee. Closed-door meetings don't allow congressmen to make speeches or issue press releases or titillate their constituents with inside stories.

For these reasons it is unlikely that we can count on an intelligence committee alone to prevent abuses such as interfering with the mail and listening in on telephone calls. To accomplish that we need something more.

We know that many people in the intelligence community knew instinctively that the recently exposed abuses were wrong.

When James R. Schlesinger became head of the CIA in the spring of 1973, he learned of some illegal operations and sent a memorandum to the heads of all the CIA's divisions asking if they knew of any other operations that were illegal or skirted legality. The replies came flooding back, indicating that many men and women in the system were disturbed by what was going on but had never been motivated to speak out or didn't know where to turn.

The mere fact that the abuses have been exposed, and the public reaction to them, should produce considerable motivation to speak out in the future. To give people a place to turn to, we should create an inspector general for intelligence, patterned on the Watergate special prosecutor's office, who would have full authority to monitor the internal workings of all the intelligence agencies. To encourage whistle blowers, it must also be made a criminal offense for employees to fail knowingly to report any violations.

A permanent congressional committee could help here. It can't run the inspector general's office, but it can give him backbone by calling him to testify periodically. If he is having problems because the agencies are evasive, a congressional committee may embarrass the agencies into cooperating.

The toughest problem to handle is covert operations. Some critics would like to bar them outright. But there is simply not enough support for that and there are some cases where covert operations may be needed — the drug traffic and the possibility of terrorist groups getting nuclear weapons are two. So the question is how to control the cloak-and-dagger work.

Many reformers suggest that an intelligence committee be given real teeth and required to pass on all covert operations. But most congressmen are reluctant to act on behalf of their colleagues. It's one thing to cast a vote on the floor of the House as one of 435 members; it's quite something else to be told to operate behind closed doors.

your colleagues.

I'm sure there are many in the executive branch who would like to see Congress have veto power — for exactly the same reasons that I'm sure most members of Congress don't want the authority — because it would give future administrations an out. If an operation goes awry, the executive can point to Congress and say — as it did with the Gulf of Tonkin resolution — “But Congress authorized us to do it.” Members also know they could face the reverse charge: a stern administration saying, “The United States is in trouble in Majnoonistan today because Congress wouldn't let us launch a little covert operation.”

Such reluctance is not a political forecast; it's political history. For years the CIA has been telling those subcommittees about their covert operations, although usually only after they were begun. The special House Intelligence Committee recently asked CIA Director William Colby what happened when one of the committees objected. Did that halt an operation? Colby was stunned. The question had never come up before. The subcommittees preferred not to get involved. Deniability was not invented by the Nixon administration.

If a committee is to have veto power, then its political composition becomes terribly important. A committee filled with Ron Dellumses and Michael Harringtons probably wouldn't allow CIA agents to do anything more violent than play darts at CIA headquarters. Pack the committee with hawkish conservatives and you're back to square one. So granting Congress a veto over covert operations is a very unpromising idea.

Many reformers also suggest that Congress can control covert operations through the budgetary power. Congress must, of course, have the power of the purse. But in the intelligence field, there is not necessarily a correlation between money and mischief. In Thailand a CIA agent tampered with politics by sending one forged letter. The cost to the U.S. Treasury: one postage stamp. The cost to U.S. foreign policy: continuing embarrassment. Budget control is no panacea.

Covert operations often are carried out in a country without the knowledge of our ambassador there. The system has tended to exclude potential critics who might ask searching questions, point out inconsistencies and explode the premises of a planned operation. Investigations have shown that administrations often have sidestepped the 40 Committee which the White House itself set up to oversee covert operations. If the president likes an idea, the proposal often goes into effect without benefit of any criticisms.

Covert actions must be controlled primarily from within the executive branch. To begin, the 40 Committee should be regulated by law rather than executive whim. Each member should be required individually to assess in writing every proposed covert operation, analyzing the risks involved, the prospective benefits, the dangers of failure and possible alternative ways of accomplishing the objective. Experience shows that when officials are required to write their own reports, they think more clearly of the consequences than if they are simply asked to initial a

committee report.

To inject ambassadors back into the policy-making chain, they should also be required by law to write their own assessments for the president.

A congressional committee can supplement these controls. A congressional intelligence committee should be told about all planned operations in advance—the entire committee, not just the leaders, as in the past. While no approval or disapproval would be voted on, individual members could send their own assessments to the President.

No doubt a lot of congressmen would simply write a list of reservations to cover themselves in case the operation went wrong. But that is not all bad. It is a good idea to have advice reaching the president from a few people who have a bias for negativism. There is too much me-tooism in the executive branch already.

Tales of abuses and covert operations have provided the "sex" in these congressional investigations, but the committee members are also concerned with the more mundane issue of how to make the intelligence agencies do a better job of disseminating and analyzing intelligence.

There are many problems:

- Too many people are writing day-to-day reports and not enough are doing long-range thinking.
- Analysts all too often give the answers it is believed the policymakers want.
- Policymakers (the president and secretary of state) don't keep the

analysts up to date on what they are thinking and what they have done in talks with their counterparts abroad.

• Policymakers make too many demands for information without first considering the time, money and manpower involved.

Congress can't just pass a law saying, "Hey, stop wasting manpower." It can, however, give an executive the position and authority to come to grips with these problems. For years no one has been in charge. The intelligence community is composed of several fiefdoms. The post of director of central intelligence (DCI), now held by William Colby, was set up in 1947 to end the fragmentation of intelligence in separate Army, Navy and State Department fiefdoms. The CIA was set up to provide analyses independent of the other bureaucracies and the DCI was supposed to coordinate the work of the other intelligence operations.

But it hasn't worked out that way. The fiefdoms continued, partly because the DCI was made the head of the CIA and thus leads a bureaucratic rival of other intelligence operations.

Perhaps it is now time to clean up the system so that it really reflects President Truman's original intent. We should break the DCI off from the CIA and set him up in his own office as an assistant to the president charged with overseeing the entire intelligence operation.

The DCI, freed from the responsibilities of running the CIA, could then

concentrate on eliminating duplication in intelligence collection and on promoting competition in intelligence analysis.

The new DCI ought to have one new agency to oversee; the covert operations section should be removed from the CIA. The dirty-tricks side of the CIA has dominated the agency over the years and most of the directors have come from that side. Separating covert operations would allow skilled analysts to rise to the top of what would then be solely an analysis agency. Splitting off covert operations would also allow the CIA to attract quality analysts who have been repelled by the agency's reputation. And good intelligence, after all, depends more on people than on organizational structure.

There are no ideal solutions. But improvements can be made. These are a few of the suggestions which could return national respect to the intelligence agencies while tightening up the reins on those agencies.

A congressional committee is not in itself the solution; Congress cannot and should not run the executive. A congressional committee can act as a prod to better management and a brake on poorly thought-out covert operations. But executive decisions must be made in the executive departments, so Congress would be wise to concentrate on how to reform those departments, not get bogged down arguing whether a permanent intelligence committee should have 10 or 12 members.

POST, Denver  
22 Nov. 1975

## Hart Unsure of CIA Reform

By TODD ENGDAHL  
Denver Post Staff Writer

Despite Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) cooperation with the Senate committee investigating assassination plots, Sen. Gary Hart, D-Colo., said Friday he found it impossible to tell if the agency really has lost the cold war mentality which made such plots possible.

"It is my personal conviction that William Colby (CIA director) doesn't want the CIA out killing people. I'm not sure about others," Hart said.

Both Colby and President Ford have said they will take steps to insure that assassination isn't used as a tool of American foreign policy.

Hart said he believes "the assassination plots are aberrations. They do not reflect the real American character."

### FULL COMMITTEES

But he said better congressional oversight and a law making it a crime for CIA officials to conspire to assassinate foreign leaders are needed to prevent future abuses.

At a press conference at Stapleton International Airport, Hart said congressional CIA oversight bodies should be full committees, not subcommittees as in the past. The chairman and members should rotate regularly "so you don't have a captive, buddy committee," he explained.

Oversight committees should receive the same intelligence information the President does, Hart said, adding he felt

that there would be no danger of security leaks.

Hart was one of the authors of a 347-page interim report released Thursday by the Senate Intelligence Committee, which has been studying the assassination plots and other CIA activities.

The report gave details of CIA assassination plots against five foreign leaders but concluded that the agency wasn't directly involved in the deaths of the four who were eventually assassinated.

The five leaders were Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, the target of several CIA plots; Congolese leader Patrice Lumumba; former South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem; Dominican Republic dictator Rafael Trujillo; and Gen. Rene Schneider, head of the Chilean general staff. All but Castro are dead, killed by opposition elements in their own countries.

### "HASN'T HURT"

Hart denied that release of the report has seriously hurt the United States or its intelligence gathering activities, as President Ford and CIA officials maintain.

"If nothing else, it (the report) educates the public," Hart said, adding that public awareness could help prevent such activities in the future.

While Hart admitted release of the report "unquestionably will do some damage to our national reputation," he said he felt people eventually would decide release of the report was proper.

The report "demonstrates what is right

about this country. Any country is capable of this kind of conduct, but no other country in the world would be willing to discuss openly such improper conduct," he said.

"We bent over backwards to cooperate with the CIA, the FBI and the White House," Hart said, adding that parts of the report were modified and some names deleted in order to protect intelligence operations.

Hart said CIA witnesses before the committee were surprisingly cooperative. "It was interesting, the willingness of the people to talk."

But he noted there was "a lot more reluctance to talk on the part of the policymakers."

### CONFLICT AT FIRST

"There was great conflict in the committee" at first, Hart said, noting that the membership varied from him to conservative Republican Sen. Barry Goldwater of Arizona.

But the committee drew together as more evidence was revealed and more discussions held, he said. Hart noted that the full committee made few changes in the draft report and that no member voted against releasing the report.

Hart stressed that the report is only an interim one, and that the committee will continue its investigation of CIA activities.

"We expect other information to come out," he said.

GLOBE, Boston  
1 Dec. 1975

## Spooking the spooks

A disturbing Congressional report confirming widespread suspicions about Central Intelligence Agency involvement in a series of political assassination plots has raised once again a difficult set of questions. Reduced to their simplest form, they come to two straightforward matters: Who is going to control the CIA? And how?

Nothing is absolutely certain in the political process but it does seem fairly clear that there is going to be some serious attempt to place reins on the agency's tendency to develop and implement public policy rather than restrict itself to its original purpose of gathering intelligence on an international scale.

The job looks like an easy one at first glance. The trouble is quite evident. The CIA operates in an atmosphere of great secrecy. Its agents are often not known to each other. Its budget, the traditional means of controlling other government operations, is hidden away in a variety of disguises that mystify even the Congress.

So the solutions should come quickly. Make the CIA's budget public, at least in its gross numbers. Make the senior officers in the CIA accountable to Congress as well as the President. Ban the use of all covert practices which, as in the case of assassination, lead to the ultimate embarrassment of the United States. Order the CIA to limit its activities to gathering data. And keep it out of domestic affairs.

But the functioning of an organization like the CIA, even without such obvious disasters as the assassination attempts, is more complicated than those direct solutions would suggest, though there is the distinct possibility that some or all of them may go into effect.

One must start with the assumption that an intelligence organization is a desirable national institution. Political loudness in the past may have put a shade over the question, but doubters might ask themselves whether the United States Government should be without intelligence gathering operations in an era when political terrorism is on the rise in other parts of the world and may begin to appear in this country.

Many Americans would want a CIA-type organization to be aware of the internal workings of such potential terrorist groups — and that carries with it implications about CIA infiltration and probably even active participation to cover that infiltration. Ugly, but do we really want to wait until the last minute to respond to a message that Philadelphia is being held nuclear hostage by a band of terrorists? Perhaps so, but one should understand the implications of such a decision.

Right now we have no really dependable machinery for assessing the

net value of all the decisions made by our intelligence organizations. It is obvious that the assassination plots were a mistake. But the CIA can and does serve as a quiet line of communication with political leaders in and out of government in other countries who cannot for one reason or another be known as friends of the United States. It has, in the past, been the conduit for fast military assistance to such countries as Yugoslavia when it appeared Stalin might order a Soviet invasion in the late 1940s. Do those pluses outweigh other minuses?

That kind of question has to be answered by someone other than the CIA itself. It should be asked on a continuous basis and, above all, it should be asked at times when there are deviations from the broad standards of acceptable behavior.

Congress might perform a major part of the function through a separate oversight committee in addition to the existing review procedures by its committees on military and foreign affairs — a concept supported by such liberals as Rep. Michael Harrington (D-Mass.).

There should also be a regular CIA review committee within the Administration to judge when overriding national interest warrants stretching the general rules.

And what should those general rules be? The first is that any step taken as an expedient should always

be made in service of broad public policy, clearly articulated. Second, covert acts should never be begun except as a measure of last resort, with written explanations of the reasons, subject to ultimate publication in some reasonable amount of time.

Third, there are some kinds of institutions that should not be used under any circumstances — the press, academic institutions, foundations. Involvement by one such institution in the business of spying poisons the reputation of all the others.

Underlying any set of rules, there must be a clear recognition that secrecy is extremely difficult, really impossible to maintain when it works against the interests of any group. We have paid a severe price in world opinion for having acted clandestinely in Southeast Asia and Latin America. The secret war in Cambodia was no secret to the Cambodians nor, ultimately, to the rest of the world. We may be on the brink of a smaller but basically similar error in Angola.

The Soviet Union has a long record of terrible international relations in many countries because of its own secret intelligence and clandestine activities organization, the KGB. There is no need for us to imitate those failures, either domestically or internationally. Operating an intelligence system sanely in a democratic society is tricky business but the airing of the CIA's past mistakes is a healthy process that can lead to rational and effective safeguards against any repetition.

BALTIMORE SUN  
8 Dec. 1975

## Won't return to U.S., author of CIA book says

Washington (AP)—Philip Agee, a former Central Intelligence Agency agent and author of a book on the CIA, says he has decided against returning to the United States.

In a statement released here yesterday, Mr. Agee said his decision was prompted by the refusal of the Justice Department to say whether it intends to prosecute him in connection with disclosure of CIA secrets.

His book, "Inside the Company: CIA Diary," included names of CIA undercover operatives in Latin America. Mr. Agee's statement said he was concerned that if he returned to the United States he could risk "a long and costly trial of a political nature."

"Any possible advantages to be gained through a trial, such as focusing more attention on the CIA's subversion of 'free' institutions abroad, do not outweigh the time and expense that would be required of many people in a trial," he said.

The former CIA agent, who has been living recently in Britain, added that even if he is not prosecuted, "at the very least I would be enjoined by court order from speaking or writing about the CIA except when the CIA might give prior approval."

In response to inquiries from the American Civil Liberties Union, Richard L. Thornburgh, assistant attorney general, has said that Mr. Agee was not under indictment.

However, he added that the Justice Department "cannot undertake to afford assurances to any individual, absent a grant of immunity, that he will not be prosecuted for any offenses he may have committed."

Mr. Thornburgh's letter to Melvin L. Wulf, ACLU's legal director, repeated the position taken by Edward H. Levi, the Attorney General, in an earlier response to Mr. Wulf's inquiries.

WASHINGTON STAR  
10 DEC 1975

*Eliot Janeway*

## Border Pressure, Heroin and Oil

By Eliot Janeway

Special to the Washington Star

Border pressures are beginning to build up against the United States from the south as well as the north. When the policy and opinion makers of the present generation in the United States were coming of age, Henry Luce, the founder of Time Inc., and Henry Wallace, the heir presumptive to the New Deal, were debating the morals and politics of U. S. purpose in this "American century," as it was then thought to be. A mere decade ago, the United States was still agonizing over how to implement the Pax Americana.

**SUDDENLY**, Mexico City to the south and Ottawa to the north are giving Washington a hard time. As for Mexico, she has turned up on the proprietary end of the best single business in the entire world: Smuggling heroin across the California-Arizona-Texas border. For years, Mexico has been borrowing so much money abroad that she needs all the rackets she can organize in order to find the interest to pay on the money she owes.

When President Johnson was in charge, he treated Mexico as a kind of 51st state in his private back yard. But since the flow of official and undercover U. S. dollars into Mexico

began to slow down, drug pushing has given Mexico a new pipeline to the U. S. Treasury. The deepening worry about the debt-loaded peso, plus the competitive jump in rates of return inside the United States, have added up to more slowdown. But heroin pushing is a better business than dollar borrowing. It's one way of paying old interest bills without running up new ones.

**AS FOR CANADA**, she is making waves which are easier to contain legally, but more difficult to cope with politically. Outlaws in Mexico may be purely private, but bringing leverage to bear on the government powerhouse in Mexico City is the way to crack down on them. In Canada, the political troublemakers operate under one or another kind of government auspices, but the official government powerhouse in Ottawa is out of business. The provincial governments have locked out the dominion government.

The U. S.-Canadian problem begins with oil and gas. The "oil patch" in Western Canada bears an altogether different relationship to the American economy than the Middle Eastern oil world. The petronuts in the Middle East are hit-and-run players. They believe that recklessness will pay, even if it pays off in a depression, because they are

resigned to seeing other fuels take over from oil. If they don't cash in now, they never will.

**THE NUTS** IN the Canadian West, however, combine predatory strains of nationalistic socialism with plain greed. They are laboring under the delusion that the oil and gas they are sitting on is premium merchandise, and will become more so as the year 2000 comes closer. They are intoxicated with the strategy of market holdback; they believe the more oil and gas they hold back now, the more they will get for it later on.

The dependence of the U. S. economy on fuel flows from the Middle East is minimal. But the boilers that power the agricultural and industrial heartland of the North Central tier rely on the "blue-eyed Arabs" in the Canadian West for fuel supplies.

Among senior American management executives, none has a sharper pencil or louder voice than Donald Cook, retiring head of the American Electric Power Co., the largest U. S. utility system, and one of its best-managed corporate enterprises.

**COOK WAS A** familiar Washington figure during his kitchen cabinet years under Johnson as chairman

of the Securities and Exchange Commission. Later, he has worn out his welcome in Washington by speaking out against its obstruction of the development of America's vast coal reserves as the answer to expensive imported oil and against its indulgence of fruitless experiments in environmentalism to the detriment of fuel self-sufficiency.

Cook has just won a welcome in Ottawa by publishing a striking, characteristically blunt national advertisement entitled "Merci, Canada." It thanks the "blue-eyed Arabs" who run the provincial governments in western Canada for ordering the latest hold-back of fuel flows across the U. S.-Canadian border, and thereby challenging the United States to start relying on its own limitless supplies of cheap coal.

Consequently, Cook challenges the dominion government in Ottawa to reassert its authority as the responsible Canadian bargaining agent with Washington on pain of inviting national disintegration. Meanwhile, at the present rate of deterioration in U. S.-Canadian relations, the U. S.'s closest neighbor and best trading partner could present more troublesome problems for Washington than all its other adversaries overseas.

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, December 2, 1975

## Military weapons in drug traffic

By the Associated Press

Washington

Hundreds of weapons stolen from U.S. military installations are being traded in Mexico where an M16 rifle brings an ounce of heroin or up to \$1,200, a drug-traffic intelligence officer says.

Jacques Kiere, director of the El Paso Intelligence Center, said smugglers of illegal aliens have joined drug traffickers in the business of exchanging arms for narcotics.

The smugglers take guns when they go to Mexico to pick up aliens, and the aliens carry drugs into the United States when they are smuggled across the border, he said.

The El Paso center is an experimental venture of the Drug

Enforcement Assistance Administration and the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Its information is collected from reports of other agencies, informants and newspaper accounts.

Mr. Kiere told a House armed-services subcommittee that the center has received reports that about 700 military weapons "have been seen by narcotics informants."

He said some of those weapons have fallen into the hands of revolutionary groups in Mexico, while others are bought by drug traffickers who sometimes pay in heroin instead of cash.

The stolen weapons include M16 and M1 rifles, M1 and M2 carbines, as well as various handguns and hand grenades, he said. They are stolen from military installations, sporting-goods stores, and private homes, he said.

Mr. Kiere told the subcommittee, which has been looking into theft of weapons from military facilities, that would be easy for military personnel to enter the illegal weapons trade. Some of the guns reported missing are "lost" by National Guardsmen in field exercises, he said.

"An M16 is worth one ounce of heroin south of the border which has a value of \$1,000 to \$1,200 if you were to pay cash for it."

Jerald F. Meidel, director of the security department at the Naval Weapon Support Center in Crane, Indiana, told the subcommittee there have been 10 incidents of thefts of losses of weapons ammunition at the center since April, 1974.

In the one instance where there was an arrest and a conviction, the subject was found to have various parts of .45-caliber pistol, a 12-gauge shotgun, and other equipment from the base.

Los Angeles Times Thurs., Nov. 27, 1975.

# Drug Smuggling on Rise in Caribbean

From Reuters

BRIDGETOWN, Barbados—They cast off by night, when the picturesque harbor is cloaked in darkness. A shrimp boat, a launch or sometimes a weatherworn schooner heads out into the Caribbean Sea taking drug smugglers to meet a ship steaming up from the South American ports.

It could be a fruitless journey—but they'll try another night. For if the rendezvous is kept, there are rich pickings for island boatmen prepared to take the risk.

They take on drugs—cocaine, marijuana or heroin brought out by crewmen on some of the bigger cargo ships. And their night run is a transit link of growing importance in the multimillion-dollar flow of illegal narcotics to the pushers and peddlers of New York.

Police here say hard drugs reach the Caribbean from dealers in Central and South America. Their source is unknown but most has come in the past from Mexico and Turkey—which now claims to have blocked its illegal exports.

Sterling Johnson, special drugs prosecutor for New York City, says the Caribbean islands have become the "soft underbelly" of the United States as far as drug control measures are concerned.

Small craft leave the islands at intervals to pick up drugs from the bigger ships offshore, then head either for Florida or back to any one of a score of inlets or small harbors in the island chain.

"If you can get things into the Caribbean—you know, just take a boat into the middle of the sea and have a shrimp trawler meet it—then you can get this stuff right into Miami with no one any the wiser," Johnson says.

Drug transit traffic has emerged one way or another in

## Drug agents in the Caribbean are hampered by lack of manpower.

most of the favored Caribbean sun spots—Jamaica, Trinidad, Barbados, Haiti, Puerto Rico, Antigua, the Bahamas and Dutch-held Aruba—over the last few years.

Not all these centers would concede that the problem is

Washington Post  
10 Dec. 1975

## Short Supply Of Uranium Is Predicted

By Thomas O'Toole  
Washington Post Staff Writer

There are not enough known uranium reserves in the United States to fuel the atomic power plants the nation's electric companies plan to build during the rest of the century.

That's the judgment of the U.S. Geological Survey, whose chief scientist for uranium exploration said that the only way the United States can make up the shortage is to find new and more expensive domestic deposits or turn to

the already shrinking and uncertain import market for the future.

"But it would not be a prudent national policy to depend on imports," Dr. Frank C. Armstrong said yesterday at a Colorado conference on uranium supply sponsored by the Geological Survey. "Everybody is competing for uranium, and I think the U.S. will have to depend on itself for its uranium supply."

There are 55 plants producing nuclear power in the United States. Another 63 are being built and 120 are on order, presumably to be built by 1985. The Energy Research and Development Administration has estimated that there will be 725 plants generating nuclear power by the year 2000.

getting worse.

Barbados has a big illuminated sign at Seawell International Airport which says, in effect: "There is no drug problem here. Please help to keep it that way."

But senior police know the airport has been used as a transit point. One massive haul of marijuana came to light there recently in several suitcases left for collection.

Jamaica has had a big drug problem for years. Marijuana, known locally as ganja, is grown on the island and exchanged for money and guns smuggled in from the United States.

Drug traders crossing to Florida run the gauntlet of offshore patrols by Jamaican coast guard and defense force boats. But most of the transit trade to the States has been handled in light aircraft crossing from the U.S. mainland to land at small rural airstrips in remote parts of the island.

At Braco airstrip in the north, police once surprised a Cessna pilot who took off in haste with only half his load of marijuana leaf. But he turned out to be an undercover agent with the FBI. Four more Americans on the trip were arrested and charged in the U.S. courts.

The U.N. administrative and budgetary committee recently earmarked nearly \$4 million for international narcotics control. It also urged a fresh look at measures to curb the illegal trafficking in drugs.

Drug control agents in the Caribbean are hampered by lack of manpower and expertise in drug detection as well as a shortage of surveillance vehicles and craft. Airport customs control varies from point to point. San Juan in Puerto Rico and Port of Spain in Trinidad have a reputation here for rigorous customs scrutiny of incoming baggage. Elsewhere in islands which look to the tourist trade to boost a shaky economy customs men are less likely to make an extensive search.

Any measurable improvement in control of drugs in transit depends on close cooperation with federal enforcement agencies in the United States, according to officials here.

The Jamaicans asked for help when the two-way traffic in guns and drugs reached menacing proportions, and the result was Operation Buccaneer.

This was a joint assault by Jamaican authorities and the federal law enforcement agencies aimed at cutting the flow of ganja and hard drugs reaching U.S. destinations from West Indian islands and ports.

Figures issued by the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration list several thousand tons of ganja seized in Operation Buccaneer in 1974, along with 8,083 tons of ganja seeds, 65 tons of hashish, 20 tons of cocaine, 11 weapons, 11 aircraft, 17 boats and more than \$143,000 in cash. In addition there were 98 arrests, and more than 500 acres of ganja were destroyed.

Armstrong said current U.S. production of 12,600 tons of uranium ore a year is enough to meet current demand, but that this rate of production would only satisfy 15 per cent of total demand over the next 25 years.

Known uranium reserves in the United States total 600,000 tons, Armstrong said, with another 1 million tons "undiscovered but probable."

Counting the 1 million tons as "probable," Armstrong went on, still leaves the United

States short by 400,000 tons.

At the same conference, Warren I. Finch, chief of the Survey's Branch of Uranium and Thorium Resources, said that miners in the next 25 years would have to find as much as 5 times the uranium they found in the last 25 years.

"If the nuclear power industry is to survive on domestic fuel," Finch said, "the uranium must be found or we will be dependent on foreign imports—a situation we must avoid at all cost."



NEW YORK TIMES

10 Dec. 1975

## SOVIET 'VIOLATION' OF PACT DISCUSSED

### Kissinger Explains Process for Examining Charges of Arms Accord Breaches

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 9—Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger opened the lid a bit today on the normally super-secret subject of alleged Soviet violations of the 1972 accords to limit strategic arms.

The topic is heavily classified involving the most sophisticated intelligence-gathering equipment and the most sensitive negotiations.

Until now the Administration has refused to discuss at length the recurring charges from its critics that it did not sufficiently hold the Russians accountable for compliance with the two 1972 agreements.

The agreements limit each side's defensive missiles—the antiballistic missiles—and froze for five years the number of land-based and submarine-launched offensive missiles.

In a news conference, Mr. Kissinger said that initial reports of possible Soviet violations were made known to the Administration initially through intelligence channels—the Central Intelligence Agency or the Defense Intelligence Agency.

#### Responsible Panels Listed

He said that the reports were dealt with by these groups:

A special intelligence committee set up by the C.I.A. in the summer of 1973, which meets four times a year and issues a report each time on Soviet compliance with the 1972 accords. These reports, Mr. Kissinger said, go directly to the President and every senior member of the Administration dealing with the negotiations on strategic arms.

The verification panel of the National Security Council, with representatives from key agencies, which has met four times on compliance issues and 40 times on other matters relating to strategic arms.

The verification panel working group, which has met 11 times since the middle of 1973.

The National Security Council itself, headed by the President, which has met once to discuss compliance questions.

#### President Briefed

In addition, in an effort to rebut Adm. Elmo R. Zumwalt, who charged in Senate testimony on Dec. 2 that President Ford had been kept in ignorance of reported Soviet violations, Mr. Kissinger said that the President had been briefed on compliance matters 10 times since 1973, six of them since he became President in August, 1974. He also said that Mr. Ford received two special C.I.A. reports every morning and that he read them.

Mr. Kissinger said that the verification panel working group decided what to do about an alleged violation and either listed options or made a recommendation to the full verification panel, which performed the same function for the National Security Council.

The votes in the verification panel have always been unanimous, Secretary Kissinger said.

Discussing actual allegations against the Russians, Mr. Kissinger said the most serious one, closest to an actual violation, was a charge that the Russians had been testing anti-aircraft radar in an "ABM mode" but that after this was brought to Moscow's attention in January 1975, the activity stopped. It has not been resumed, he said.

#### Report on Silos Recalled

This allegation as well as others cited in the news conference have been reported in The New York Times. Mr. Kissinger noted that in June 1973, while Leonid I. Brezhnev, the Soviet Communist party leader, was in Washington conferring with President Richard M. Nixon, reports were received of unusual construction of additional missile silos by the Russians in apparent violation of the accord.

On June 26 the United States sent a note to the Russians "in the Presidential channel" raising the issue of possible violation, he said.

The message, he declared, was kept highly secret. The Russians replied that the silos were for command and control centers, a view shared by the C.I.A., and now, Mr. Kissinger said, the issue is dead.

He said that reports of new Soviet antiballistic missile radar equipment in the Kamchatka Peninsula on the Pacific coast being studied but that this was at most a "technical" problem since the Russians, if they requested it, would probably be permitted the use of Kamchatka as an A.B.M. test site in compliance with the 1972 accord.

LONDON DAILY TELEGRAPH

4 DECEMBER 1975

## Russians are bullied in Britain, says Kremlin

By JOHN MILLER in Moscow

**R**USSIA yesterday accused the Home Office of persistently attempting to subvert Russians visiting and studying in London, particularly an

Armenian folk dancer, Suren Arutunyan.

With the apparent blessing of the Soviet Government, the newspaper *Literary Gazette* said Russian citizens were being encouraged to defect in order to complicate Anglo-Soviet relations.

It seized on the case involving Arutunyan, 25, a dancer who returned to Moscow three weeks ago after having first sought political asylum.

The Russians have twice complained through diplomatic channels over the Arutunyan affair. But yesterday's attack on Whitehall's handling of it strongly suggested their annoyance goes a lot deeper.

According to the Soviet version Arutunyan was seized by the Home Office at Heathrow on Nov. 7 as he was about to return to Moscow with a dance group after a three-week British tour.

#### 'Worked over'

At a London flat he was "worked over" by British security officials who told him he would be "liquidated without trace" if he did not agree to defect.

The newspaper's account of the interrogation read like something from a classical spy novel with officials standing over the wretched Armenian for 90 minutes repeatedly saying: "Sign... sign. We have three questions to ask you."

What the three questions were was not revealed. But having signed he was taken to the American Embassy in Grosvenor Square where a Russian-speaking diplomat told him to apply for asylum in the United States.

*Literary Gazette* said the hostage managed to escape after three days in the London flat. He went to the Soviet Embassy which looked after him and got him out of the country.

The newspaper highlighted

the problems of Soviet students on postgraduate courses at Ealing Technical College. It claimed that "all types of rogues" are buzzing around the college trying to free the students.

#### No pressure to stay

OUR COMMUNIST AFFAIRS CORRESPONDENT writes: A Foreign Office spokesman yesterday dismissed the Soviet account of the Arutunyan affair as "totally at variance with the facts." The dancer had first asked for permission to stay in Britain, but had later changed his mind.

He had not been kidnapped or beaten or subjected to any form of pressure.

## Blackmail of students denied

By JOHN IZBICKI

**S**OVIENT claims that British Secret Service agents had used cloak and dagger methods to force Russian students to defect to the West, were strongly denied last night.

After Soviet claims that security men tried to blackmail Russian students at Ealing Technical College, Mr. Richard Leeson, acting vice-principal said there had been "not the slightest breath of a suggestion that anything untoward had happened to these students."

Russians have studied English at Ealing College since the signing of an Anglo-Soviet cultural agreement in 1973. A successful pilot course for 11 such students was held that year.

A further 55 students came to Ealing in two groups last academic year. Fifteen are there now. Up to 49 Russians are to arrive for the course next month and some will be sent to Shaf-field Polytechnic.

## Eastern Europe

Tom Braden

WASHINGTON POST, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1975

# Solzhenitsyn: Courageous--and Outrageous

Alexander Solzhenitsyn is a very brave man; a devoutly religious man; a great humanist, and perhaps, though less surely, a great novelist. But I wonder why we continue to treat him as though he were also an authority on American government and American diplomacy.

I ask this question because the mistakes he makes in writing about American government and diplomacy are so outrageous. For example, in speaking of the assassination of President John F. Kennedy: "It was all the worse because of the inability or lack of desire by the American judicial authorities to uncover the assassins and clear up the crime."

Or even more outrageously, in speaking of President Ford's dismissal of Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, "There should at least be decency toward one's allies. After all, the Secretary of Defense is not merely a member of the American government. He is in fact also responsible for the defense of the entire free world. It would have been a friendly act first to have received consent from the allies."

But all this is by way of prelude. Solzhenitsyn proceeds to an indictment of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, (a) for being "linked" to the dismissal of Schlesinger, (b) for making "unending

concessions" to the Russians, (c) for bringing about in Vietnam "the worst diplomatic defeat for the West in 30 years," and (d) for arranging a Middle East agreement which gives him (Solzhenitsyn) "an alarming feeling of shakiness."

He then suggests that the secretary's Nobel Peace Prize was "pornographic" and that he ought to "transfer to a university where he can lecture to credulous youngsters."

Why is it that so many novelists, when they turn to political analyses, tend to exaggeration and bombast? I have always thought that Mark Twain's "Huckleberry Finn" was the greatest of American novels, but when Mark Twain wrote about politics, which he did most of the time, he was unreadable. The overstatement, the hyperbole, the anger drowned all thought, and Twain's political essays are nothing but childish emotions, like graffiti scrawled upon walls.

John Dos Passos and John Steinbeck also wrote fine novels, but when they, too, turned to political analyses, they were naive, intemperate and silly.

Can it be that the novelist, who, if he is any good, has a fine appreciation of the nuances of individual feeling and

behavior, has no sense of the nuances of politics and of political behavior? How can Solzhenitsyn say that the Middle Eastern peace gives him "shakiness" as though it did not give Dr. Kissinger "shakiness" and the Arabs "shakiness"—and the Israelis? What would be "unshaky"? Some final solution? And why doesn't the novelist see that in political as well as in human problems there may be no final solutions?

What does Solzhenitsyn mean by "unending concessions"? Trade? Wheat? Arms agreements? He does not say; and one cannot escape the impression that if he did say, what he said would be as silly as his suggestion that a U.S. President should consult with other governments before making a cabinet change.

There is something Manichaean as well as naive about Solzhenitsyn's attack on Dr. Kissinger. He has arrayed the forces of light upon his side, and he is doing battle with Kissinger as the stealthy representative of darkness. One is reminded of all those who have practiced cutting Gordian knots, from Alexander to the Roundheads, of Cromwell to the John Birch Society. They have no patience with those who are, trying to untie the knot. To cut it, they will risk civilization.

Los Angeles Times

WASHINGTON STAR  
7 DEC 1975

William F. Buckley Jr.

## Solzhenitsyn misses mark on Kissinger detente motives

I confess to being gravely disappointed by the recent article by Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, whom I consider the outstanding human figure of the century.

What possessed him?

He begins by casually tossing to the enemy the verdict in the matter of the Warren Commission's investigation of the assassination of President Kennedy. That tragedy, Solzhenitsyn writes in the *New York Times*, "was all the worse because of the inability or the lack of desire by the American judicial authorities to uncover the assassins and to clear up the crime."

That statement is quite simply untrue. The effort to identify the assassin was as complete as it could be, and there is no reason to suppose that it was less than successful.

Solzhenitsyn went on to say that the failure to investigate had a devastating effect on the world. "Something more than respect was shaken — it was our faith."

That faith was perhaps shaken, but it was the doing of the muckrakers and profiteers, who are not to be entirely distinguished from the

been busy for a decade now trying to prove that the United States, not the Soviet Union, was responsible for the cold war. It is not only strange but catastrophic that Solzhenitsyn should find himself, however unwittingly, aiding them in their efforts.

What does this have to do with Kissinger? Solzhenitsyn suddenly links that episode, in which Kissinger had no part, to the firing of James Schlesinger, which Solzhenitsyn — and his friends — regret. But he arrives, without logical transition, to Henry Kissinger, and in his comments about Kissinger reveals himself to be deeply uninformed. He bases his arguments against detente on the totally fictitious allegation that Henry Kissinger is of the breed of Americans — Linus Pauling being the archetype — who wake up every morning with the taste of an atomic cinder in their mouths:

"Defending his policy of unending concessions, Mr. Kissinger repeats the one and same argument almost like an incantation: 'Let our critics point out the alternative to nuclear war.' Indeed, the nuclear age is an obsession for him."

Kissinger."

But that simply is not true. The book that first brought Mr. Kissinger to public attention was called *Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy*, and it is an entirely non-hysterical book about the nuclear age. Mr. Kissinger has never had anything but contempt for those who believe that the choice is between nuclear war and disarmament. We was a stalwart defender of the doctrine of graduated response, and risked his academic reputation and lost a great many friends by backing tough military action in Indochina, including the incursion into Cambodia, the bombing of Hanoi, and the blockade of Haiphong.

The Paris Accord was always chancy, but when Solzhenitsyn asks, "Is it possible that the prominent diplomat could not see what a house of cards he was building?" the answer is: That is exactly correct. Kissinger did not anticipate the emasculation of Nixon by the Watergate developments of the ensuing summer. Nor did Solzhenitsyn's hero, James Schlesinger, foresee the debacle in June of 1973 when he took office. I am not, in fact, aware that Solzhenitsyn anticipated it.

What Mr. Solzhenitsyn seems not to have paid any notice to is his own enduring critique of the spiritual corruption of the Western world. Who has said it more plainly than he — with perhaps the exception of Whittaker Chambers, who in any case said

it earlier, and James Burnham — that there are deeply rooted suicidal compulsions working in the West. What Kissinger says isn't: "We must have detente because the alternative is a nuclear war." What he says is, "The American people" (by which he means the American Establishment) will not stand up and resist. Under the circumstances, the only alternative is to maneuver."

I agree with Solzhenitsyn, not Kissinger, that the American people, if roused, will do better than they have done. And perhaps Mr. Kissinger's problem is that he was not himself born to rouse people, disposing of different skills from Solzhenitsyn's, and never having worked for an American president whose skills were those of Cato. To believe Kissinger is wrong about detente (as I believe he is) cannot justify depicting him as Solzhenitsyn does — as a superficial, cowardly demagogue, who feasts on the kindergarten dichotomy of: detente or nuclear war.

I break a confidence to reveal to Mr. Solzhenitsyn that it was Mr. Kissinger who gave to the President, urging him to read it all, *Gulag Archipelago*. Mr. Solzhenitsyn is a man of such moral splendor it is painful to see him work a personal injustice, and reveal a great ignorance of the character of an important American substantially charged with the preservation of such freedom.

NEW YORK TIMES  
9 DEC 1975

## SOLZHENITSYN STAND BY FORD DENOUNCED

WASHINGTON, Dec. 8 (UPI)

—George Meany, president of the A.F.L.-C.I.O., released a confidential administration memo today that cautioned President Ford last summer that he would be sending Moscow a "deliberate negative signal" on detente if he received Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn.

"So thee it is in black and white? Mr. Meany told a session of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which is holding hearings into the future of United States foreign policy. "We didn't want to offend the commissars, so we spit in the face of the man our State Department refers to, perhaps sarcastically, as the most admired of all Russians."

Mr. Meany, who described the Administration's Soviet policy as a flop, contends that

the Russians have been taking advantage of detente to bolster their strategic position and foment turmoil in the third world. He has been bitter over Mr.

Ford's refusal to receive Mr. Solzhenitsyn, who visited Washington in July as Mr. Meany's guest and who spoke out forcefully against detente.

Mr. Ford, on State Department advice, declined to receive the exiled Nobel Prize winner at the White House. Later, under Congressional pressure, he said the author would be welcome, but Mr. Solzhenitsyn snubbed him.

The memo—Mr. Meany did not disclose how he got it—was written by George S. Springsteen, executive secretary to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, and was addressed to Lieut. Gen. Brent Snowcroft, then the president's deputy adviser on national security affairs.

## Western Europe

WASHINGTON STAR  
7 DEC 1975

# How Gloom Muddled Kissinger's Portugal Policy

By Tad Szulc

As a domestic political phenomenon, the Portuguese revolution has defied coherent analysis by observers in Portugal and abroad. The country has had neither a full-fledged leftist dictatorship, contrary to the impressions of nervous and superficially informed foreigners (including many high-ranking American officials and newsmen guilty of shallow and overdramatic reporting), nor a democracy in the normally accepted sense. It had freedom of speech and of the press in some ways; in others it did not.

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*This article is one aspect of Szulc's comprehensive report and analysis on the Portuguese Revolution and U.S. foreign policy being published today in the Winter 1975-76 issue of the journal Foreign Policy. Excerpted and reprinted by permission.*

As an on-going revolution, it has lacked definable direction, except in an instinctively populist or leftist manner. It has had no spectacular leaders — Portugal does not have, say, a Fidel Castro — but just more or less important *dramatis personae* appearing and disappearing on the stage in an ever-revolving political theater of the absurd. It has been misunderstood, misinterpreted, maligned, exaggerated, underestimated, or praised, always depending on the bias and the prejudice of the observer of the moment. It has been intractable and it remains unpredictable even when it appears, as has happened so many times, that a course has finally been set.

American policy was never the dominant factor in events in Portugal, but events there have been regarded by Kissinger and others, including President Ford, as of the utmost importance to the future of Europe and the course of East-West relations.

U.S. strategic and political interests are significantly involved in the Portuguese crisis. Not only might a radical turn in Portugal deprive the United States of its air base and naval station in the Azores, but, as perceived from the beginning in Washington, a marked leftward shift

in Lisbon would dangerously upset the balance of power in Europe. The United States and a number of NATO governments thus take the view that a real change in the status quo in Portugal is intolerable.

For Moscow, of course, the situation poses a special dilemma: on the one hand, it cannot shirk its "international solidarity" duty to the Portuguese Communists; on the other, it must carefully weigh the risks to détente with the United States.

American policy during this period was confused and uneven. Personally orchestrated by Kissinger, it has followed a tortuous and contradictory path to the point of being, at times, incomprehensible even to senior State Department officials, to say nothing of the Portuguese. Washington has blown hot and cold in its relations with Lisbon, although the dominant theme all along has been a pervasive and probably self-defeating fear of a Communist takeover in Portugal. For nearly two years, the administration lived through largely self-induced nightmares of falling dominoes and Communist takeovers in southern Europe.

In the process, Kissinger instructed the Central Intelligence Agency to try its best, through covert operations, to aid the anti-Communist cause although the real importance of the agency's role is questionable. He mysteriously fired one American ambassador in Lisbon and bogged down in lengthy disagreements with the highly qualified, hand-picked successor.

The secretary's personal historical pessimism, not always attuned to the facts of the situation, played a major part in the formulation of American policies over the last two years.

Kissinger's pessimism toward Portugal is part of his larger pessimistic assessment of the prospects for the long-range survival of Western civilization — at least as represented by the strain of democratic capitalism characterizing the great industrialized nations. Kissinger's vision as a historian has acquired a distinctively neo-Splenglerian bent in recent years, particularly as the United States and the West have increasingly had to face "Third World" rebellions by raw materials producers (the OPEC phenomenon had clearly surprised and shaken Kissinger) and local challenges to the Western status quo such as in Chile after 1970 and in Portugal in 1974.

The spectacle of Portugal, a Western

country, moving to what Kissinger perceived as the brink of anarchy or a Communist takeover, seemed to reinforce the secretary's view that the West's moral fiber was breaking down. He told associates in Washington that it might simply be too late to "save" Portugal.

Not all of them agreed with Kissinger, but, inevitably, much of the Portugal policy was being formulated on this gloomy basis. The West Europeans saw us as too defeatist.

Kissinger's pessimism also clashed with the view held in the course of 1975 by his ambassador in Lisbon, Frank Carlucci, that the administration was giving up too soon on Portugal. Carlucci, a Foreign Service Officer who gave up his post as under secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW) in January 1975 to take the Lisbon assignment, opposed Kissinger's policy of isolating Portugal and its government during the "Communist danger" period on the reasonable grounds that such isolation would only play into the hands of the Communists and their Soviet allies. Kissinger at that point had no faith even in the Socialists and Soares. The Western Europeans also withheld economic aid to the Lisbon government last summer, but they maintained a highly active political and diplomatic presence.

Carlucci's views were quietly shared by some senior State Department officials who felt that what one of them privately called Kissinger's "basic pessimism about everything in the world" must not color U.S. policies while the struggle over Portugal remained unresolved. Last May, Carlucci was able, during a brief visit to Washington, to change somewhat Kissinger's outlook; and last August, after the Communists suffered their defeat (and after another Carlucci visit to Washington), Kissinger finally brought himself to address words of encouragement to Portuguese democrats as part of a foreign policy speech in Birmingham, Alabama. But since then, U.S. policy has gone back and forth again more than once.

The outcome so far of the Portuguese crisis — in which Communist influence has been eliminated by more moderate leftists as the revolution gained maturity — suggests two truths about international affairs.

One is that, Kissinger's visceral pessimism notwithstanding, it is possible for the Communist party to lose a contest for power when demo-

cratic forces retain their capacity to react. If the Portuguese experiment has produced any memorable leaders, they were Socialist and democrat Mario Soares, and Major Ernesto Melo Antunes, a leader of the so-called moderate military faction. The fiery Moscow loyalist Alvaro Cunhal, secretary-general of the Portuguese Communist party, turned out to be vastly overrated because, in part, there is a tendency to ascribe superior political gifts to Communists.

As of this writing, Army General Francisco da Costa Gomes, the current provisional president, seems to have emerged as a master politician. Even if a leftist military regime were to take power in Portugal it will have resulted from a radical *gauchiste* turn in which the Communists played a supportive rather than a directing role.

The second truth is that it is possible for communism to be defeated without major involvement by the CIA. This, in turn, raises interesting new questions about the validity of CIA covert operations in general. The CIA became involved in Portugal mainly through the provision of funds to non-Communist parties and, possibly, newspapers and so on. But its role in the outcome was far from decisive.

The point is that the CIA could not have worked in a political vacuum. It might have been able to help, say, now-exiled General Antonio de Spínola to engineer a coup, if the conditions had been right, but it took the stamina and the dedication of the Socialists and moderates in the armed forces to change the course of events in Portugal. The CIA money could not have bought votes for the Socialists and the Popular Democrats last April any more than Soviet money could buy votes for the Communists. Antunes and his companions could not be suborned, either. They had to undergo their own political evolution as the Portuguese Revolution unfolded, step by step.

In this context, it is important to remember former Premier Caetano's phrase just before the 1974 revolution: "Beware of the captains: they are too young to be bought." Caetano, of course, should know. Chances, then, are that the situation would not have been all that different if the CIA had stayed out of Portugal altogether. Money from Western Europe obviously helped the Socialists, but the amounts were relatively modest and, in the end, it was up to Soares to make a go of his battle against the Communists — or to fold. By the same token, the CIA had no means of arresting the extreme leftist coup attempt during October 1975.

Another important aspect of the Portuguese trauma involves the Soviet Union and, consequently, U.S.-Soviet relations and detente. Moscow never made an overwhelming effort to help Cunhal. U.S. experts on Soviet affairs — as well as Western European experts — take the view that Moscow was running an essentially low-risk and limited investment operation. If Cunhal could succeed in his power bid, it would have been a welcome dividend for the Russians. So long as he was in the running, he

had Soviet political and financial support. In fact, Moscow was prepared to bankroll him from the very beginning because his prospects appeared quite promising. Moscow made Portugal a contested territory between the East and the West, but it never overplayed its hand.

It is, of course, a matter of conjecture how the Kremlin would have acted if Cunhal, with an assist from the radical General Vasco dos Santos Goncalves, the deposed premier, had been successful. Then, clearly, the Soviets would be under obligation to provide the Lisbon leadership with the kind of backing they gave Cuba 15 years earlier.

Still, Moscow would be faced with a dilemma, particularly if it moved to extract advantages from the Portuguese situation under some quid pro quo political or strategic arrangement. State Department experts, for example, take the view that if Moscow had had to choose between Portugal and the survival of detente, it would have probably chosen the latter. Yet, we cannot be sure. The temptation to control a strategic piece of real estate in Western Europe might have been too much to resist.

It cannot be excluded that Brezhnev has used the Portuguese affair as a defense against domestic critics of detente with the United States. In this, he appears to have received considerable assistance from Kissinger.

Kissinger's behavior in this context has been immensely interesting — and seemingly contradictory. While warning against Communist penetration in Portugal — and fully aware that Moscow was funding Cunhal's operations — the secretary meticulously refrained for well over a year from making it a public issue with Moscow. He waited until after the Helsinki summit in July before even criticizing the Russians for their activities in Portugal. State Department officials say that there is no record of any protest to the Soviet Union, although they cannot be sure that Ford or Kissinger did not at some point raise the Portuguese matter with Soviet leaders. (Kissinger himself told a Washington news conference on July 25 that Soviet activities in Portugal would be "incompatible with the spirit of relaxation of tensions, and we will bring it to the attention of the Soviet leaders when we meet with them, as we already have brought it to their attention.")

However, the secretary did not explain the last reference.)

In Helsinki, on July 30, Kissinger acknowledged that "the issue of Portugal did not come up directly in the (Brezhnev-Ford) talks but in a general way about the principles that each side should carry out." The secretary also sounded strangely protective of the Soviet position in Portugal: "We should keep in mind that detente cannot be used as a means of asking the Soviet Union to take care of all of our problems on our side of the line and correct analysis of the situation in Portugal should emphasize . . . that many problems in Portugal have indigenous roots and others have to do with Western countries . . ."

But two weeks later, in his speech in Birmingham, Kissinger suddenly seemed to have discovered the extent of the Soviet involvement in Portugal. Nothing had happened in those two weeks — in fact, this was the period when the Communists suffered their worst defeat — but Kissinger was proclaiming that "the United States has never accepted that the Soviet Union is free to relax tensions selectively or as a cover for the pursuit of unilateral advantage. In Portugal, a focus of current concern, the Soviet Union should not assume that it has the option, directly or indirectly, to influence events contrary to the right of the Portuguese people to determine their own future. The involvement of external powers for this purpose, in a country which is an old friend and ally of ours, is inconsistent with any principle of European security."

The record of U.S. policies toward Portugal since the April 1974 revolution is thus one of oscillations, contradictions, uncertainties, unexplained shifts in policy, and, above all, a lack of understanding of the immense complexities involved in the Portuguese situation. Obviously, there are no simple answers concerning Portugal's future either in Lisbon or in Washington. Just as obviously, one must steer clear of predictions. But a few basic points have already emerged:

• As Portuguese events unfolded since April 1974, the United States had essentially three policy choices to pursue. One was a "cold war" or Chilean approach centered on a maximal use of overt and covert intervention to stop Portugal's leftward drift. This policy was never seriously contemplated, partly because of the CIA's problems at home and the risk of highly adverse reactions in world public opinion which might have aggravated the situation.

The second option was to try to isolate Portugal. This was the policy toward which Kissinger was the most inclined, except when he abruptly changed his course in December 1974, announcing limited economic aid to Portugal. (These funds, incidentally, were not disbursed, for a variety of reasons, for at least a year.)

The isolation policy, as we have seen, produced no practical results: the mid-1975 shift toward a more moderate stance in Lisbon was the product of domestic pressures and not a direct consequence of American economic pressure. Portugal, despite grave deterioration in her economy, still had about \$3 billion worth of gold in its reserves when Goncalves (who might have turned Portugal into a replica of an eastern European state) fell.

The third option, which, with Carlucci in mind, might be called "the ambassador's policy," called for a greater effort to understand the Portuguese revolution and to support the moderates to the greatest extent possible. This was, in effect, vetoed by Kissinger. Instead of choosing any of these policy choices, however, Kis-

singer vacillated, distracted by other major events — Watergate and the Ford administration, shuttle diplomacy in the Mideast, disaster in Indochina. American policy toward Portugal evolved sporadically and unevenly, reflecting the lack of a firm guiding hand at any level. Kissinger, in fits and bursts, made highly personal decisions; between them drift and confusion persisted.

● The United States must live with the fact that Portugal is politically on a leftist course. However, it need not be a disaster from the viewpoint of U.S. national interest, especially if the moderates in Lisbon succeed in hammering together a European Socialist democracy. This is, evidently, what the Portuguese desire — if the 1975 elections in which Socialists did so well, Communists so badly, are to have any meaning and if, indeed, in Kissinger's own words, they have the right "to determine their own future."

● The alternatives can be much worse. Gratuitous U.S. pressures could conceivably result in a new drift to the extreme left — and it should not be assumed that Moscow has given up on Portugal altogether. Similarly, only tragedy can ensue if U.S. policies, through the use of the CIA or otherwise, encourage a rightist coup d'état, a turn of events in the realm of the possible. A civil war could easily be the result of such a coup attempt.

● Nothing is to be gained from threatening Portugal with expulsion from NATO, even if a way can be devised to do so. It likewise would be fruitless to deny that country economic aid it desperately needs on grounds there are Communists in Lisbon's public administration — and a lone Communist cabinet minister. It is difficult to see what the United States would gain from forcing Portugal into economic collapse.

Taking the whole situation into consideration, it would appear that a wise U.S. policy, untainted by lapses of historical pessimism on the part of our secretaries of state, should aim at helping to stabilize (rather than destabilize) the present Portuguese government, its leftist inclinations notwithstanding. Moreover, it should be done in close consultation with the Western Europeans, who are more sensitive to the Portuguese problems and realities than the Ford administration.

All this should still apply even if the extreme leftists succeed in assuming power in the immediate future. The past has shown that no trend is necessarily permanent in Portugal, and this would be no time to undercut the moderates if they are down once more. There simply are no other sensible solutions, if Washington has learned anything at all from watching Portugal in the last two years — unless we are really prepared to give up on it altogether.

BALTIMORE SUN

5 Dec. 1975

**'God vs. Marx'****Vatican takes offensive to block new Communist gains in Italy**By GILBERT A. LEWTHWAITE  
Sun Staff Correspondent

Rome—The Vatican is engaged in a bitter propaganda campaign to head off a possible Communist takeover of the holy city of Rome next spring and, later, this Catholic nation.

Pope Paul VI has endorsed the church's sudden and vehement entry into the Italian political scene, in what is being presented here as a decisive battle of "God against Marx."

The Catholic hierarchy has been stirred into action by the sweeping advances of the Communists in local administrations and by the possibility that they will win next year's Rome city election and the 1977 Italian general election.

The campaign centers on trying to convince Italians that they cannot be both Catholics in name and Communists in practice, that Christianity and Marxism are incompatible. The church has been alarmed by the growth of extreme left-wing movements within the ranks of the faithful, which have helped push the Communists to within 2 percentage points of overtaking the Catholic-oriented Christian Democratic party at the polls.

The Christian Democrats have dominated government here for three decades.

In June's regional and administrative elections, the Communists gained 5 percentage points from previous showings to take 33 per cent of the vote, against the Christian Democrats' 35 per cent.

Opinion polls suggest that if a general election were held today, the Communists would emerge as the strongest party and would finally be able to engineer the "historical compromise" by which they have been seeking a share in government for years.

The members of the Catholic hierarchy involved in the propaganda campaign have, among other things, demanded the rejuvenation of the Christian

Democratic leadership to make it more appealing and responsive to the younger generation, and have questioned the widely held belief that Italy's Communist-run regions are the best administered in the country.

The Communists now control every major Italian city except Rome. It was the imminent prospect of a Red victory here that finally persuaded the Vatican to end what appeared to be a stunned silence after last June's election upset, which followed the church's defeat in a divorce referendum.

The Vatican's effort to combat the Communist advance will have at least the tacit support of the United States State Department, which is increasingly concerned at the prospect of a Communist power grab in this southern North Atlantic Treaty Organization nation.

The leader of the Vatican campaign so far has been Ugo Cardinal Poletti, vicar of Rome, a moderate cleric who is considered a possible future pope. "The prospect that Italy, whose culture is so deeply steeped in Catholicism, should pin her hopes for the future on an atheistic doctrine is a source of great sorrow and concern for all of us, from the Holy Father down," he said in a recent interview.

Cardinal Poletti has explained his decision to speak out as being necessary to counteract a Communist claim that because he organized a recent conference critical of the Christian Democratic administration of Rome he was in favor of "historical compromise" with the Communists.

Significantly, however, the Vatican newspaper *L'Osservatore Romano*, has reprinted every word of criticism of the Communists by Cardinal Poletti and another leading cleric who has joined the fray, the Most Rev. Cesare Pagani, the bishop of Communist-controlled Umbria.

Even more impressive is the fact that Pope Paul has en-

dorsed the cardinals' viewpoint that it is "inadmissible" for Catholics to vote Communist, and more recently has said that communism means men living together not in a spirit of charity, but "in struggle, violence, the domination of one class over another."

Most Vatican observers expect another major broadside from the Italian Episcopal conference next week, and the conflict is likely to intensify as Election Day approaches.

So far the Communist reaction has been a deliberately muted mixture of disappointment that the Vatican should descend into the political arena and surprise that it should doubt the Communists' public commitment to moderation and democracy.

There is also an understated suggestion that the church itself has something to answer for in the sort of ineffectual and corrupt government that has characterized postwar Italian politics.

The very restraint by the Communists has become one focal point of Catholic attack, with Cardinal Poletti comparing the possible advent of Communists into government to "the development in the early 1920's, when fascism, after pledging to operate within a democratic multiparty framework, went on to force upon the country a totalitarian regime."

Cardinal Poletti is little less scathing about the geriatric leadership of the Christian Democrats, calling for "a Watergate-style clean-up" to re-establish credibility and trust in the right-center party if it is to be a viable alternative to communism.

Bishop Cesare, in whose Umbrian diocese the Communists gained 46 per cent of the vote in June's elections, has joined the general attack and has more specifically complained that Catholic welfare agencies in his area have been underfinanced and pushed aside by the Communist administration.



# Near East

WASHINGTON POST  
5 DEC 1975

George F. Will

## U.S. Capitulation in the U.N.

Another tiger of extremism is loose in the United Nations, this time with the consent of the U.S. government, which could have prevented it. In a last minute policy swerve, the U.S. dashed Israeli hopes for a veto—hopes the Israelis felt were firmly based on U.S. assurances—and voted for a resolution that the U.S. knew would guarantee participation by the Palestine Liberation Organization in next month's U.N. debate on the Middle East.

The invitation to the PLO was attached to a Security Council resolution extending the mandate of the U.N. observer force on the Golan Heights, between Israeli and Syrian forces. On the eve of expiration of the disengagement agreement, Israel agreed to renewal. But Syria, aware of the brittleness of U.S. support for Israel, opposed renewal unless it included the invitation to the PLO.

The PLO is an unelected body funded by Arab governments. It is committed to the use of terrorism in pursuit of the destruction of Israel, a U.N. member.

There is a kind of majestic brazenness to the Ford administration's argument in defense of itself. The argument is that the U.S.—by supporting a resolution that the U.S. knew would result in an invitation to the PLO—is not compromising its diplomatic boycott of the PLO. The administration argues that the PLO is invited to debate, not negotiate, therefore...

Therefore nothing.

The distinction is a distinction without a difference. And the administration's

feeble argument indicates that the administration is ashamed of itself. Why else does it argue so foolishly that it has not done what it obviously has done?

The U.S. voted the way it did for the reason that everything happens in U.S. foreign policy: Secretary of State Kissinger commanded it. As late as Saturday night, Nov. 29, the Israelis were assured that the U.S. would veto the resolution. Sunday morning Kissinger called the U.N. and ordered the U.S. to side with Syria and its chief sponsor, the Soviet Union, against Israel.

This is an example of the U.S. policy of preemptive concession. Kissinger reportedly was told by other diplomats before Sunday that U.S. firmness could get the Palestinian question deleted from the resolution.

This would have blocked the planned statement from the Soviet ambassador that "the understanding of the majority" is that the PLO is to participate in the U.N. debate. Instead of standing firm, the U.S. melted into the anti-Israel majority.

As always is the case with U.S. concessions, this one is being praised by people who contrive to see it as a deft stroke to encourage "moderates." What moderates?

The PLO, whose leader, Yasser Arafat, toted a gun to the U.N. rostrum last year?

Syria, which has been bitterly critical of Egypt's moderation, and which now appears vindicated in its contention that obduracy pays when dealing with Israel and the U.S.?

Advocates of softer U.S. negotiating positions lack originality, but not persistence. Whenever they are called up to rationalize a concession, they do so by asserting that the concession will strengthen the "moderates" against the "hawks"—the "moderates" in the Soviet Politburo, in the PLO, in Arab governments. You may remember those days, one peace settlement and one Nobel Peace Prize ago, when this was said with regard to "moderates" in Hanoi.

But the U.S. vote in the U.N. was clear capitulation to the forces of extremism in the Middle East, and for no clear purpose. Judging from past experience, it is probable that if the U.S. had credibly threatened to veto the resolution, Syria would have backed down, allowing renewal of the mandate of the U.N. observers without insisting on the invitation to the PLO.

And it is highly probable that if Syria had not backed down, and the mandate had not been renewed, nothing much would have happened. The Syrian government is not a feast of reason, but it is not crazy enough to contemplate a fair fight, alone, against Israel.

The U.S. vote was a giant step in a deplorable direction: it confers legitimacy on a dictatorial terrorist organization, the PLO, as the representative of the long-suffering Palestinian people. Perhaps the PLO's ruthlessness, and the support of its totalitarian allies has made inevitable the ascendancy of the PLO. But the U.S. vote was needless complicity in that ascendancy.

# Africa

WASHINGTON POST  
12 DEC 1975

## U.S. Angola Cost: \$50 Million

By Marilyn Berger  
Washington Post Staff Writer

American involvement in the Angolan civil war has cost almost \$50 million in a covert operation that some informed sources believe may be the biggest the United States has undertaken outside of Southeast Asia.

The bulk of U.S.-supplied military equipment has been provided in less than six months.

Money and military equipment are being provided to two factions that are battling the Soviet-backed Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), informed sources disclosed. Most of it is being funneled to Angola through neighboring Zaire.

In a separate operation, South Africa is also giving support to one of these factions: UNITA -- the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola -- headed by Jonas Savimbi.

Some American officials are concerned that black African anger over the increasingly direct involvement of white-ruled South Africa may provoke the Organization of African Unity to recognize the Soviet-backed faction as the legitimate government of Angola.

Holden Roberto heads the third group, the FNLA -- the National Front for the Liberation of Angola. Roberto is close to the President of Zaire, Mobutu Sese Seko, and has long received American support. His backing within Angola, however, is said to be thin.

Sen. Dick Clark (D-Iowa), head of the African sub-

committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee who has met with all three liberation leaders, said yesterday that he believes the United States, in supporting Roberto, is "backing the only sure loser."

In Clark's view, Savimbi who heads a group with support in heavily populated areas, would be prepared to form a coalition with the Soviet-backed MPLA.

The decision to send arms, in addition to the "political" money that was already going to the two Angolan factions, was made by the Forty Committee in early spring, informed sources said. The Forty Committee must approve all covert operations.

While some of the equipment being made available is American made, much is being bought on the international arms market.

Sources said there has been a step-up of arms supplies following the arrival in Angola of 3,500 to 4,000 Cubans. The Cubans have provided the MPLA with the expertise needed to deal with sophisticated Soviet equipment being airlifted to Angola.

While American officials see the Cuban role as important, some doubt that their presence will be decisive. One estimates that the war will see-saw back and forth for months, possibly years.

Clark last week introduced an amendment to the military assistance bill that would prohibit any American assistance to any group in Angola without specific congressional authorization. Such an amendment is the

## Two Factions Get Arms, Money

only way Congress can bar activities of which it disapproves.

Noting that this is one of the most widely known of all "covert" operations, Clark attributes the disclosures to "deep divisions" in the administration about its advisability.

Clark, in an interview, said he is not particularly concerned about the prospect of a Soviet-backed faction winning out if the United States support were to stop its.

"The history of Soviet intervention in Africa," he said, "is one of almost total failure. . . . If the MPLA wins, the Soviets will be lucky if they can hang on for a year or two."

Some U.S. officials note that liberation movements, no matter how strongly they have been supported frequently fail to show their gratitude once in power.

Mozambique is a case in point. Despite the support Moscow gave to the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (Frelimo), a Soviet requests for a port for its warships was rejected recently and the Russians have been rebuked publicly for trying to put pressure on Mozambique's leaders.

The Chinese, on the other hand, are more welcome both as instructors and as suppliers of military equipment.

Clark said he has spoken to the leaders of the three Angolan liberation groups and "they all sound almost the same. They all see themselves as African socialists."

For the last month,

Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger has complained publicly about Soviet intervention in Angola.

Kissinger has argued that Moscow's policy "is difficult to reconcile . . . with the principles of coexistence that were signed in 1972," and said "this would have to be taken into account by our policy if it continues."

He said that "the United States cannot be indifferent while an outside power embarks upon an interventionist policy."

Kissinger, who seems to see the Angola war primarily in terms of the superpower relationship, said that all "extracontinental powers should stay out of Angola."

This demand, however, does not solve the major problem from the African viewpoint, the involvement of South Africa.

Black African anger over the South African role, far more than the Soviet and Cuban involvement, could influence the outcome, officials here say.

The OAU foreign ministers are scheduled to meet Dec. 18 in Addis Ababa to work out an agenda for an African summit that American officials say might endorse the MPLA as the legitimate government of Angola.

Two thirds of the 46 members of the OAU have agreed to hold a summit on Angola.

The OAU's present position calls for a government of national reconciliation in Angola, a so-called "African solution" that would bring the three liberation movements into a single administration.

Friday, Dec. 12, 1975

THE WASHINGTON POST

## CORE Recruiting Force for Angola

By Les Payne  
and Ernest Volkman  
Newsday

The Congress of Racial Equality has been recruiting black American military veterans for service as mercenaries in the civil war now raging in Angola, U.S. intelligence sources say.

CORE Chairman Roy Innis admits that his civil rights organization is recruiting black veterans for Angola, but said the men would serve as a "police force" on behalf of the Organization of African Unity's attempts

the Angola war. The organization is a confederation of African nations.

He added that he hoped to raise the money for such a force from the black community. He denied that the plan was connected in any way with the U.S. government.

"I have talked with dozens of black veterans in New York, Los Angeles, Baltimore and Chicago," Innis said, "and they are excited about the idea. There are all kinds of people going to Angola to

Africa. We are proposing that independent Afro-Americans, not linked with the Establishment, contribute their skills in economics, politics and the military."

CORE, which has headquarters in New York, was one of the leading groups in the civil rights struggle during the 1960s. In recent years, however, Innis has redirected the organization's efforts toward a philosophy of "black nationalism" at home and abroad.

U.S. intelligence sources

who revealed the existence of the CORE recruiting plan, said that it was another part of a growing Central Intelligence Agency operation to improve the military fortunes of two anti-Communist liberation movements in Angola -- the National Front for the Liberation of Angola and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola.

Both are fighting the

Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola, which has direct Soviet support, including advanced weapons. A drive by the two anti-Communist groups three weeks ago to oust the Popular Movement has encountered serious reverses after some early success.

A CIA arms airlift was recently stepped up to bolster the National Front and National Union drives. Both groups also have the support of several hundred mercenaries, including, the sources said, some Americans. Additionally, about 1,000 South Africans are fighting beside National Union forces.

Innis denied that CORE's recruitment plan was linked in any way to the CIA. "I would not accept federal funds (for the recruitment program)," Innis said. "The CIA can't be trusted."

Innis said the veterans interviewed by CORE were asked about their military experience and their political opinions.

The names of those favorably considered for possible service, Innis added, were placed on file for future contact. All the men interviewed were former enlisted men and Vietnam veterans, Innis said, adding that he was also looking for

former black officers.

"I tried to persuade them," Innis said, "that they had been a hired gun for the U.S. in Korea and Vietnam. We were offering them a chance to fight in one just war for black Africa."

Although Innis called his prospective force a "neutral force" and a "brigade for peace," the CORE chairman also said that he did "not look forward at all to a Soviet takeover in Angola." Innis added that the Popular Movement, which now holds the dominant military position in Angola, was "Soviet-dominated."

"I know the aggressive nature of the Soviets," he said. "They are grabby and pushy. I am discouraged that key military advisers to the MPLA are Cuban or Soviet."

Additionally, Innis confirmed reports that Solomon Goodrich, his chief assistant, was sent to Angola to participate in Angola's independence celebration Nov. 11. While there, Innis said, Goodrich held meetings with the National Union, the most avowedly pro-Western liberation group in Angola with strong CIA connections.

Innis is a close friend of Uganda President Idi Amin, who has strongly protested Soviet involvement in the Popular Movement. Amin is

also head of the Organization of African Unity, which has attempted to mediate the Angolan civil war. The organization has also protested what it calls "outside interference" in the war.

"I will offer our services to Amin as chairman of the OAU," Innis said. "The force would be operating under an OAU mandate. We will await the green light from Angola and the OAU before acting." A spokesman for the OAU Secretariat at the United Nations said he would not discuss the CORE plan and a spokesman for the Ugandan U.N. mission said he knew nothing of the plan.

Innis hinted that he has already recruited a team of former military-medical personnel for service in Angola. "I would like to send the medical men early next year, sometime before the spring," he said. "I hope that the OAU has decided by then. I'm looking for some good riflemen...the key military adviser to the FNLA is a Portuguese colonel, but I think they need some black colonels."

(At a press conference yesterday, Innis said CORE is recruiting experienced combat medics and would consider sending black U.S.

Army veterans to serve as combat advisers in Angola.

(He denied that these men would be sent to bolster the anti-Communist forces. Any of the three Angolan groups could request help from CORE, Innis said. So far, CORE has contacted only one of the three, UNITA, and has been asked only for medical supplies, he added.

Innis said CORE would form an "objective and neutral force, a peace brigade" to stand between the warring factions in case the Organization of African Unity managed to arrange a ceasefire.

("We are not mercenaries," he said. "We are Africans abroad. The Cubans, the Russians, the South Africans, the CIA—they are the mercenaries.")

There are at least two other efforts now under way in the United States to recruit mercenaries for service in Angola, although the sponsors of the efforts are unknown. One, in Fresno, Calif., offered up to \$1,200 a month to white military veterans willing to fight in Angola. It was not specified which side the mercenaries would fight on, but one source said the recruitment was for the National Union.

NEW YORK TIMES  
12 Dec. 1975

## Angola Reported Getting \$50 Million in U.S. Arms

By DAVID BINDER

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 11—The United States has sent \$25 million in arms and support funds to Angola over the last three months, a high-ranking Government official said today, and plans to send another \$25 million in supplies to counter the large-scale military intervention there by the Soviet Union and Cuba.

The official said that the first \$25 million was distributed by the Central Intelligence Agency, mostly through Zaire, which has a 1,200-mile frontier with Angola.

He said the secret United States operation was an attempt "to create a stalemate" in the Angolan civil war.

### Soviet Aid Cited

Strife broke out in July in the former Portuguese colony and has intensified since Angola attained independence Nov. 11. The civil war involves factions that grew out of three separate national liberation movements.

The official said that the

Soviet Union had sent 27 shiploads of military supplies since the spring and, since October, has flown "30 to 40" supply missions with huge AN-22 cargo planes. He said there were about 200 Soviet military advisers in Angola.

Since mid-October, Cuba has sent infantry weapons and troops to Angola. As of last week the Administration estimated there were 4,000 Cuban soldiers in combat.

Today, another high-ranking official said there was evidence that Cuba now had "close to 5,000" men in Angola. Cuban infantry and artillery units have been seen on all three major battle sectors in the northern and central regions of the country.

### Cuban Role Described

According to intelligence reports reaching Washington the most effective weapons supplied by the Soviet Union are 24-barrel antipersonnel rocket launchers and tanks.

These launchers for 122-mm.

rockets and the Soviet T-54 tanks are manned by Cubans, the official said, explaining: "The MPLA has experience in guerrilla fighting, but not with sophisticated weapons." MPLA is the Portuguese acronym for the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola.

There was a report last week by the Luanda radio of artillery practice on the outskirts of the city, which the Popular Movement has declared its capital. American intelligence analysts believe this may be a sign of an attempt to train Angolans in the use of heavy weapons.

American military supplies have consisted mainly of portable infantry weapons, the official said, including large numbers of antitank missile launchers and antipersonnel rocket launchers—"the kind you hold on your shoulder that you could use with a minimum of training."

He said he was not in a position to give the designations of the weapons.

"There are no American advisers in Angola, either civilian or military," the official said. He added that no Americans were involved in the ground fighting.

However, he said that the United States had supplied five artillery spotter planes that flew into the Angolan battle zones, returning to bases in Zaire. "They fly in and out," he

said of the American pilots.

The official said that the additional \$25 million worth of weapons and support funds to be sent to Angola "shortly" would exhaust the C.I.A.'s funds for such contingencies. Should the Administration want additional funds for the Angola struggle it would need Congressional authorization, the official remarked.

He said additional military equipment was being sent from Western Europe for the forces fighting the Popular Movement. But he did not disclose which countries were the suppliers, or the nature or amount of the supplies.

"But the Soviet-Cuban involvement is far in excess of anything we or the Europeans are doing," he asserted.

He said that the American supplies were flown mostly by C-141 transports to landing fields in Zaire. There, he said, the equipment is turned over to the Zaire Army, which is said to have 1,000 soldiers on the northern Angola front above Luanda.

The Zaireans are reported to be fighting alongside the Front for the National Liberation of Angola headed by Holden Roberto, a brother-in-law of Zaire's President, Mobutu Sese Seko.

### Help in the South

The official said that a small amount of American-supplied weapons had also reached the southern-based forces of the

National Union for the Total Independence of Angola, which is now allied with Mr. Roberto's forces.

The National Union forces are fighting the Luanda-based Popular Movement and Cubans in several sectors by a long front parallel to and sometimes crossing the 896-mile Benguela railway, which stretches from the Atlantic to the Zaire frontier.

The National Union troops have been bolstered by South African soldiers and equipment, including wheeled armored vehicles, the official said. Although the United States has no hard figures on the size of the South African involvement, American intelligence officials believe that about 1,000 South African soldiers are in Angola.

The American operation was characterized Tuesday by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger as "covert," and he therefore declined to give details about it at a news conference. Last night at a Washington forum William E. Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, said the American assistance was "secret" and he, too, declined to supply details.

#### Pike Wants Discussion

Mr. Colby shared the rostrum with Representative Otis G. Pike, the Suffolk Democrat who is chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence. After listening to Mr. Colby outline details of the Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola Mr. Pike said it was "preposterous" not to discuss the American opera-

tion, too.

On Monday Mr. Colby briefed the Pike committee on the Angola situation.

The official who gave details of the American effort to The New York Times said the reason President Ford had authorized the \$50 million supply operation was that "the Russians are in to win" all of Angola.

"Our effort is to have a stand-off between the factions so as to get all the parties together in a coalition," he added.

A high-ranking Soviet diplomat in Washington questioned about his country's aims in Angola, denied that the Soviet-Cuban involvement was designed to insure a take-over of all of Angola by the Popular Movement headed by Augustus

tinho Neto.

"It is not total," he insisted. "We are just helping them stay alive, that's all. It is equal to your involvement. It is not that big. You have blown it up in your press."

Asked why there were so many Cuban soldiers in Angola, the diplomat replied: "Why don't you ask the Cubans? Secretary Kissinger should get in touch with them."

The diplomat indicated that the Soviet Union had not ruled out the idea of Angolan coalition talks as a means of ending the civil war. But American officials said the Soviet Union had not responded to Mr. Kissinger's proposal that coalition discussions be initiated through the offices of the United States and the Soviet Union.

WASHINGTON STAR  
6 DEC 1975

## Angola's foreign 'friends'

Independence for Angola, after centuries of Portuguese colonial rule and little preparation for self-government, had loomed for many months as a potentially violent affair. There are three "liberation" groups divided along tribal and ideological lines, and African and Portuguese intermediaries had failed to hold them together in a coalition. Last month, the Portuguese left on schedule. The long-anticipated civil war commenced.

The fight could be bloodier and more prolonged as a result of the substantial foreign involvement that has surfaced since then. Moscow has emerged as the chief sponsor of the Marxist-led Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which drove its rivals from the capital, Luanda, in the months preceding independence. Besides that city, the MPLA controls a wedge of central Angola and the oil-rich northern enclave of Cabinda. The Soviet Union has poured substantial military equipment into the Luanda area, has technicians on the scene and is believed responsible for the arrival of some 3,000 Cuban troops to aid the MPLA cause.

Arrayed against the MPLA are the National Front for the Liberation of Angola (FNLA) and the Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), which together control most of the country and have joined forces in the south. Backing the "anti-Soviet" liberationists is a strange collaboration of outsiders including the United States, Communist China and South Africa. Significant American and Chinese military aid has been channeled through Zaire, which also backs the FNLA. White personnel are prominent in the anti-MPLA front, including Portuguese who would like to stay in Angola under a relatively friendly regime, and South Africans.

It is not easy to sort out everyone's interests. Angola has mineral wealth that is attractive to many nations. Pretoria has an immediate stake in heading off the establishment of a militantly hostile government on the border of Southwest Africa.

The Russians are suspected of having more in mind than helping a group of ideological soulmates. They are not "colonizing" Africa, and Ambassador Moynihan did not mean to be taken literally when he threw out that barb the other day. But the Soviets are obviously seeking more influence in Africa, and possibly a naval base on the South Atlantic overlooking the supertanker routes between the Middle East and the West. The Cubans are paying on their debt for years of Soviet assistance.

Peking's distrust of Soviet power throughout the world explains the Chinese role in opposing Moscow's Angolan clients. Washington is reluctant to countenance a pro-Soviet bastion in southern Africa and has an understandable preference for the other factions, which it seeks to help short of a manpower commitment that would arouse politically explosive evocations of Vietnam.

There are dangers for all. Angolans of all persuasions face the prospect of more casualties and more destruction of their emergent country because of the additional firepower introduced by foreigners. All will bear blame for any larger catastrophe that results. And as Secretary of State Kissinger has repeatedly warned, the cause of East-West detente could be hurt in the Angolan confrontation.

If it is not too late, the Organization of African Unity should try again to bring the Angolan parties to the conference table and seek an end of foreign intervention.

# East Asia

WASHINGTON STAR  
8 DEC 1975

## Kissinger in Peking: Too Eager to Please?

By Henry S. Bradsher  
Washington Star Staff Writer

MANILA — After President Ford left China last week, a member of his official party who went with him to meet Mao Tse-tung talked to reporters about the chairman of the Chinese Communist party.

Later, another U.S. official wanted to know who had done the talking, since it was not that well-known "senior American official" who is authorized to talk to reporters — but who has had almost nothing to say about Mao. There was some anger that someone else had leaked information about the Chinese leader.

This is a result of an American attitude that a number of foreign observers in Peking find curious.

To some of them, the willingness of U.S. officials to accommodate Chinese wishes in relations between Peking and Washington is at the very least surprising. It might also be counter-productive, since considerable evidence suggests that the Chinese respect foreigners who stand up to them and assert their rights more than the United States has done.

SECRETARY of State Henry A. Kissinger told a news conference Thursday night in Peking, "We had agreed with our Chinese hosts" that no information would be given out during Ford's talks with Mao and acting Premier Teng Hsiao-ping.

Kissinger added, "We have tended to follow in these matters the practices of our hosts that the briefing should take place only at the end of the visit."

NEW YORK TIMES  
9 DEC 1975

## Laos Says It Wants Ties With U.S. but Fears Plots

By FOX BUTTERFIELD  
Special to The New York Times

VIENTIANE, Laos, Dec. 8—A senior official of the new Communist Government of Laos said today that Laos wanted good relations with the United States but worried that Washington was plotting with exiled Laotian rightists in Thailand to invade the country.

The official, Sisana Sisan, Minister of Propaganda and information in the new People's Democratic Republic of Laos, which was established last week, said that "the new Government is ready to have good relations with the United States if they respect our in-

dependence and sovereignty."

But, he said, "according to our sources" certain "U.S. institutions have recently given grants of \$150 million" to former Laotian rightist officers and leaders who fled to Thailand. Mr. Sisana Sisan also charged that American reconnaissance planes based in Thailand were still flying missions over Laos.

### First Interview

Mr. Sisana Sisan, a short, slight, partly bald man, made his comments in the first interview given by the new Gov-

What happened was that the Chinese asked the U.S. delegation not to give out any information and Kissinger was more than happy to comply. Although such secrecy is considered by some White House staff members to be a poor idea politically, it is exactly what Kissinger prefers.

A Chinese official involved in this restrictive practice commented to a Peking resident that the Americans were very well behaved. But some diplomats in Peking saw this as an example of American weakness.

When the late Georges Pompidou visited China as president of France two years ago, the Chinese asked his officials not to talk to the accompanying French press party while negotiations were under way. The officials agreed, but when told of it Pompidou angrily overruled them.

POMPIDOU SAID the French people had a right to know what was going on. So the French press was given some information

daily. And it was the impression in Peking's foreign community later that Premier Chou En-lai had respected Pompidou for his toughness.

Several recent visitors have given reporters in Peking detailed accounts of their meetings with Mao. Most of what the world knows about Mao's health and mental acuity comes from these briefings.

It does not come from U.S. officials. They act as if every bit of information about Mao has to be kept a deep secret, in contrast to the belief by Edward Heath of Britain, and Chancellor Helmut Schmidt of Germany that the world has a right to some discreetly handled information.

When he was challenged by a reporter on his secretiveness, Kissinger contended that he could not have said more daily than he was saying at his Thursday news conference after the talks were over.

BUT HE SAID little then beyond confirming reporters' speculations on what

topics had been discussed. How a listing of the topics earlier in the week would have prejudiced the discussions was not made clear.

The whole uneven nature of the Chinese-American relationship was emphasized by Ford's trip.

There has been political criticism in the United States on the lines that first the Nixon administration and now that of Ford — both guided by Kissinger — have accepted China's pretensions to the old Middle Kingdom role. China has historically insisted that it was the center of the world and the outer Barbarians should come to it.

With almost a guilty conscience over the continued diplomatic and defense tie to Peking's enemies on Taiwan, the two administrations have accepted the idea that Chinese officials cannot visit the United States so long as Chinese Nationalist diplomats are stationed there.

China has also refused to consider an exchange of journalists on residential assignments so long as the Nationalist news agency is represented in Washington.

However, in several other world capitals, Communist and Nationalist Chinese journalists do coexist.

ernment to Western journalists. He is reportedly a member of the Central Committee of the long-secretive Lao People's Revolutionary Party, or Phak Pasason Pativat Lao, the Communist organization that has directed the Pathet Lao.

Along with several other senior Communist leaders, he appeared publicly in Vientiane last week for the first time after many years in the Pathet Lao's headquarters in the mountains of northeastern Laos near the North Vietnamese border.

In the interview, Mr. Sisana Sisan also disclosed that a truck convoy carrying gasoline from North Vietnam had crossed into Laos in an effort to relieve the critical fuel shortage in Vientiane.

Supplies of gasoline in this drowsy city of 180,000 people are nearly exhausted because Thailand, on which Laos normally depends for all its im-

ports, has kept its border closed for the last three weeks following an attack on a Thai patrol boat on the Mekong River. Vientiane has already run out of many types of goods ranging from beer and ice cream to radio batteries and prices of many other items have more than doubled.

### Road Transport Difficult

If the new Communist authorities can succeed in bringing supplies into the Vientiane area from North Vietnam, it could mean a major economic realignment that would make the country's political adjustment to the new Communist Government easier. However, the few roads through the Annamese Mountains are poor and the job will be difficult.

The new Communist Government adopted a far-reaching political and economic program last week calling for a "popular democratic dictatorship" and

virtual nationalization of the economy of this small undeveloped country.

The program also pledges that the Government will "completely get rid of the influence of the slavish, reactionary and decadent culture" of Laos by destroying "all reactionary novels, books, newspapers and pictures."

These measures will help the country "along the path of self-mastery so as to march forward to socialism," said Kaysone Phomvihane, the new Prime Minister, who proposed the plan. It also says that the Communists must "struggle to demand that the United States contribute to healing the wounds of war in Laos."

Prime Minister Kaysone Phomvihane is also secretary general of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party. The Laotian Communists are now using that name in all their communications, although previously they sometimes called their organization the Laotian People's Party. In the local language the name is rendered as Phak Pasason Pativat Lao.

#### Monarchy Abolished

According to a statement outlining the program broadcast by the Vientiane radio, it was approved unanimously by a national congress of people's representatives, which met secretly in Vientiane last week.

It was this congress that abolished the six-century-old Laotian monarchy and dissolved the former coalition Government set up under the Vientiane peace agreement of 1973 that ended many years of civil war. The congress met in the gymnasium of the former American school here. The school,

along with a large compound of the United States Agency for International Development and several United States housing compounds, was seized by the Pathet Lao last summer.

The United States, however, still maintains an embassy here — its only one in Indochina.

Although the Vientiane radio and the two Government-controlled newspapers have now carried several reports of the meeting, it is still unclear by whose authority the congress acted to change the Government or just who the representatives were. Diplomats here believe that the 265 representatives were probably selected members of various local and provincial councils elected throughout Laos over the last few months.

The diplomats are also uncertain why the Communists moved so hastily to set up their new regime. An election for a new National Assembly was scheduled for next April and it was widely expected that the change would take place then.

Some diplomats believe that Mr. Kaysone Phomvihane and the other Communist leaders simply grew tired of waiting to take final control, after so many years in their primitive mountain headquarters.

#### Political Report Presented

Mr. Kaysone Phomvihane himself, in a political report to the congress, said merely that the old Government was "unable to respond to the new demands of the situation."

The action program that Mr. Kaysone Phomvihane read to the congress still referred to

elections to be held for a National Assembly and to the writing of a new constitution, though he gave no dates.

The main political emphasis of the program appears to lie in Mr. Kaysone Phomvihane's call for "guaranteeing that the popular democratic dictatorship will be further strengthened and consolidated with every passing day." Emphasis is also given to "strengthening the peoples' security forces, particularly those forces responsible for certain duties," as Mr. Kaysone Phomvihane put it, "so as to promptly smash all counterrevolutionary organizations."

Under the new Government, the Prime Minister said, the state will regulate prices, foreign exchange, all imports and exports and the purchase of all essential goods. It will also "nationalize all economic and financial bases in order to abolish alleconomic bases of the comprador bourgeoisies, particularly those serving as stooges of the United States imperialists."

#### Tourism to Be Promoted

Although the Communists have already seized total political control, they have so far attempted few of these economic changes.

Two other measures mentioned in the plan are encouragement of tourism and the building of a road, with North Vietnamese help, through Vietnam to the South China Sea, to relieve Laotian dependence on Thailand.

Much of the program has a stridently anti-American tone, with Mr. Kaysone Phomvihane accusing the United States of "new tricks and schemes" to

destroy the Communist regime. This was in contrast with a statement by Mr. Sisana Sisane today that Laos welcomed an announcement by a State Department spokesman last week that Washington would recognize the new Government.

Mr. Sisana Sisane did not give a source for his charge that some American group had supplied Laotian exiles in Thailand with \$150 million. But there were unsubstantiated newspaper reports to the effect last summer from the United States.

#### Comment by Washington

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Dec. 8

Asked to respond to the remarks of Mr. Sisana Sisane, a State Department spokesman said he had "no information that supports" the allegation that the United States gave \$150 million to former Laotian officers and political leaders.

The spokesman, John Trattner, also said he had no information about United States reconnaissance flights in Indochina. "We are maintaining relations with the Lao Government," he said.

Last week Mr. Trattner said that the United States would continue to maintain diplomatic relations with Laos despite the formation of a Communist-dominated Government there. He said that the establishment of the new regime and abolition of the monarchy in Laos had been "no surprise" to the United States because of the steady erosion of Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's coalition Government and the increasing assumption of power by the Pathet Lao.

LONDON TIMES

1 Dec. 1975

## Why China fears the build up of Russian arms could spark off a third world war

It is well known that China's leaders consider the East-West détente to be an illusion and that they think the factors leading to a new world war between the two superpowers over Europe are increasing. The underlying reasons for this have not been satisfactorily explained. In public, the Chinese refer to the increasing military might the Soviet Union is displaying in Europe. They also argue that the Soviet Union is in an expansionary phase and that the United States is, relatively, on the decline. This, however, was said by the Chinese earlier in the 1970s without them claiming a new World War was inevitable.

The Chinese first began to point to the dangers of a new World War in the second half of 1973. This was the time former President Nixon's hold on the presidency began to weaken. The Chinese are known to have ascribed the fall of

Nixon, not so much to the Watergate affair, but to the deep structural changes in the political economic system in the United States. They maintain that the period of Nixon's rise to power was associated with the shift in American conventional strategic priorities to Asia and particularly to Vietnam in the middle 1960s. This was related to the growing economic and indeed political importance of the American West- and mid-West business circles. Nixon's own men were representative of these forces, whose international outlook was so different from the free-trading internationalists of the East coast who tended to collude with the Soviet Union. Nixon's fall, however, is connected with the transfer of strategic priorities away from East Asia and with the return to the centre of power and influence of the East coast internationalists. This structural

shift, the Chinese suggest, has been accompanied by less realistic policies for dealing with the Soviet Union. This is confirmed, in the Chinese view, by the recent changes in senior American personnel. The Chinese are also concerned by the weakness of the foreign affairs executive branch and by the resulting multiplicity of voices shaping American foreign policy.

It is interesting to observe that at the same time as the Chinese noted these changes in the United States, they also began to change their public way of analysing the internal Soviet system. Hitherto China had abused both America and Russia as superpowers, defining the term behaviourally as countries which bully, subvert and exploit others on a global scale. In early 1974 the Chinese began to identify the superpowers as countries in the grip of monopoly capitalism. Characteristically, the Soviet Union was regarded as the worst of the two. In the first place, monopoly capitalism was seen as the

in the state itself, and in the second place its economy was badly out of balance because of excessive militarization on too narrow a base. The Chinese began to point to the fact that the Soviet Union, with half the American GNP, was spending even more than America on arms.

The growing imbalance in the Soviet economy, which was regarded as one of the root causes of her alleged expansionism, was being countered by trade with the western countries. In China's view these countries were bound to be the object of the supposed Soviet expansionism sooner or later. The western countries, therefore, were seen as remarkably shortsighted and unclear as to where their true interests lay.

It seemed to the Chinese leaders that the circumstances of the 1930s were repeating themselves. The Chinese quite freely identified Brezhnev with Hitler and they compared the policies of the western leaders towards the Soviet Union with the policies of appeasement by the leaders of



France and Britain towards Hitler. In the Chinese view some of the west European countries are cutting down on defence while the Soviet Union is continually expanding her offensive capabilities. Like Hitler in the 1930s, Mr Brezhnev is said to make hollow proclamations about peace and the relaxations of tensions. The western leaders who signed the Munich documents in 1938 and who claimed to have brought "peace in our time" are said to have their counterparts who signed even more documents in Helsinki earlier this year. In Senator Jackson the Chinese are said to have found a latter day Churchill.

The Chinese today are concerned about the fragility of Nato's southern flank. Nearly all the countries there are fraught with conflicts. In addition to the Greek-Turkish Cyprus imbroglio the Chinese point to trouble spots in the Iberian peninsula and in the Mediterranean area as a whole

in which the Russians have already intervened. The Chinese refer to the members of the Portuguese Communist Party as "pro-Moscow elements" and they have identified many of the 105 Russians Mr Heath expelled from Britain for spying, as now operating freely in Lisbon. The Chinese are alarmed by what may happen in Yugoslavia after the death of Marshal Tito. Chinese commentators also frequently point to the alleged political and military pressures the Soviet Union is bringing to bear upon Norway and other north European countries as new and alarming developments.

In the Chinese view many of the western leaders do not recognize the true features of the present Soviet system and, in effect, they are appeasing the Soviet Union. It should be remembered, however, that the Chinese have long argued that the two superpowers are locked in permanent conflict

even though they may from time to time enter into transitory agreements. One question which arises from the Chinese analysis is how far can the Americans allow their position in Europe to be eroded before seeking to restore their position or making a stand? Once again the analogy with the pre-Second World War days is instructive. Britain declared war only when Hitler was judged to have gone too far. The declaration was made from a position of weakness after appeasement had failed. Could that situation arise again? Mr Heath has reported that the Britain of 1940 was very much on Chairman Mao's mind when he last saw him in September. In public, however, the Chinese maintain the Soviet Union is likely to initiate the war for internal reasons.

Seen in this light there is certainly more plausibility to the Chinese fears than there might seem at first sight. There

is no sign that the Chinese believe they would benefit from such a war. They may be accused of having a special interest in the case they plead, and they may be accused of exaggeration, but their advice on how to avoid the war is, in itself, unexceptionable. It is simply that the west European countries should be more united and better prepared to fight a war of resistance. The Chinese would also like to see even closer links between European and Third World countries as the latter are still seen as the major force for revolutionary change in international affairs.

While that may be unacceptable in the present mood in western Europe, the Chinese analysis clearly deserves more careful consideration than it seems to have received so far in the west.

**Michael B. Yahuda**

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LONDON TIMES

1 Dec. 1975

## WASHINGTON AND PEKING

President Ford's visit to China is the second by an American President within four years. Could any other capital in the world have entertained two American Presidents in so short a time without any reciprocal journey to Washington? To ask the question is to expose the character of the special relationship that has bound China and the United States for more than half a century. For most of that time each country has loomed larger in the other's sights, less by calculations of diplomatic power or military might than by sentiment. To the Chinese the United States became, early in this century, a model for modernization. American idealism found in China's progress its own national cause.

That era is fast disappearing. A new realism has been injected into Sino-American relations. The electoral gain that President Ford hopes to collect from this trip will be measurable but may be the last drawing on the old bank of sentiment. Eight visits by Dr Kissinger have shown that relations with China could be successfully exploited but that they were secondary to relations with Western Europe, the Soviet block and Japan. The real détente remains with Moscow. The western alliance and the uncertainty of Russian intentions will remain the focus of American thinking. For the moment, therefore, Mr Nixon's initiative has run out of steam. President Ford will not be able to conceal the fact that he has no business to discuss.

The most rewarding business for the Chinese would be an end to the interference in their affairs—as Peking calls it—

whereby a rival government of China survives in Taiwan and maintains an embassy in Washington. This justifies in diplomatic terms China's refusal to send any reciprocal visitor to Washington—though Mr Teng Hsiao-ping and Mr Chiao Kuan-hua, the Foreign Minister, have both attended the United Nations. Following the collapse in Vietnam last April, however, the Chinese acknowledge that American weakness precludes further retreat. The withdrawal of recognition from the government in Taiwan would not only damage the island's political cohesion (which the Chinese would foresee), but could have repercussions on South Korea and would be unsettling for Japan. Over such demands the Chinese are now willing to be patient and to await a more propitious time. In particular they are privately satisfied that the Japanese-American security treaty should stand.

But over the American relationship as a counter to Russian hostility the Chinese have shown themselves pressingly insistent. Détente with the Soviet Union is an illusion, they say; no concessions that are made will draw from Moscow a binding agreement. This argument has been urged on every Western European visitor and by almost all of them strongly resisted. It has been urged on all Americans and by Dr Kissinger in October bluntly rejected. The Americans would not allow their relations with Moscow to harm or divert those with Peking, said Dr Kissinger, but the United States would avoid "needless confrontations". Since his visit Mr Schlesinger's dismissal must have underlined

that determination. Having failed to convince Dr Kissinger Mr Teng Hsiao-ping will not now expect to shake President Ford. Relations are in a trough.

Perhaps it is not surprising that at a time of world economic recession the pursuit of mutual agreement between major powers should also be languishing. The Chinese should take comfort from the sluggishness of the dialogue between Washington and Moscow. With Mr Brezhnev's uncertain tenure that is not surprising. In Peking too it must be allowed that with Chairman Mao's dominance fading the time is hardly appropriate for a reordering of American priorities in the region. In both communist capitals—if the adjective may still serve to link them—the prospects of change call for some hesitation on the American side.

Yet Sino-American relations remain firmly based. The Shanghai communiqué hammered out on Mr Nixon's 1972 visit defined the understanding between the two countries. Both wish to reduce the danger of international military conflict: President Ford will underline that. Neither power seeks hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and each is opposed to efforts by any others to establish such hegemony: the Chinese will make great play with that. The angry words, the suspicions, the fears of war, the mutual charges of expansionism all run along the Sino-Soviet side of the triangle. The United States has the task of holding the balance in its relations with both powers. That is the steadying effect that can follow from President Ford's visit and from which many other countries may benefit.

# Latin America

NEW YORK TIMES  
30 Nov. 1975

## Juntas Move Right and The Church Is Now the Left

By JUAN de ONIS

BUENOS AIRES—The repressive police methods employed by the rightwing dictatorships in Brazil, Chile and Uruguay are provoking energetic protests from the strongest religious congregation in those countries, the Roman Catholic church.

The role of "witness of conscience" and of public criticism of human rights violations adopted by prominent Catholic authorities places the church in a controversial position in relation to the military rulers.

From a traditionally conservative and doctrinally anti-Communist point of view, the church leadership, pressed by progressive younger priests and laymen, has become the champion in these countries of human rights, political liberties, and social justice.

This has antagonized the military rulers, who claim that they seized power to preserve the "Christian values" of their societies from Marxist atheism and leftwing, revolutionary subversion.

Joined by fervent anti-Communist Catholic conservatives, who oppose progressive tendencies in the church, the military and the controlled press denounce what they identify as Communist infiltration of the clergy.

In Chile, a clash between security forces and guerrillas of the outlawed Revolutionary Left Movement in October was followed by evidence that priests and nuns, including several North Americans serving in Chile, had given refuge and medical assistance to fugitive guerrillas.

With this help, the two principal surviving leaders of the Revolutionary Left Movement Andres Pascal Allende, a nephew of the late Chilean President Salvador Allende Gossens, and Nelson Gutiérrez, who was wounded, were able to reach asylum in the residence of the Papal Nuncio and the Embassy of Costa Rica.

### Arrests and Expulsions

The Government ordered the expulsion of three North American priests and three nuns, and arrested at least six other priests accused of collaborating with the guerrillas.

The conflict broadened politically when Gen. Augusto Pinochet Ugarte the President of the Chilean junta, ordered the dissolution of an Inter-church Committee for Peace, which for two years has been the only source in Chile of legal and economic assistance to political prisoners and their families.

In defense of his priests, and of the unity of the Catholic church in Chile, Raul Cardinal Silva Henriquez, Archbishop of Santiago, issued the strongest attack yet heard in Chile

against police repression without judicial control against political dissenters.

Replying to Jaime Guzman, an adviser to General Pinochet, who accused the clergy of "complicity with subversion," the archbishop called for the restoration of "clear and firm juridical rules" for the arrest and trial of prisoners.

"Any other attitude would amount, in practice, to endorsing the establishment in Chile of a form of arbitrary justice which begins with the moral degradation of the accused and ends, almost inevitably, with their physical destruction," said the church statement.

This was a clear allusion to the charges, documented by the Committee for Peace, that hundreds of persons have been arrested in Chile, never to be found again, after being taken to prisons where some survivors have said they were severely tortured.

### A 'Suicide' Shocks Brazil

Similar arrests and torture, without any court order or legal defense, have been widespread in Brazil. The issue was dramatized last month when Vladimir Herzog, the news director of a television station in São Paulo, was found dead in a detention center a few hours after being arrested. He was declared a suicide and buried without an autopsy. Military authorities had forbidden one.

The death of Mr. Herzog, who was accused of being part of a Communist network, shocked public opinion in Brazil, and Archbishop Paulo Arne of São Paulo denounced the "flagrant lack of respect for the human person by those who declare that they are acting on Christian principles." The statement, read in all the parishes of São Paulo, one of the biggest Catholic communities in the world, was followed by a day of fasting and prayer for the restoration of respect for human rights.

In Uruguay, where military authorities have arrested hundreds in the past few weeks, the church has bowed to censorship imposed on a pastoral letter that was issued two weeks ago calling for restoration of democratic political rights.

The original draft of the pastoral letter had called for a "full amnesty" for political prisoners and the thousands of Uruguayans who have gone abroad under threat of repression. This was deleted after Uruguayan authorities reportedly threatened to expell all priests and nuns with foreign citizenship, who are numerous in Uruguay.

Church criticism of repression is based on the decision reached at the conference of Latin-American bishops attended by Pope Paul VI in Colombia in 1968. That conference reflected the progressive tendencies in the church for "liberation" of man in Latin America through active participation in political decisions, economic development and social justice.

These positions have been interpreted unevenly by the clergy. Conservative bishops and priests are still strongly attached to traditional ideas of authority, and have attacked so-called "Christian left" movements in the church, some of which support guerrilla groups and cooperate with Marxists.

But the predominant current in the church clearly feels that the future of Roman Catholicism in Latin America requires that the clergy take a stand for political liberties, and social reform, or run the risk of being isolated and abandoned by both educated youth and the economically deprived.

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# Neglecting the Latins

By Neal B. Freeman

SAO PAULO, Brazil—During a recent visit to this city I posed a question to the local press officer of United States Information Service: When was the last time that a United States President had visited Brazil?

He could not remember—could he call me back?

Well, I amended the question, when was the last time a President visited any part of South America? He would have to look it up.

Well, I didn't mean to cause any trouble; could he tell me when the peripatetic Henry A. Kissinger had last been spotted in these parts? Yes. The gentleman brightened. He had been in Venezuela just in the last few years. Oh, for a lengthy visit? It was really more a "matter of hours."

Perhaps we should be grateful for the Kissinger visit, even if it was for little more than a refueling stop. The last Presidential tour, if my clipping files are to be believed, was undertaken by Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Since then much has happened. For the United States, diplomacy has tended to harden along East-West lines. As if mesmerized by a global Ping-Pong match, we look first to Europe, the Middle East and the deepening Red currents of the Mediterranean; then to the Japanese miracle, the rubble of Indochina and the beguiling octogenarians of Peking.

In both directions, we launch conferences, initiatives, euphemisms and, in every third airplane, our gift-bearing Secretary of State. Surely all this money and moral energy must be yielding significant return. Surely.

While we have been reaping the rich harvest of this diplomacy, however, a few things have been happening along the North-South axis. Brazil, for one instance, has become an economic giant. No, it has not contrived a geometric expansion of the coffee-and-bananas economy. It is an industrial power, with a shot at surpassing West Germany and Japan by the end of the century.

The industrial hub of São Paulo, with a metropolitan population of ten million people, has become an international automotive center of the first rank. Its skilled workers will produce 900,000 cars this year. The performance in textiles, chemicals, electrical equipment and machinery is equally impressive. São Paulo remains a major exporter of sugar, cotton, beef, citrus and coffee. Since

1967, the annual growth rate of its economy has averaged 13 percent in real terms.

Nor is the São Paulo miracle unique. Much the same story could be told about Caracas and Mexico City. And given a political break, Buenos Aires, a dynamic metropolitan area of eight million persons, could quickly become one of the leading cities of the world.

Our neighbors to the South, as we have patronizingly dismissed them for years, are growing up. They have natural resources in abundance, growing populations and the kind of confident, gleam-in-the-eye ambition that once characterized their neighbors to the North.

To put the matter in the pragmatism of the day: Our neighbors are rich, smart and hungry. Yet, at least diplomatically, our policy seems to be one of benign neglect.

Amazingly, the South Americans do not hate us. Even their resentments, which are both inevitable and understandable, are well-controlled. With the exception of a handful of governments, we enjoy the residual good feelings of all social strata, from prime ministers and generals to workers and farmers. One could say without wild exaggeration that these people are not only our allies but our friends. How long they will remain so we cannot tell.

A modest suggestion, therefore. Sometime soon, before the political conventions, President Ford should carve out ten days to visit the great nations of South America. Caracas, Bogota, Brasilia, São Paulo and Buenos Aires would be "must" stops. The President would not be coming to deal. There would be nothing up his sleeve—no Phantoms, no wheat, no mutual reductions of military forces. He would be here to listen, learn and feel the friendship. It is my guess that he would respond in the most effective manner possible—with warm and affectionate good nature.

If his domestic forays to Hartford, Milwaukee and San Francisco have been unsuccessful, it is because they have been perceived as political exercises. A friendship tour with no strings attached, by contrast, would be perceived as a gesture of hemispheric solidarity.

All of America, North and South, would be the winner. It might even spare a future Secretary of State some of the perils of shuttle diplomacy.

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